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ABSTRACT
This work is an assessment of the administration of 
Count Alejandro O'Reilly as governor of Louisiana from Au­
gust, 1769, to March, 1770. O'Reilly was a soldier of for­
tune who rose to the rank of lieutenant general in the Span­
ish army and was made Inspector General of Infantry in 1764. 
He was chosen by Charles III to bring Spanish rule to Loui­
siana after the 1768 insurrection of the French settlers in 
New Orleans. This uprising had resulted in the expulsion 
of the first Spanish .governor, Antonio de Ulloa, who had 
come to take possession of the colony after its' transfer 
from France to Spain by the Treaty of Fontainebleau in No­
vember, 1762. Because of O'Reilly's execution of the main 
leaders of the rebellion in New Orleans, much abuse was 
heaped upon him by unsympathetic historians until well into 
the twentieth century.
This study is introduced by a brief analysis of the his­
toriography covering these events. Next, there is an intro­
ductory chapter dealing with the transfer of the colony 
from France to Spain and Governor Ulloa's administration, 
which ended in his expulsion in October, 1768.
The main body of the work covers Governor O'Reilly's
arrival in Louisiana, in August, 1769, the trial of the rebel
leaders, and the governor's administration of the colony.
Considerable space has been devoted to an analysis of the
iv
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trial proceedings, which are found in the Archives of the In­
dies in Seville and in the National Historical Archives in 
Madrid. The reader can determine from these proceedings 
whether or not the trial was conducted fairly by eighteenth 
century Spanish standards.
The Indian policy adopted by O ’Reilly and continued by 
his successors also comes under study. In connection with 
this, O'Reilly's plans for Louisiana's military posture 
within the Spanish American Empire has been outlined. The 
weaknesses and strengths of these policies are shown in re­
lation to the use made of them by the subsequent Spanish 
governors of Louisiana.
This study also treats the social and commercial prob­
lems under O'Reilly, and analyzes his fiscal and commercial 
policies in the light of the subsequent history of Spanish 
Louisiana. The inadequacies of some of these policies are 
noted.
O'Reilly's most important contribution to Louisiana was 
the Code 0 'Reilly. This code was a synthesis of Spain's Laws 
of the Indies. and was compiled under O'Reilly's direction 
by two of his lawyers, Felix del Rey and Jose Manuel de Urru- 
tia. Although intended to be temporary, it served the colony 
until Spain returned Louisiana to France in 1803.
The brief epilogue covers the highlights of O'Reilly's 
career from his return to Spain in June, 1770, until his
vi
death in March, 1794. He was Inspector General of Infantry 
until 1783 and served as governor of Madrid, Andalusia, and 
Cadiz, retiring from the last post in 1786. The crown sum­
moned him in 1794 to take command of the Army of the Pyrenees, 
but he died en route at Murcia (Chincilla).
INTRODUCTION
On August 18, 1769, the French flag was lowered in the 
Place d'Armes (today Jackson Square) in the city of New Or­
leans. In its place was raised the banner of the Spanish 
monarch Charles III. Thus began the brief but important 
administration of Lieutenant General Don Alejandro O'Reilly 
as the second Spanish governor of Louisiana.
O'Reilly had been sent by Charles III to restore Span­
ish authority in the newly acquired colony of Louisiana. 
Developments in that colony after the arrival of Don Anto­
nio de Ulloa, Spain's first governor of Louisiana, had led 
to an insurrection in October, 176 8, and to Ulloa's subse­
quent expulsion. When O'Reilly came to Louisiana in 1769 
to establish Spanish rule, he had the leaders of the rebel­
lion tried and six of them were condemned to death.
In spite of the attempt of a number of historians in 
recent times to exonerate O'Reilly for his treatment of 
the insurrectionists, one still hears him popularly re­
ferred to as "Bloody O'Reilly." In order to put the Span­
ish governor's actions in proper perspective, it would be 
appropriate to examine critically the attitudes of leading 
historians of Louisiana from the beginning of the nine­
teenth century to the present. These illustrate a variety
of views and interpretations: some indicate judgments based
on obvious prejudice or lack of knowledge of sources; others
adopt more ienient or vindicating positions.
As early as 1830 a bitter attack was made upon O'Reilly
and upon Spanish justice by the French historian, Francois
Barb£-Marbois. Referring to the governor, he wrote:
...The Spanish general, O'Reilly, replaced Don An­
tonio de Ulloa. ... O'Reilly was an enemy of recon- 
ciliatory measures, a warrior of reputation in his 
profession, and thought a colony might be governed 
even more despotically than a conquered country.
The barbarian indulged in acts of violence and fe­
rocity which he mistook for prudence and firmness,
... Scaffolds were erected in New Orleans. Six 
colonists paid by their heads for the courage with 
which they had manifested their attachment to France.
  The Court of Madrid secretly disapproved of these
acts of outrage; but fearing to endanger the author­
ity of its governors it abstained frcm condemning 
O'Reilly and even from disavowing him by an authen­
tic act.-*-
Barbe-Marbois either ignored or was unaware of certain vi­
tal documents covering the events that had occurred at New 
Orleans and at Madrid. That the French historian might 
have been misinformed concerning the most critical facts in 
the case is evident, as at least two readily discernible er­
rors illustrate. First, his comments concerning a secret 
disapproval of O'Reilly's actions by Charles III and his 
court are without foundation. Neither Barbe-Marbois nor
■'•Francois Barbe-Marbois, A History of Louisiana (Phila­
delphia, 1830), pp. 137-138.
anyone else has ever located any document proving this as­
sertion. On the contrary, materials used by the Califor­
nia historian, David K. Bjork, in 1923, and the Spanish his­
torian, Rodriguez-Casado, in 1942, are quoted in this study 
and show conclusively that the king and his advisors approved 
the general's actions in Louisiana. Second, Barbe-Marbois 
said that O'Reilly had 3,000 soldiers with him when he ar­
rived in New Orleans in August of 1769. The records, how­
ever, clearly indicate that the exact number of men under the 
general's command was 2,056.2
A realistic explanation for this historian's attitude 
toward O'Reilly and the Spanish is Barb^-Marbois' sympathy 
for his fellow Frenchmen in Louisiana. Nevertheless, it 
is difficult to understand how he could accuse O'Reilly of 
barbarism when only six men were condemned to death for 
treason in an insurrection in which a large portion of the 
population of New Orleans and its environs was involved.
Another writer who attacked the Spanish general was 
Francois Xavier Martin, Chief -Justice of the Louisiana Su­
preme Court in the early nineteenth century. He pronounced
^Ibid., p. 137. See the letter of Bucareli to Arriaga, 
Havana, July 7, 1769, Archivo General de Indias, Audiencia 
de Santo Domingo (hereinafter cited as A.G.I.S.D.), 80-1-6. 
The document, in the Bancroft Library, Louisiana Collection, 
has been translated and printed in Lawrence Kinnaird (ed.), 
Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 1765-1794, Vols. II-IV of 
the American Historical Association's Annual Report for 1945 
(3 parts; Washington, D.C., 1946-1949), Pt. 1, p. 137.
nearly as severe a judgment on O’Reilly as had Barbe-Mar­
bois. Martin wrote:
...Posterity, the judge of men in power, will doom 
this act to public execration. No necessity de­
manded, no policy justified it. Ulloa's conduct 
provoked the measures to which the inhabitants re­
sorted. During nearly two (sic) years he had haunted 
the province as a phantom of dubious authority. ...
If the indiscretion of a few of them needed an apol­
ogy, the common misfortune afforded it.3
His statement and others similar to it reflect an uncriti­
cal attitude. How can treason be called an act of "indis­
cretion"?
Even in the first part of the twentieth century, his­
torians in Louisiana were still condemning O'Reilly. Al- 
cee Fortier, a well known Louisiana historian, maintained 
that the general deserved the title, "Bloody O'Reilly," 
which had been given him by the people of Louisiana. For­
tier accused the Spanish governor of violating King 
Charles' desire that clemency be accorded the rebels.4 He 
agreed with Martin that nothing could excuse the governor' 
"cruelty"
^Francois Xavier Martin, A History of Louisiana (New
Orleans, 1829), pp. 208-209.
4 In her analysis of Fortier, Dr. Jo Ann Carrigan does 
not agree with Fortier and shows that the revisionist 
studies of this era disprove Fortier's assertion. Cf. Al- 
cee Fortier, A History of Louisiana (Vol. I, 2d ed.; Baton 
Rouge, 1966), pp. 334-335.
^Alcee Fortier, A History of Louisiana (4 vols.: 
New York, 1904), I, 227-229.
As late as 1922, Henry Plauche Dart, a Louisiana attor­
ney and legal historian, was continuing the myth of "Bloody 
O'Reilly." He went to the extreme of calling the governor 
the "hired executioner" of Charles III. Without offering 
proofs, he accused O'Reilly of having come to Louisiana with 
a predetermination to find the leaders of the rebellion 
guilty.^ A careful study of the general's correspondence 
with the Spanish Minister of State, the Marques de Grimal­
di, and with El Baylio, Frey Don Julian de Arriaga, Secre­
tary of State for the Indies, ahould have been made by Dart. 
Had he read O'Reilly's account of his meeting with the 
rebel leaders aboard the Spanish frigate Palas, and the ac­
count of the arrest and trial of the insurrectionists, he 
could not have drawn such conclusions.
Popular writers and-authors of text books of Louisiana 
history were also infected by this anti-Spanish bias.
Among the literary figures George Washington Cable is typi­
cal. In a work on the Creole families of Louisiana, he un- 
questioningly accepted the anti-Spanish interpretation.
He stated that the sobriquet, "Cruel O'Reilly," was one 
merited by the Spanish governor, and he could find no ex­
cuse for the execution of the rebel leaders.7
^Henry Plauche Dart, "Remy's Lost History of Louisi­
ana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, Vol. V (January.
1922) ,“p. "15.------  ----- -------
^George Washington Cable, The Creoles of Louisiana 
(New York, 1884), pp. 74-75.
Other writers who followed Cable's lead were John Fick- 
len and Grace E. King. In their collaborative work on Loui­
siana history, they espoused the "patriot-martyr" theme for 
the executed rebels. With pathos they wrote: "All the Cre­
oles wept over the sad fate of the patriots, and prayed 
O'Reilly to spare their lives. But nothing could move him." 
And while they blamed the French commandant and acting gov­
ernor, Charles Philippe Aubry, more than they did the Span­
ish general, still they most heartily condemned the latter 
for the "deceptive" manner in which he chose to arrest the
Orebel leaders when he called them to his residence.
Writing in the early twentieth century, Marc Villiers 
du Terrage, a French nobleman, condemned the Spanish sys­
tem rather than O'Reilly. He considered the general a mere 
instrument of the Spanish empire. While admitting that the 
Spanish had the right to try the rebels, Terrage held that
death for treason in this instance was cruel and the Spanish
9legal system ruthless. If one accepts Terrage's thesis, 
then all nations are guilty of cruelty, for death is the 
normal penalty for treason.
8John R. Ficklen and Grace E. King, Stories from 
Louisiana History (New Orleans, 1905), pp. 240, 243.
9
Marc Villiers du Terrage, Les Dernieres Annees de la 
Louisiane Frangaise (Paris, 1903), p. 318.
The most impartial view of the Spanish and of O'Reilly 
was made by Charles Etienne Gayarr^, a nineteenth century 
Louisiana historian. Considering the events that occurred 
in New Orleans in 1769 in the light of the standards pre­
vailing in all of the European nations at that time, he 
stated:
...To judge fairly of the feelings and ideas of these 
men, we must transport ourselves back to the days in 
which they lived; we must adopt the turn of mind which 
education, habits and associations had given them, and 
we must become impregnated with the political, social 
and moral atmosphere in which they had been born. ...
It is not astonishing, therefore, that both Aubry and 
O'Reilly should have honestly thought that, to pick 
out of the rebellious colonists twelve leaders only, 
...was an extremely merciful act. Besides, there is 
no doubt that O'Reilly was moved by considerations of 
policy; ... and above all it was expedient to set a 
salutary example before the other colonies...
These observations are notable for their fairness, and they 
stand out in near isolation in the midst of the bitter at­
tacks on O'Reilly that lasted into the second quarter of 
the twentieth century. Unfortunately, since Gayarre was 
the grandson of O'Reilly's comptroller, this interpretation 
was dismissed as the product of pro-Spanish bias. Actually, 
Gayarre's work is based on a remarkably thorough study of 
documents from the Spanish archives.
By the mid-1920's, the historiographical attitude to­
ward O'Reilly began to reverse itself. In 1925 the histor- 
an, Henry Edward Chambers, in his multi-volume work on
■^Charles Etienne Gayarre, A History of Louisiana (New 
Orleans, 1866), II, 345-347.
Louisiana, shifted the blame for the death of the "patriots" 
away from the Spanish governor and laid it on the shoulders 
of Aubry. He maintained that "O'Reilly came to the colony 
with a predetermined course of action laid out for him," and 
stated that the Spanish governor accepted as a matter of 
course the suppression of the rebellion and the punishment 
of its leaders. Chambers contended that O'Reilly was com­
pelled by circumstances to make an example of the leaders of 
the insurrection, lest other Spanish colonials rebel. The 
bulk of the blame was laid upon Aubry. Chambers asserted 
that Aubry, in a calculated manner, had kept Ulloa and the 
colonial leaders from coming to terms, and that Aubry had 
inserted between them a "wedge of misunderstanding and mu­
tual antagonism," thus causing the rebellion. He concluded 
that: "If the blood of the martyred Lafreniere and his com­
panions calls aloud for vengeance, it is the shade (sic) of 
Aubry and not that of O'Reilly that must heed the call."H
In the 1930's other historians continued the trend to­
ward removing the blame from O'Reilly for his actions in 
punishing the rebel leaders. Another Louisiana historian, 
James E. Winston, who relied mostly on secondary materials 
supplemented by a few documents, attempted to prove that the 
Spanish general was not vindictive and that he had not vio­
lated the instructions of Charles III. Nevertheless, he
■^Henry Edward Chambers, A History of Louisiana (3 vols. 
New York, 1925), I, 291-292.
maintained that O'Reilly should have been more merciful, as
no one had lost his life in the insurrection against Ulloa;
he deplored the "inquisitorial" manner in which the trial
was conducted, and he stated that the leaders were presumed
guilty. He also asserted that force had been used in ob-
12taining the confessions of the accused. Had he used all 
of the documents, Winston would have learned that neither 
of the two latter assertions was correct. Moreover, to 
call the Spanish trial procedures "inquisitorial" was to 
judge eighteenth century Spanish procedure by twentieth 
century American standards. This is righteous indignation, 
not historical analysis.
Writing in the early 1930's, David Knuth Bjork pub­
lished a work on Spain in North America. In this volume he 
incorporated much of his doctoral dissertation on the early 
Spanish era in Louisiana. Through a careful examination of 
many documents he proved that the Spanish monarch approved 
of O'Reilly's actions in Louisiana, and that the general
13had indeed faithfully carried out the king's instructions.
12James E. Winston, "The Causes and Results ofi—the Rev­
olution of 1768," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, Vol. XV, 
No. 2 (April, 1932), pp. 197-213.
13David Knuth Bjork, "Alejandro O'Reilly and the Span­
ish Occupation of Louisiana, 1769-1770," in New Spain and 
the Anglo-American West, ed.,by George P. Hammond (2 vols.; 
Lancaster, Pa., 1932), I, 181-182.
10
Another prominent historian of the Spanish colonial era 
in North America, John Walter Caughey, writing during the 
1930's, agreed with Bjork's position. He asserted that 
O'Reilly had followed instructions, and that in judging his 
actions one must use eighteenth century Spanish norms, not 
the more "refined" ones of twentieth century America.
In 1942 the Spanish historian, Vicente Rodriguez-Casado, 
carefully studied Spain's first years in Louisiana. It was 
his view that O'Reilly was acting in complete accord with 
the king's commands. He further noted the heavy emphasis 
placed on economic factors by the rebels themselves in their 
"Memorial" justifying the insurrection.^
In spite of the attempts of these scholars to put 
O'Reilly's administration of the colony and the trial and 
execution of the rebels in proper historical perspective, 
the myth of "Bloody O'Reilly" has not completely disap­
peared from general works still in use. As late as 1949,
G. W. McGinty, in a text on Louisiana history, perpetuated 
the myth. He accused O'Reilly of a predetermination to 
make an example of the rebel leaders, and of deceit when,
John Walton Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez in Louisianaana,
15vicente Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacron 
espanola en la Luisiana (Madrid, 1942) , pp” T§2~-T$7~.
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without warning, according to him, O'Reilly arrested the 
leaders at his residence in New Orleans.16 In short, he 
merely repeated earlier attacks on the Spanish governor.
Fortunately, by 1960 the most widely used text in Lou­
isiana history, that of Edwin A. Davis, reflected the revi­
sionist interpretation of O'Reilly. This prominent Louisi­
ana historian flatly rejected the "martyr-patriot" motif.
He stressed, even more than Rodriguez-Casado, the economic 
issues that prompted the French planters and merchants of 
New Orleans to rebel against Ulloa. The "Memorial" issued 
by these merchants and inhabitants of New Orleans, as will 
be shown, certainly gives great substance to Davis' position. 
Moreover, Davis unqualifiedly asserts that O'Reilly was an 
honorable man who justly executed the leaders of a rebel­
lion against legitimate Spanish authority.-*-7
In a new edition of Fortier's History of Louisiana, 
edited by Jo Ann Carrigan of Louisiana State University, a 
new analysis of Fortier's "principle and rights" theory is 
•made. Dr. Carrigan notes that Fortier's assertion that the 
colonists loved both France and liberty seems to be a con­
tradiction. However, the contradiction is only apparent, 
she asserts, for the colonists hoped to regain their former
l^Garnie William McGinty, A History of Louisiana (New 
York, 1949), pp. 72-73.
l^Edwin A. Davis, The Story of Louisiana (Baton Rouge. 
1960), I, 106. -------------
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de facto independence of the years immediately preceding 
Ulloa's arrival by returning to the laissez-faire rule of 
France. The rebel leaders, she noted, had become free in 
practice, and exercised a self-rule similar to the British 
colonists in America. Just as the British Americans struck 
for their "rights" in 1776, so had the Louisiana rebels of 
1768. They claimed they were fighting for their liberties, 
which they indeed had acquired through the neglect of the 
French government, especially during the Seven Years War. 
These "rights" had in effect become their "fundamental 
rights and liberties." This analysis seems to put Dr. Car­
rigan on the fringe of the revisionist school.
In view of historians' diverse interpretations of 
O'Reilly's career in Louisiana, an impartial study of the 
man and his achievements is essential to an accurate and 
objective appraisal of his regime. This work does not pro­
pose to be another polemic. It is intended to provide a 
more detailed account of the Spanish governor's activities 
in the former French colony than is presently available. 
Moreover, greater use has been made of manuscript sources 
collected in the Spanish and American archives and libraries. 
It will be demonstrated that Governor O'Reilly had full power 
to act as he did, and that he was neither vindictive nor
■^Fortier, A History of Louisiana. I (2d ed.), 344-
345.
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deceitful in his handling of the rebels, having been in­
structed to establish Spanish power in Louisiana, and to 
punish those responsible for the expulsion of Governor 
Ulloa.
A considerable part of the dissertation will examine 
O’Reilly's policies, which were aimed at the creation of a 
sound foundation for Spanish rule. As will be shown, these 
policies laid the basis for an examplary legal system and 
for the promotion of prosperity through commerce and agri­
culture. In these respects his influence in the colony 
was lasting.
Alejandro O'Reilly's contributions to the future of 
the former French colony evidence the conclusion that he 
was one of the most capable governors of Louisiana during 
the period of Spanish domination.
I
THE CESSION OF LOUISIANA TO SPAIN BY FRANCE,
AND THE FIRST ATTEMPT BY THE SPANISH 
TO EFFECT OCCUPATION
During the course of the Seven Years War, the French 
Court resolved to rid itself of the vast colony of Louisi­
ana. By 1761 it had become apparent that when peace came, 
France might lose to the British all of her possessions in 
North America. From an economic point of view, the loss of 
Louisiana would have been an asset. The colony had been a 
constant disappointment to the crown from the earliest days 
of settlement. Its costs had been excessive to Antoine 
Crozat who had been granted the concession to settle Louis­
iana in 1712. Consequent to his failure to regain his in­
vestment from Louisiana, he had successfully petitioned the 
king, in 1717, to revoke his concession. Later that year 
the notorious John Law received the Louisiana concession.
He was soon bankrupt, as were many of his fellow investors, 
and although he was ousted in 1720, the company that he had 
organized controlled Louisiana until 1731. In that same 
year, Louisiana became a Crown colony; but the Louisiana 
venture was also an economic failure for the French king.
In spite of this failure from the economic standpoint, 
Louisiana had served the French for decades as a buffer to
English expansion across the North American continent below 
the Great Lakes. By 1761 it was almost a certainty that 
Canada would be demanded by England as the price for peace. 
This might lead to Britain’s eventual absorption of Louisi­
ana, and this would greatly enhance the power of the Brit­
ish Empire. The French Minister of State, the Duke of Choi- 
seul, realized, therefore, that he must consider means of 
preventing this from occurring. The Marquis D1Ossun, the 
French ambassador to Spain, suggested to Choiseul that the 
French government might persuade some Canadians to migrate 
to Louisiana, thereby leaving England fewer people in Can­
ada. However, a majority of these settlers preferred to re­
main in their secure homes rather than venture into a wild­
erness. This idea having failed, Choiseul then next pro­
posed changing Louisiana's boundary so that it would include 
within its territory those parts of Canada most vital to the 
French fur trade.̂  This plan also proved unworkable.
The final phase of the discussion over the future of 
Louisiana evolved from another suggestion of the Marquis 
D ’Ossun. He sent a communique to Choiseul telling him that 
Charles III of Spain was desirous of possessing that colony. 
Consequently, there began a series of negotiations with the 
Spanish in 1761 to effect the transfer of Louisiana to 
Spain. Affecting these negotiations was the Family Compact
■̂ -Eliia W. Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy (Norman. 
1934), pp. 16-19.
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between the French and Spanish Bourbons, signed on August 
15, 1761. This compact, the work of Choiseul, was designed 
to provide a needed ally for France in her war with England. 
The French Minister of State offered Louisiana to Charles 
III provided he would make a much needed loan to the French 
and subsequently enter the war against England. In 1761 
Charles refused to make the loan, as his bullion vessels 
had not arrived from America. Moreover, he flatly refused 
to enter the war before May of 1762. Hence, the proposed 
cession of Louisiana to Spain did not occur in 1761.
Meanwhile Spain had been offering to act as a peace­
maker between France and England, thereby hoping to per­
suade the British to return Gibraltar and Minorca to her 
for this service. This gesture was refused by the English.
In the interim, the Spanish had been giving open aid to the 
French, which led England to declare war on Spain on Janu­
ary 2, 1762. This immediately removed Louisiana from the 
diplomatic scene as an offering by the French to involve 
Spain in the war and its status was then even more uncertain.
In the course of the year 1762, the British overwhelmed 
the French and also began to inflict serious defeats on the 
Spanish in the colonial areas. By August, 1762, France was 
compelled to make peace overtures to Great Britain, but be­
cause of the Family Compact, she could not accept a peace 
without the consent of the Spanish. Delay was dangerous.
The French Ministry again offered Louisiana to the Spanish, 
but this time to end the war, not to enter it. Spanish 
misfortune came to the aid_of the French, for on September 
29, 1762, the fortress of Havana fell to the British. Since 
Britain had already occupied the Floridas to the Mississippi, 
the French offer of Louisiana to Charles seemed to provide 
the necessary protection for New Spain against English ex­
pansion. It was, in effect, the only plausible solution 
for Spain at the time. The Spanish Court did not consider 
the loss of the Floridas serious, and as Havana was to be 
returned by the British, the remaining problem of a buffer 
zone was resolved by the French cession of Louisiana to 
Spain. Consequently, the three nations signed a preliminary 
agreement that was ratified in the Treaty of Paris in 1763.^
The treaty of cession for the colony took place sec­
retly. It was signed by Louis XV of France at Fontaine­
bleau on November 23, 1762, and by the Spanish plenipoten­
tiary, the Marquis of Grimaldi, ambassador to France, on No­
vember 25, 1762.3 By January of 1763, France had prepared 
a notice of the treaty for delivery to the colonists in Loui­
siana, but, upon the insistence of the Spanish Court, this 
was not then dispatched.
2Ibid., pp. 22-34. See also, Arthur S. Aiton, "The 
Diplomacy of the Louisiana Cession," American Historical 
Review, XXXVI (1931), pp. 701-720.
^Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy, p. 39.
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In May of 1763, the Duke of Choiseul urged the Spanish 
to take possession of their new territory. In spite of 
this suggestion and later ones, it was not until January 
of 1764 that the Spanish Court took any action. Moreover, 
it was not until April 21, 1764, after some unexplained de­
lays by the French, that the documents of transfer were 
signed and delivered to the Spanish diplomats in Paris. On 
that same day, a letter was sent by the Duke of Choiseul to 
Director-General Abbadie of Louisiana, informing him and the 
colonists of the formal transfer of Louisiana to Spain.^
It is evident that both governments were responsible 
for delaying the actual transfer of the colony, but Spain 
found further cause for delaying the actual occupation.
The Spanish felt that they needed a large contingent of 
troops to send to Louisiana to effect possession. At that 
time, most of the Spanish troops were deployed elsewhere as 
a part of the program of restoration of those fortifications 
that had suffered during the war that had just ended. Choi­
seul offered a solution to this problem by suggesting that 
the French--soldiers in Louisiana could enlist in the Spanish
army. This provect'-fĉ  be acceptable to the Spanish Court,
and an apparent obstacle was removed.^
^Fortier, A History of Louisiana, I, 148-150.
5Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy, pp. 40-43.
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The final step preparatory to occupation was taken in 
May, 1765, when Charles III appointed Don Antonio de Ulloa, 
Captain of the Royal Spanish Navy, the first Spanish gover­
nor of Louisiana.^
Ulloa was born on January 12, 1716, in Seville, the son 
of Bernardo de Ulloa y Sousa, an economist. Besides being 
a naval officer, Don Antonio was a well-known scientist who 
had made two extensive journeys in Spanish America. He had 
been a member of a scientific expedition sponsored by the 
French Academy of Science in the late 1730's and early 
1740's. His role in that venture was published as A Voyage 
to South America. At the same time he was authorized, along 
with Jorge Juan y Santacilla, also a member of the expedi­
tion, to study the conditions that existed in the viceroy­
alty of Peru. The observations of these two men were re­
ported to Philip V of Spain in a confidential paper in 1749, 
which was later published in 1826 as the Noticias Secretas 
de America.? Later Ulloa served as the governor of Huanca- 
velica in the viceroyalty of Peru from 1758 to 1764.®
®Ulloa's Appointment, Aranjuez, May 21, 1765, A.G.I. 
S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 32, L.C., p. 3.
7Arthur P. Whitaker, "Antonio de Ulloa," Hispanic Amer­
ican Historical Review (May, 1935), pp. 155-183"!
Sjohn Preston Moore, "Antonio de Ulloa: A Profile of
the First Spanish Governor of Louisiana," Louisiana History, 
VIII, No. 3 (Summer, 1967), 196.
After Ulloa's service as governor of Louisiana, he was 
again called to duty in the Royal Navy. In 1777-78, he had
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In the meantime the colonists of Louisiana had learned 
in October of 1764 of the cession of that area to Spain. 
Prominent men in the colony called for a meeting of the 
Superior Council of the colony,  ̂to discuss this event.
Among those present at this meeting were Nicholas Chauvin 
de Lafreniere, Procurator General (Attorney General) of the 
colony, and Jean Milhet, one of the richest merchants in New 
Orleans. Lafreniere suggested that a delegation be sent to 
France to petition Louis XV to revoke the cession. The Su­
perior Council agreed with Lafreniere, selecting Jean Milhet 
to carry the petition to Louis XV. Upon his arrival in 
France, Milhet sought out the father of Louisiana, Jean Bap­
tiste Le Moyne, Sieur de Bienville. By his good graces, an 
audience was secured with the Duke of Choiseul. Although 
Choiseul intimated his understanding of the feelings of the 
French of New Orleans, nonetheless he told the delegates 
that the, cession of the colony was a fait accompli. After
the responsibility for the direction of the flota, or fleet, 
to New Spain which brought back to Spain one of the richest 
cargoes of the eighteenth century. For his lack of success 
in commanding his squadron in 1779 against the British, he 
was court-martialed but was acquitted. He served in the 
Navy for the remaining years of his life as a vice-admiral 
(teniente general de la armada). He died on July 5, 1795, 
at the age of 79. Whitaker, "Antonio de Ulloa," Hispanic 
American Historical Review (May, 1935), pp. 186-188.
^The Superior Council was a governmental organ in New 
Orleans having judicial and legislative powers. It resem­
bled the Spanish Cabildp, but was much more powerful. Its 
members were appointed by the French king from among the 
influential planters and merchants of the New Orleans area.
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considerable delay in France, Milhet finally returned to 
Louisiana in 1767 to report the sad news of his failure to 
his fellow colonists.
While Milhet was away on his journey, further delays 
by Spain in taking possession of Louisiana gave some of the 
inhabitants of that colony ample time to imagine the worst 
at the hands of their new rulers. They feared that the ar­
rival of the Spanish would mean the end of their freedom 
which had increased progressively during the long years of 
their isolation. France, moreover, had never exerted a 
strict control over Louisiana and had, by necessity, been 
extremely lax during the Seven Years War. Unfortunately, 
the colonists did not know the ultimate intentions of the 
Spanish monarch in their regard, for their new governor had 
been instructed to leave, for the time being, their local 
customs and institutions as undisturbed as possible, conso­
nant with Spanish sovereignty. Governor Ulloa had been giv­
en the following orders by Charles III:
... I have decided that in this new acquisition, for 
the present, no change in the system of government 
shall be undertaken, and consequently, that in no way 
shall it be subject to the laws and practices observed 
in my dominion of the Indies, but that it shall be re­
garded as a separate colony, even with respect to all 
trade between them. It is my will that, ... everything
^Gayarre, A History of Louisiana, I, 127, 180-181; 
Fortier, A History of Louisiana, I, 151, 159.
pertaining to it shall go through the Ministry of
State, ...
These instructions had come to Ulloa in Havana, where 
he awaited his new assignment from the king. He had come 
to Havana in February, 1765, arriving there from Callao, 
Peru. His term as governor of Huancavelica, from 1758 to 
1764, had not been successful. Due to powerful interest 
groups, among which were the Viceroy of Peru and the members 
of the Audiencia of Peru, he had failed to achieve his goal 
in Peru, which was the revitalization of its silver min­
ing. I2
Further preparations for the occupation of Louisiana 
continued during 1765. Subsequent to receiving the royal 
Cedula appointing him governor, Ulloa was advised by the 
Marques de Grimaldi, Spanish Minister of State, that the 
commander of the frigate, La Liebre, would be at his ser­
vice and would meet him in Havana.^ The captain of that 
frigate had been ordered to accompany the new governor of 
Louisiana and tc remain there as long as Ulloa required 
the services of the frigate. Moreover, the captain carried
■^Cedula of Ulloa's Appointment as Governor of Louisi­
ana, Aranjuez, May 21, 1765, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, L.C., 
p. 3.
^Moore, "Antonio de Ulloa," Louisiana History, VIII, 
No. 3, 191-192.
l^Ulloa sailed on the Volante, a smaller vessel, as 
he feared the frigate, La Liebre, might be too large to 
safely negotiate the passage at the mouth of the Mississ­
ippi . Ibid.
23
with him further instructions for Ulloa from the king, in­
forming the newly appointed governor of the procedures to 
be followed in taking possession of Louisiana.^4
After receiving his appointment as governor of Louisi­
ana, Ulloa took steps to carry out his new assignment. In 
July, 1765, he wrote to the Superior Council of New Orleans, 
notifying them of his appointment as governor.̂  He then 
made preparations for his journey to New Orleans. However, 
it was not until January 17 of the following year that he, 
his officials, and his small military contingent set sail.
The Spaniards arrived in New Orleans on March 5, 
where Ulloa was greeted by the French commandant and acting- 
governor, Charles Philippe Aubry. Aubry had succeeded Dir­
ector-General Abbadie, who had died suddenly on February 4, 
1765.16 Through Aubry, as a result of circumstances unfore­
seen by the Spanish Court, Ulloa governed Louisiana during 
his entire stay in the colony.
Among the many difficulties facing the new governor 
was the shortage of troops. From the time of his arrival
l4Grimaldi to Ulloa, Madrid, July 3, 1765, Archivo 
General de Indias, Papeles de Cuba (hereinafter cited as
A.G.I.P.C.), Legajo 174, Doc. 185, in Kinnaird, Spain in 
the Mississippi Valley, pp. 2-3.
1 C  /-‘•-’Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 130.
l^Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy, p. 44, citing 
Archivo Historico Nacional (hereinafter cited as A.H.N.), 
Papeles de Estado, 3883, Exp. 3, Doc. 7, Fol. 631.
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in Louisiana, until he unceremoniously departed in October 
of 1768, this problem plagued Ulloa. He had brought with 
him about ninety Spanish soldiers, anticipating many enlist­
ments among the French troops yet stationed in Louisiana. 
Contrary to Choiseul's and Ulloa's hopes, these enlistments 
did not materialize. This was due in part, however, to the 
interpretation which Ulloa decided to place upon his orders 
to pay the Spanish and the French soldiers equally. He 
adapted the pay scale to the French regulations which called 
for seven livres per month. The Spanish scale was 35 livres 
per month, and had Ulloa used this scale he might well have 
recruited enough volunteers. In a letter of May 24, 1766, 
this matter was corrected. In the king's name, the Marques 
de Grimaldi granted Ulloa permission to pay all Louisiana 
troops according to the higher Spanish rate for troops 
serving in the Indies.^
Unfortunately, this change came too late to help Ulloa. 
He noted in a communique to Antonio Bucareli, Captain-Gen­
eral and Governor of Cuba, that despite the higher wages 
the French regulars by that time were unwilling to enlist 
in the Spanish army. With more liberality Ulloa might have 
solved his troop problem from the beginning. Ulloa further
^Grimaldi to Ulloa, Aranjuez, May 24, 1766, A.G.I.P.C., 
Legajo 174, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 
pp. 5-10.
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noted that, in order to carry out his instructions in Louis­
iana, and to be an effective governor, "... there is no oth­
er recourse than to bring the troops from Spain. Not­
withstanding this initial misjudgment, Ulloa realized, and 
stated, the positive need for a large Spanish contingent to 
control the colony effectively.
In retrospect it is clear that the absence of a powerful 
military force was the key factor in making a rebellion pos­
sible in Louisiana. Not only did Ulloa see the need for 
this force, but Charles Aubry felt that without it he could 
not formally transfer the colony to Ulloa at the capital city 
of New Orleans. It was Aubry's influence that convinced 
Ulloa not to attempt to take formal possession there.19
Also of considerable importance in setting the stage 
for the rebellion against Ulloa was the decision of the Span­
ish Court to enforce certain typical Spanish mercantile re­
strictions on the trade of the Louisianians. One of these 
decrees, dated May 6, 1766, was promulgated in New Orleans 
for Ulloa by Aubry on September 6, 1766. It restricted the
l^Ulloa to Bucareli, New Orleans, August 31, 1766,
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 1055, ibid., pp. 12-13.
l ^ G a y a r r e ' s  analysis seems to be correct when he says 
that Aubry used this argument with Ulloa to delay the trans­
fer. Cf. Gayarr£, History of Louisiana, II, 162. See also,
B.F. French (ed.), Historical Memoirs of Louisiana (5 vols.; 
New York, 1846-1853), V, 158.
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commerce of Louisiana to only a few Spanish colonies and the 
mother country, while prohibiting foreign trade except with 
the islands of Martinique and St. Domingue, and with France. 
Regulations against smuggling were to be enforced, and all 
cargo lists had to have Ulloa's approval. The governor con­
trolled the prices of all imported or exported goods, and 
the papers of all vessels sailing from France to Louisiana 
came under his supervision. Due to the unpopularity of 
these restrictions, Aubry, under pressure of the Superior 
Council, did not enforce the decree. In this decision 
Ulloa acquiesced. Although the decree was unpopular, it 
was certainly not illegal as Fortier claimed.20
The mercantile decree of March 23, 1768, was similar 
to that of May 6, 1766. It limited the shipment of goods 
to the colonists themselves. Only specified ports in Spain, 
such as Cadiz and Seville, were open to trade with Louisiana 
and a few items were duty free. Commodities from Louisiana 
which could not be sold in Spain could be shipped, duty 
free, to other countries in Europe for sale. Finally, only 
goods produced in Louisiana were to be exported from that 
colony.21 This decree, as well as the earlier one, was no
^ R o d r i g u e z - C a s a d o} Primeros anos de dominacion esparT- 
ola, p. 120; Gayarfe,.History of Louisiana^ II, 168-171; 
Fortier, History of Louisiana' 1̂  160, l6l, 170.
Commercial Decree of March 23, 1768, El Pardo, in 
Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, pp. 45-50.
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more restrictive than the average Spanish mercantile decree. 
Nevertheless, the French colonists of Louisiana, as the 
British colonists in North America, had long been free, in 
practice, of most mercantile restrictions and consequently 
were unwilling to submit to these relatively mild ones. Due 
to the resistance of the colonists, this decree, like the 
earlier one, was never enforced.
The handling of the retirement of paper issues in Lou­
isiana proved to be another cross for Ulloa to bear. Upon 
the Spanish governor's arrival, he was asked by Nicholas 
Foucault, the French Commissary, to indicate his intentions 
in regard to the paper issues then outstanding. Ulloa 
offered to redeem this paper at 75 percent of its value, 
since that was the ratio established by Louis XV. However, 
the colonists refused to accept this as a compromise, in­
sisting that had the colony not been transferred the French 
king would have redeemed the currency at par. However, the 
history of the paper issues of the colony did not justify 
their claim. 2̂
Another source of concern for Ulloa was the lack of 
sufficient funds to run the colony. The original yearly 
allotment made by the Spanish government for Louisiana was
150,000 pesos, which was to come from the treasury of New 
Spain. Unfortunately, this amount was inadequate. Ulloa's
^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 159-160.
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letters to Bucareli are a litany of pleas for funds, and 
this situation continued until the governor was forced out 
of the colony. As early as May of 1766, in recording the 
tour of the posts of the colony, Ulloa mentioned sending 
his treasurer, Don Martin Navarro, to Balize to meet the 
Spanish frigate carrying 110,000 of the 150,000 pesos due 
the Louisiana treasury.23
On December 12, 1766, Ulloa asked Bucareli for addi­
tional funds to maintain the Spanish establishment in Lou­
isiana. By January 23, 1767, he had sounded a note of ur­
gency in a communique to Bucareli. Ulloa noted that since 
June of 1766 the Colony had relied solely on Spanish gold 
and silver for its currency, as faith had been lost in the 
French and Spanish paper issues. The amount allotted to 
him for the running of the colony had proved to be far 
short of what was needed. Moreover, he lacked ample funds 
even to meet the basic military and civilian necessities.2^
It was not long before Ulloa was again pleading for
23Ulloa to Bucareli, Balize, May, 1766, A.G.I.P.C., 
Legajo 1055, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 
p. 10. The King to the Viceroy of New Spain, Aranjuez,
May 21, 1765, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 36, L.C., pp. 
18-21. The King to Ulloa, Aranjuez, May 21, 1765, ibid., 
Doc. 37, L.C., pp. 22-25.
2^Ulloa to Bucareli, Balize, December 12, 1766, 
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 1055, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Miss­
issippi Valley , p. 13. Ulloa to Bucareli, Balize, January 
23, 1767, ibid., p. 19.
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money to finance the administration of the colony. In a 
letter of March 3, 1767, he made known his need for an addi­
tional forty to fifty thousand pesos to meet current and em­
ergency expenditures; and at the same time he gave his first 
indication that seditious activities were being carried on 
in the colony. His belief was that this unrest was aided by 
the impoverishment of the newly established government. To 
avoid giving these groups any cause for complaint, he urged, 
in a letter to Bucareli, the immediate dispatch of funds:
... In view of this and also of the fact that here 
everything causes revolts and seditions, I should 
thank Your Lordship, if your circumstances permit, 
please to order that I be sent promptly 40.000 or
50,000 pesos for account of the allotment.25
As a result of such repeated petitions, the Spanish
Court finally realized that the 150,000 pesos allocated for
Louisiana's yearly expenses would have to be augmented with
further funds. In May, 1767, the king decreed that 250,000
pesos should be allotted to the Louisiana treasury each year.26
However, as a shortage of silver existed at that time in New
Spain, the source of Louisiana's funds, the additional money
did not arrive when due.27 This was a situation for which
25ulloa to Bucareli, Balize, March 3, 1767, ibid.,
pp. 20-21.
26crimaldi to Arriaga, Aranjuez, May 13, 1767, A.G.I.
S.D., 86-6-6, ibid., p. 28.
27New Spain, Ulloa's source of funds, was undergoing 
financial reorganization by the new Viceroy, Jose de Gal­
vez. Collection of revenue was temporarily suspended dur­
ing this time. Consequently, the funds for Ulloa were not 
available. Cf. Moore, "Antonio de Ulloa," Louisiana History, 
VIII, No. 3, p. 217.
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Ulloa could not be blamed, but which, nonetheless caused ad­
ditional difficulties in a colony where problems were already 
serious.
In the summer of 1767, financial matters in the colony 
reached a critical state. Writing on June 17, 1767, from 
Balize, Ulloa informed Bucareli that both the French and the 
Spanish commissariats in Louisiana had suspended all payments, 
as he simply had no funds. In addition, he noted: "... This 
results not only in seditious and insolent rumors, but also 
very extravagant threats. ...I cannot exaggerate to Your 
Lordship the peril in which the colony finds itself, nor the 
importance of some aid to fulfill the most urgent require­
ments and to quiet the disturbances that are being experi­
enced. ..."2® But the new allotment of 250,000 pesos was by 
no means forthcoming as promised. Although an additional
60,000 pesos had been transported to Louisiana on the fri­
gate, San Juan Bautista, the creditors of the Spanish gov­
ernment had not been paid in full. Furthermore, Ulloa needed 
money to pay the troops which he thought would arrive soon 
from Spain. Finally, he pleaded: "... For this reason I
hope that Your Lordship will please order that there be no 
delay in remitting the funds to complete the allotment,
28uiloa to Bucareli, New Orleans, June 17, 1767, A.G.I.
P.C., Legajo 1055, ibid., p. 31.
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when the Viceroy of Mexico has had them sent to your city, 
as he promised.
By December of 1767, the finances of the colony had fur­
ther deteriorated. It is to Ulloa's credit that he was able 
to carry on as long as he did without proper funds. Two let­
ters to the governor of Havana bear eloquent testimony to the 
approaching financial crisis. Ulloa noted that prices had 
risen for the colonists who bought their goods on credit. 
Those dependent upon the Spanish government for their sala­
ries and payments were suffering considerable hardship, as 
often they could not even buy on credit. Confidence in the 
Spanish colonial government had deteriorated to this extent. 
Ulloa's own words are fully expressive of the danger:
... Everybody is without pay; troops, officials, offi­
cers, and purveyors. In the hope that the balance of 
the allotment would be received during the month just 
ending, the people have been suffering their want in 
patience; but now that they have seen the contrary 
come to pass, it is inevitable that this will result 
in some very serious disaster, for the reason that, 
as I have told Your Lordship, there TIs no place here 
to turn for aid.30
These letters indicate the almost universally unfavorable re­
ception now accorded the Spanish, as Fortier noted.31 it is
29uiloa to Bucareli, New Orleans, June 17, 1767, A.G.I. 
P.C., Legajo 1055, ibid.. p. 31.
30Ulloa to Bucareli, New Orleans, December 2, 1767, and 
Ulloa to Bucareli, New Orleans, December 25, 1767, A.G.I.P.C., 
Legajo 1055, ibid., pp. 38-40.
^Fortier, A History of Louisiana. I, 159-163.
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difficult to imagine how Ulloa's warnings could have been
virtually disregarded by the Court at Madrid, until it was
too late to help him.
By February, 1768, the situation had not improved. The
distressed Ulloa again pleaded for the allocated funds:
My Very Dear Sir:
Having described to Your Excellency on previous 
occasions the miserable and critical state in which 
this colony finds itself through lack of funds, I 
have nothing more to add, because the longer the de­
lay the more the want and troubles increase. ... One 
of the suppliers of flour, Moore of New York, among 
others, ... has asked me on two or three occasions 
with great urgency to permit him to go to collect 
this in that city (Havana).32
It is apparent that Ulloa was under heavy pressure from the
colonists and did not command their respect. Clearly, any
government that is unable to satisfy the basic needs of its
citizens cannot long survive.
. The climax of these financial difficulties was reached 
in June, 1768. At that time, Ulloa gave clear notice to 
Bucareli of the dangers involved in attempting to govern a 
colony with such a small amount of money. Debts against the 
government were steadily accumulating, and no sign of im­
provement was in sight. Ulloa had no doubt of the conse­
quences if such a pattern continued. At the time of writing 
this letter, 140,000 pesos from the 1767 allotment were still
^^uiloa to Bucareli, New Orleans, February 20, 1768,
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 1055, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississ­
ippi Valley, pp. 42-43.
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due. There was no silver in circulation, and it had been the 
only liquid money since 1767. Under those circumstances, le­
gal proceedings against debtors in the colony were suspended. 
The calamity which resulted from this intolerable situation 
was predicted by Ulloa:
Such a situation is the more difficult and its conse­
quences much more serious in a new dominion, as is 
this one where, at the same time a new sovereignty be­
gins, want makes itself felt. Furthermore, little at­
tention is paid to it. For these reasons, it is inev­
itable that the new subjects and those that supply the 
necessities of life should make most dire predictions 
for the future, because, as their fealty has not become 
deep-rooted nor their confidence been won, distrust 
cannot fail to be widespread, and it reveals itself automatically.33
In October, 1768, as a final attempt to resolve the fin­
ancial problems of the colony, Ulloa pointed out to the Min­
ister of State, the Marques de Grimaldi, that conditions in 
Louisiana had become intolerable because of money shortages. 
The governor confessed that he realized that the failure of 
his allotment to arrive was due to the general shortage of 
funds in New Spain. Nonetheless, this knowledge did not help 
Ulloa in his desperate plight. Consequently, in order to re­
duce his own expenditures to the minimum, he suggested a re­
duction in the forts defending the colony. Since the Eng­
lish had abandoned some of their posts adjacent to Spanish 
Louisiana, he felt he could safely evacuate the Spanish posts
33uiloa to Bucareli, New Orleans, June 22, 1768, A.G.I.
P.C., Legajo 1055, ibid., pp. 52-54.
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across from these areas.^ His enforced departure from the 
colony prevented the implementation of the plan.
In summary, then, there were two main issues: a short­
age of adequate money to run the colony, and too small a mil­
itary force to enable Ulloa to assert his authority. The re­
sult was that the first Spanish governor of Louisiana was 
brought into conflict with the powerful Superior Council.
This clash focused on the legitimacy of Spanish authority and 
upon which agency was to exercise power in the colony--the 
governor or the Superior Council. The Council had long been 
powerful and was reluctant to give up its position in the 
governmental affairs of Loiiisiana.
The struggle between Ulloa and the Council had begun al­
most immediately upon his arrival in the colony. Upon Aubry's 
advice, the Spanish governor had refused to present his cred­
entials to the Superior Council when the latter demanded to 
see them. Moreover, Ulloa had not taken formal possession 
of Louisiana at the capital city of New Orleans as the Coun­
cil had reasonably expected. Instead, it was at the French 
fortress of Balize, near the mouth of the Mississippi, that 
the act of transfer had occurred and the Spanish flag was 
raised. No member of the Superior Council was present at 
this ceremony. Nonetheless, the document of transfer was
■^Ulloa to Grimaldi, New Orleans, October 6, 1768, 
A.G.I.S.D., 86-6-6, ibid., pp. 75-76.
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signed on that occasion by the Acting-Governor, Charles
Philippe Aubry, the only official who had the power to turn
the colony over to Ulloa. The wording of this document
clearly shows that in Aubry*s mind there was no doubt to
whom the colony belonged, nor that the transfer had been
legally made. It stated in part:
Don Antonio de Ulloa, charged by His Catholic Majesty 
with taking the possession and government of the prov­
ince of Louisiana, ... to execute the orders of the 
King, his master, ... I order, ... that he be given 
possession of the post of Balize and that the flag 
of His Majesty the King of France, my master, be 
struck and that of His Majesty the King of Spain be 
raised in its place....
Balize, 20 January 1767 
Aubry (signature)35
It is true, as Gayarre asserts, that Aubry opposed the 
choice of Balize as the site of transfer.36 Yet, as unim­
portant as was that post, the document clearly proves that 
the transfer was made one year and nine months prior to the 
rebellion. Fortier's assertion that the colonists were 
justified in not acknowledging Louisiana as a Spanish pos­
session is invalid in the face of this document signed by
^ A u b r y ' s  Order, Balize, January 20,1767, A.H.N., Sec- 
cion Consejo de Indias, Legajo 20,854, Foxas 296, cited by 
Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros art os de dominacion es panola, 
pp. 176-177. This document signed by Aubry, in which he 
recognized Ulloa's legitimacy, clearly refutes any claim he 
is alleged to have made to the Superior Council on October 
28, 1768, that he had never seen anything decisive concern­
ing Ulloa's governing powers for the colony. Gayarre attri­
butes this statement to Aubry. Cf. Gayarre, History of Lou­
isiana, II, 193.
^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 174-175.
36
the only French officer in the colony empowered to make the 
transfer. Moreover, Fortier claims that the ceremony at 
Balize was only a flag-raising ceremony. The wording of 
the document referring to Ulloa's commission to take pos­
session of Louisiana and its government in the name of the
37Spanish king completely refutes Fortier's statement.
Ulloa chose Balize for the transfer because Aubry had 
advised him that no formal transfer could take place at New 
Orleans without a large Spanish contingent. The French of­
ficial felt that disturbances would occur in the capital 
city if the Spanish did not have a show of force at the 
time of the act of possession. Until the Spanish flag had 
been raised at that city, actual control of the colony was 
tenuous. Even the Spanish Minister of State realized this, 
for in a letter to Ulloa, written not long after the Balize 
transfer, he stated: "... when possession of the said
colony has been taken, this gentleman (Aubry) shall be given
a present of 3,000 pesos fuertes, so that he may arrange
38for his voyage to France." Thus, although the Marques de 
Grimaldi knew that Louisiana was in law and in fact Spanish, 
he realized that complete control of the colony could exist
37Fortier, A History of Louisiana, I, 161-162.
O Q
Grimaldi to Ulloa, Aranjuez, June 20, 1768, A.G.I. 
P.C., Legajo 174, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi 
Valley, p. 50.
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only when the Spanish flag flew over New Orleans. In conse­
quence, it seems just to assert that the Spanish Court must 
take the brunt of the responsibility for Ulloa's failure to 
take possession of Louisiana. The governor had often in­
formed the Minister of State and the Captain General of Cuba 
of his shortage of money and troops. There was little else 
Ulloa could have done under the circumstances, since all ap­
propriations and troop movements were centrally controlled.
The status of the colony, however, was never legally in 
doubt after 1764. The Treaty-of Fontainebleau was valid.
The act of transfer at Balize was sufficient to effect the 
change in government in Louisiana itself. All of the colo­
nists had the opportunity of knowing of the general terms 
of the treaty; Director-General D'Abbadie had been informed 
of the Treaty of Fontainebleau in a letter, dated April 21, 
1764, from the Duke of Choiseul, the French Minister of 
State. Furthermore, Jean Milhet had returned to the colony 
in 1767, after his interview with Choiseul, and had informed 
the Superior Council and the other interested colonists that 
Louisiana had indeed become a part of the Spanish Empire.
His long delay, however, did feed the hopes of the colonists 
that perhaps Louisiana might again become French. The dis­
appointment his news brought, consequently, was all the more 
bitter.^9 Nonetheless, it is incontrovertible that Ulloa was 
accepted by the colonists as the de jure and de facto governor.
^Martin, A History of Louisiana, p. 201.
He and the Spanish troops were accepted, although half­
heartedly. In addition, Spanish money was the basic cur­
rency, and only Spanish passports were acceptable. No fur­
ther proofs need be offered that the colony was, and was 
known to be, Spanish.
To the unusual circumstances of effecting the trans­
fer at Balize and Ulloa's refusal to act independently of 
Aubry in the New Orleans area, was added the personal an­
tagonism of the colonists toward the Spanish official. He 
had been married by proxy to a Peruvian lady, the Marchio­
ness d'Abrado, whose arrival he awaited at Balize from Sep­
tember, 1766, to March, 1767. When he returned to New Or­
leans with his new bride, no festivities were held for the 
city's social elite to honor the occasion. Certainly the 
socially sensitive Creoles could interpret this as an af­
front to themselves. Yet, there is no evidence offered that 
Ulloa intended to be discourteous. It seems that he felt 
that any other course of action at the time would be inop­
portune, as he had not taken formal possession of the colony 
at New Orleans. He was a naturally retiring man, which may 
help to explajLn the incident.^®
The rebellion, to a degree anticipated by Ulloa, occurred 
late in October of 1768. The early stages of the uprising 
are fully described by the governor in a letter of October 
26, 176 8, to Grimaldi:
4n s' . . .,uGayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 175-176; Fortier,
A History of Louisiana, I, 161.
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Most Excellent Sir:
My Very Dear Sir: Yesterday, the 25th, at eleven
o'clock Senor Maxent41 came to inform me of what had 
been learned about the present disturbances, and a 
little later the engineer, Don Ypolito Amelot, brought 
me the same information. This leaves no doubt that 
there is already a conspiracy of the whole colony to 
refuse submission to the dominion of His Majesty.
Their plan is to present a manifesto full of com­
plaints against me, because it is necessary to have 
some pretext to excuse their report to the council.... 
The conspirators will ask, ..., that the council inti­
mate to me that I should depart from the province, .... 
In order to make it appear that they are forcing the 
council to accede to this decision, they have drawn up 
a memorial...
...we learned that next Friday the city will be 
full of people, the Germans and the Acadians coming to 
it, together with the people here, armed to carry out 
the coup.
When the French governor tried to persuade the 
attorney general (Lafreniere) to exert himself to put 
down this uprising, the latter replied that he could 
not do so,. . .
The French governor is of the opinion that this 
uprising has been plotted among Lafreniere, Comisario 
Foucault, and Noyan, the son-in-law of the former,...
...I have given Your Excellency this long account 
before the trouble breaks out....
New Orleans, October 26, 1768.
Don Antonio de Ulloa.42
Obviously the full extent of the disturbances then 
occurring in New Orleans and its environs was understood by 
Ulloa. Both he and Aubry knew the plans of the conspirators
4lGilbert Antoine de St. Maxent was a rich planter sym­
pathetic to the Spanish. He had given 1500 pesos to Ulloa's 
government to pay the Germans for the food supplies bought 
on^credit^ Gf. Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de domina- 
cion espanola, p. 154.
42uiloa to Grimaldi, New Orleans, October 26, 1768, 
A.G.I.S.D., 86-6-6, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi 
Valley, pp. 77-81.
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and the names of the leaders before the insurrection materi­
alized. The testimony of these two men was of invaluable aid 
to the prosecuting attorney who tried the leaders of the con­
spiracy and rebellion.
As foreseen by the Spanish governor, a meeting of the 
Superior Council took place on October 28, 1768, to discuss 
the legitimacy and the conduct of Ulloa and the Spanish re­
gime he headed. At that meeting Chauvin de Lafreniere, the 
attorney general of the colony, in the most violent terms 
urged the acceptance of a petition which he alleged the col­
onists had drawn up and given him to present to the Superior 
Council. This petition demanded that Ulloa either present 
his credentials to the Superior Council or face banishment 
as a disturber of the peace. Moreover, it insisted that all 
of the former privileges of the colonists be restored by 
Ulloa's government, and that free trade be allowed. At the
/ ■  Vurging of Lafreniere, the Council accepted the petition in 
its entirety. Ulloa refused to submit to these demands, since 
he considered himself the legal governor and did not recognize 
the Superior Council as having any prerogatives. Thus, an 
impasse was reached.
Soon after these demands had been rejected, armed bands, 
among whom were the Acadians and Germans from the coastal re­
gions near New Orleans, arrived in the city. These groups
✓were led by Joseph Villere, Captain of the militia of the 
German Coast, and by Jean Baptiste Noyan, Captain reforme of the
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French cavalry. Aubry, fearing for Ulloa's safety, convinced 
the Spanish governor that, as there was no adequate force to 
provide protection for the governor and his family, they 
should take refuge aboard the Spanish frigate, the Volante, 
anchored in the New Orleans harbor. Meanwhile, Aubry did 
what he could to insure Ulloa's safety. The Spanish garrison, 
assisted by the French commandant and his regulars, put up a 
show of resistance, and the French commandant tried to calm 
the rebels. With Ulloa ousted, the leaders, who apparently 
had achieved their goal, accepted Aubry's suggestions. Ulloa, 
sensing his precarious situation, decided on November 1, 1768, 
to sail for Havana.^ Seemingly, the insurrection had suc­
ceeded.^
Once in Havana, it was clear to Ulloa that to return to 
Louisiana under the existing circumstances was impossible.
He informed his superiors in a letter of December 8, 1768, 
that due to the extraordinary uprising in New Orleans, his 
orders could not be carried out. These instructions had pre­
supposed the loyalty of the people of the colony to the Span­
ish king. Recent events, Ulloa noted, had clearly demon-
43in the meantime Ulloa had transferred to a French 
vessel, Le Caesar, for the trip to Havana, as the Volante 
was in need o£ repairs. (Cf. Gayarre,,— A History of Louisi­
ana , II, 212; Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacioh 
espaiiola, p. 172.)
^See the letter of Aubry to O'Reilly, New Orleans, Au­
gust 21, 1769, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 72, L.C. pp. 
262-264. Cf. also, Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 189-
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45strated that no such loyalty existed-.
Three of the Spanish officials in Ulloa's government 
were compelled to remain in New Orleans by the rebel lead­
ers. Don Esteban Gayarre, the chief auditor, Don Martin 
Narvarro, the treasurer, and Don Jose de Loyola, commissioner 
of war and the military intendant under Ulloa, were held by 
the rebels as surety for the 100,000 pesos owed to the in­
habitants of Louisiana by the Spanish government. Besides 
these three men, there were only a few Spanish troops scat­
tered throughout the colony. Anti-Spanish feeling continued 
in Louisiana well into the following year. It reached a new 
peak in April when the Volante was forced to sail for Havana. 
Jose de Loyola, in a communique to Bucareli on April 20,
1769, reported that the spirit of rebellion had not in the 
lease diminished.^
Soon after Ulloa's departure, Pierre Marquis, a Swiss 
by birth, and the elected colonel-general of the colony's 
militia, began to spread ideas looking to the founding of a 
republic in Louisiana. This action would have required the 
expulsion of Aubry and his troops. However, the colonists 
had maintained in their "Memorial" that they were loyal to
^Ulloa to Bucareli, Havana, December 8, 1768, A.G.I. 
P.C., Legajo 1055, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi 
Valley, p. 80.
^Loyola to Bucareli, New Orleans, April 20, 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-7, ibid.. p. 84.
the French King. Most of the leaders of the movement op­
posed the establishment of a republic. Consequently, a 
"Memorial Against the Republic" was soon drafted and circu­
lated among the inhabitants of the New Orleans area. A 
probable cause for their opposition to a republic was the 
certainty that neither Spain nor France would have toler­
ated its existence, lest other colonies attempt the same 
course. Too, they must have realized that Louisiana had 
neither a sufficient population nor a strong enough economy 
to sustain itself as an independent state. They had enjoyed 
considerable freedom under French rule, and doubtless the 
overwhelming majority of them wished to return to their 
previous status. These realities, then, dealt a death blow 
to the Quixotic ideas of a republic. In a short time, Aubry, 
Foucault, and the Superior Council were again in complete 
control of the colony.^7
.. The next step the colonists took to consolidate their 
position was to draw up a "Representation to Louis XV."
This document was drafted by the Superior Council on Novem­
ber 12, 1768, and contained protestations of Loyalty to 
France. It was carried to France by Ensign Bienville de 
Noyan, a nephew of Sieur de Bienville, by M. Saint Lette, 
who replaced Jean Milhet as an emissary, and by M. Lessassier.
47cf. Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 278-282; Rod­
riguez -Casado , Primeros anos de dominacion espanola.234-238;
Du Terrage, Les Dernieres Annies de la Louisiane Francaise, 
p. 285. *----
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Charles Aubry, who had resisted the rebellion from its in­
ception, sent M. LaPeyiere to France to represent his pos­
tion. 48 From that moment on, the colonists could do little 
but await the reactions of the French and Spanish courts to 
the rebellion and the "Representation".
The attitude of the French government to the uprising 
was at first uncertain. One French author, Pierre Boulle, 
suggests that the French ministry, after hearing of the re­
bellion, considered proposing to Spain that the Louisianians 
be permitted to establish a republic under the joint protec­
tion of France and Spain. The Comte de Chalet, French 
ambassador to England, is supposed to have recommended this 
plan to the Duke of Choiseul. The Count D'Estaing is alleged 
to have further promoted this suggestion. He felt that in 
this way both Spain and France would be rid of the burden of 
supporting and constantly defending the colony, and yet it 
would still serve as a buffer to English expansion.49
Choiseul, however, rejected these recommendations, stat­
ing that the plan would be too difficult to execute. Boulle 
suggests that the Duke did not wish to offend the Spanish 
Court, which had meanwhile decided to re-establish Spanish
4^Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros alios de dominacion espan- 
ola, pp. 218-220; Fortier, A History of Louisiana, I, 169.
^Pxerre H. Boulle, "French Reaction to the Louisiana 
Revolution of 1768," in John Francis McDermott (ed.), The 
French in the Mississippi Valley (Urbana, 1965) , pp. 143-157.
45
rule in Louisiana by dispatching General O'Reilly to Louisi­
ana with a large force. He also suggests that Choiseul and 
other members of the French Ministry hoped some day to have 
Spain return Louisiana to France.^
Spain, for its part, could have taken the easy course 
and abandoned this costly colony by returning it to France 
as the rebels desired. However, the ministry realized that 
it was a good buffer against English expansion toward New 
Spain. Furthermore, they believed it might be unwise to 
let the rebellion succeed in one colony, thereby setting a 
bad example for other disaffected areas in the Spanish em­
pire. It was clear to the king and the Council of the In­
dies that Spanish control would have to be imposed upon 
Louisiana .*̂
After several meetings of the Council of the Indies, a 
decision was made to put down the rebellion. The views of 
the Council, in which the king acquiesced, were well ex­
pressed by the Duke of Alba at a session on March 25, 1769. 
Repression was necessary, he declared, in order to impress
upon the world, but especially upon the American colonists,
52the power and prestige of Charles III. The stage was set.
50Ibid., pp. 149, 150, 152, 153, 156, 157.
"^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 347.
5 2 /Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacion espano-
la, p. 291; Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 250.
46
It was only a matter of time before the Spanish Court took 
the steps necessary to bring the rebellious colonists effec­
tively under Spanish rule.
In assessing the true nature of the rebellion, one fun­
damental problem still needs to be resolved. What were the 
motives behind the insurrection? The explanation given by 
Ulloa and Aubry is essentially economic and political. The 
French and Spanish governors agreed that the rebels felt 
that Ulloa had to be expelled so that the trade restrictions 
which threatened them could be removed, and so that the Su­
perior Council could continue to be the chief governing body 
in the colony. From the beginning of Ulloa's governorship, 
the merchants and the people wanted to continue the free 
trade that they had come to enjoy under the lax rule of 
France. Chauvin de Lafreniere, the attorney general, and
Nicholas Foucault, the French commissary, had encouraged
53these sentiments among the rebels.
Another explanation for the insurrection is offered by 
a well known twentieth-century Spanish scholar, Vicente Rod- 
riguez-Casado. He discounts the assertions made by the 
nineteenth-century French historian, Francois Barbe-Marbois, 
who held that Ulloa was an absent-minded intellectual who
53Aubry to O'Reilly, New Orleans, August 20, 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 72 "C", L.C., pp. 262-264. 
Ulloa to Grimaldi, Havana, December, 1768, ibid., Doc. 69, 
L.C., pp. 119-215, passim. Cf. Gayarre, History of Louisi­
ana, II, 237-238.
was incapable of attending to normal administrative affairs. 
Instead, Rodriguez-Casado portrays Ulloa as a man faced with 
the task of imposing strict control on a colony which had 
for many years been free of nearly all restraint. He had 
been sent to Louisiana by a ministry that was almost totally 
ignorant of the political situation that existed in Louisi­
ana. Coupled with a lack of money and a shortage of troops, 
Ulloa had as an advisor an irresolute man (Aubry) who cat­
ered to public opinion. In the last analysis, according 
to this scholar, the major cause of the rebellion was the 
existence in Louisiana of a libertarian, anti-clerical 
philosophy, widespread in France and in her possessions at 
that time. It was a philosophy that understood human lib­
erty as a right which had no restraints placed upon it ex­
cept those inherent in man's nature. In this philosophy 
the laws of God had no place. It was, in effect, a philo­
sophy which held up man as the supreme standard of morality 
and law. This concept of human nature was quite obviously 
alien to that of the Spanish, who held that the king, under 
God, determined the extent of human liberty in s o c i e t y .  ̂ 4- 
Professor John Preston Moore, a scholar in the field 
of Spanish colonial history, cites a number of valid reasons 
to account for Ulloa's failure in Louisiana. Ulloa's own
Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacion espan- 
ola, pp. 176, 177, 179, 2WT.
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person and personality were, in Professor Moore's view, a 
hindrance. The Spanish governor was of medium stature, 
with stooped shoulders and pale cheeks. He was tactless, 
highly sensitive to criticism, and so retiring and unsocia­
ble that he antagonized the socially-minded Creoles of New 
Orleans. Professor Moore noted that he failed to realize 
how attached to France the colonists were and, perhaps most 
damagingly, lacked the quality of "authentic leadership."
In addition to these personal defects, he was simply unfor­
tunate in being short of both troops and money and was com­
pelled to promulgate two unpopular restrictive mercantile 
decrees.55
Needless to say, the rebels gave their own reasons for 
ousting Ulloa. Through their leaders they maintained that 
Ulloa, without showing any credentials to the Superior Coun­
cil, had assumed gubernatorial powers and had issued at his 
own discretion the "oppressive" mercantile decree of Septem­
ber, 1766. They claimed that their products would not be 
saleable in Spanish ports on a competitive basis. They con­
tended that they had been promised uninterrupted commercial 
advantages for ten years; but Ulloa's decree of September, 
1766, had taken away these privileges.56
55Moore, "Antonio de Ulloa," Louisiana History, VIII, 
No. 3, pp. 197-219.
56Fortier, A History of Louisiana, I, 185, 187, 196, 
"Memorial." It is interesting to note that the "Memo­
rial" itself, which emphasizes economic motives so much,
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Besides the heavy stress placed on the economic reasons 
for the rebellion, the insurrectionists stated that Louisi­
ana would be more useful to Spain if France owned it. They 
said that France had kept the Indians loyal, but Ulloa and
 his men had alienated them. Further ar-, they accused the
Spanish governor of violating the mar- - ; decrees of the
Council of Trent by permitting inten. -riage between a 
Spaniard and a Negress without the priest a consent. Final­
ly, they professed to offer no offense to the Spanish Court 
when they affirmed their loyalty to France and their desire 
to be subjects of Louis XV again.^7
Perhaps all of these explanations have some validity.
If this is true, then one must assign relative importance to 
each of them. First, Ulloa's correspondence with Bucareli 
and Grimaldi makes it clear that the absence of a powerful 
military force was the one factor that enabled the rebellion 
to succeed. In addition, the lack of a proper money supply 
to administer the colony lost Ulloa the support of the colo­
nial merchants. This, too, is evident from Ulloa's communi­
ques with Bucareli and Grimaldi. The extent to which Ulloa 
depended on Aubry and was willing to follow his advice was
contradicts Fortier who maintains that it was a love for 
France that caused the rebels to oust Ulloa. (Cf. Ibid., 175.)
57Ibid., 199, 202, 203.
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a serious mistake. Aubry was not only irresolute, as Rod- 
riguez-Casado stated, but he was too subservient to the 
Superior Council. Had Ulloa acted on his own, had he shown 
his credentials to the Superior Council from the first, and 
had he cooperated with its members, there may well have been 
no rebellion. Had he been more sophisticated politically, 
perhaps he could have governed the colony in cooperation with 
the Superior Council, even on its terms, until he was in a 
position of power.
Ulloa's tragedy, then, was his failure to assess quick­
ly the political situation in the colony and to work within 
its limitations. The Superior Council was to him no more 
than the equivalent of the Spanish cabildo, a body having 
purely local powers and almost completely subordinate to 
the governor. An astute political leader would have soon 
seen that in New Orleans the Superior Council had acquired 
great powers, and he would have adapted his methods to meet 
the needs of the situation. In time, with the arrival of 
the additional Spanish regulars, Ulloa's position would have 
been secure. Then he would have reduced the Council to the 
status of a cabildo or, if so instructed, abolished it.^®
58it must be admitted that to a man of Ulloa's training 
and background this would probably have been unthinkable, as 
in so acting he certainly would have disregarded the orders 
of the Minister of State, the Marques de Grimaldi.
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Therefore, it may be concluded that the real cause of 
the rebellion was a political struggle between Ulloa and the 
Superior Council. A successful insurrection occurred because 
Ulloa lacked the political ability to cope with the unfore­
seen and difficult situation in which he found himself.
II
THE COMING OF GENERAL O'REILLY TO LOUISIANA
As soon as a decision had been reached in the Council 
of the Indies to retain Louisiana, steps were taken to im­
plement this policy. Needed for the task was a man of con­
siderable military experience who possessed the ability to 
govern authoritatively, but with restraint. This latter 
quality was important lest over-severity cause either fur­
ther disorders or induce the population to migrate to the 
English colonies or to French possessions in the West Indies. 
For this mission, the King selected Lieutenant-General Don 
Alejandro O'Reilly. The general was, at that time, one of 
the most prominent soldiers in Spain and a man very high in 
the favor of Charles III. It is very likely that he was 
recommended for the command by the Spanish Minister of State, 
the Marques de Grimaldi, who had befriended him on previous 
occasions. •*-
Alejandro O'Reilly was a soldier of fortune who had 
left his native Ireland, as had many others who chafed under 
English oppression. He was born in Baltrasna, County Meath, 
Ireland, in 1722, the son of Thomas Reilly (sic), a lieuten­
ant in "Reilly's Dragoons," a brigade of the Spanish army.
■*-Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacion espan- 
ola, pp. 291, 300.
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The young O'Reilly became a cadet in the Spanish infantry in 
1732, at the age of ten. He was commissioned a lieutenant 
in the War of the Austrian Succession. In 1757, during the 
first stages of the Seven Years War, he enlisted in the Aus­
trian army, in which he served for two years. In 1759 he 
joined a French unit. In the service of France he disting­
uished himself in the battle of Bergen in April, 1759, and 
later in the battle of Minden in July, 1759. Because of 
O'Reilly's bravery in these engagements, the Duke of Broglie, 
a high-ranking French commander, recommended him to Charles 
III. Upon O'Reilly's return to Spain, the king promoted him 
to the rank of lieutenant colonel.^
When Spain entered the Seven Years War against England, 
the young Irishman was given another chance to advance his 
career. Although the war did not go well for Spain, O'Reilly 
was able to demonstrate his military competence. During the 
Spanish invasion of Portugal, England's ally, he led a regi­
ment in the capture of Chares and Pancorro. For this he was 
promoted to bridagier. From Pancorro, he led his brigade to 
Villareal, where he took part in the siege of that city. In 
this engagement he again showed his talent for warfare. His 
personal successes once more brought O'Reilly to the atten­
tion of Charles III, who, at the end of the conflict, promoted
•y /  4•“Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 286-287; David 
Knuth Bjork, "Alejandro O'Reilly and the Spanish Occupation 
of Louisiana," in New Spain and the Anglo-American West,
p. 166.
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to major general. His contemporaries considered him one of
3Spain's most outstanding military leaders.
The Spanish had lost Havana to England during the Seven 
Years War, but it was returned to Spain by the peace treaty 
which ended that conflict. As Mariscal de Campot O'Reilly 
led the Spanish forces which re-occupied Havana in 1763.^
He was ordered to restore fortifications there and in the 
rest of the West Indies where great destruction had occurred. 
Contained in his commission were additional instructions to 
give a full report on the status of the island's economy, 
its judicial system, and those-policies necessary to secure 
the island and to render it profitable to the inhabitants 
and to the crown.^
The reorganization of the army in Cuba was of first 
importance. The forces established by O'Reilly consisted 
of four volunteer regiments, eight battalions of regulars 
and one cavalry unit. The four volunteer regiments and the 
cavalry unit seemed especially well trained. Of the eight 
regular battalions, the three Plaza battalions and the 
Guanabacoa battalions were better prepared than the four
3Bjork, ibid., p. 167; Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos 
de dominacion espanola, pp. 288-289.
4Rodriguez-Casado, ibid., p. 300.
^O'Reilly to Grimaldi, Havana, April 12, 1764, A.H.N., 
Papeles de Estado, Legajo 3025, No. 4, microfilm.
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battalions of Cuba. The latter needed further training.
The future defense of the colony was of great concern 
to O'Reilly. He felt that it would have to be defended by 
its own people without appreciable support from Spain. He 
maintained that one naval squadron could delay enemy forces 
until help came from Cartagena or other parts of the empire 
south of Cuba. There was only one place close enough to 
Havana which could be used to bring in soldiers and that 
was Xagua.^
The general's observations on the economy and status 
of the population of Cuba are worthy of consideration. He 
noted the rich produce of the island and the excellent cli­
mate. However, he felt that the island was not yielding to 
its full capacity. On the contrary, it had been a drain on 
the Spanish treasury, never returning to the mother country 
a fair portion of what went into the island. Much of the 
wealth that was poured into the island from Spain was 
drained off to foreigners in legal and illegal commerce.
6Ibid.
?0'Reilly to Arriaga, April 12, 1764, ibid.
Xagua is a port located in the city of Cienfuegos in 
the Province of Santa Clara east of Havana on the island of 
Cuba. It is an excellent port with a narrow entrance and 
wide, calm bay. (Cf. G. A. Thompson (ed. and trans.), The 
Geographical and Historical Dictionary of America and the 
West Indies, V (London, 1816). 309.)
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O'Reilly insisted that this situation must be remedied.^
On the whole, according to this report, the island was 
backward. Although many causes could be cited for this con­
dition, the main ones were the inadequacies of the judicial 
system, a scarcity of labor for the haciendas, and the fail­
ure of the merchants to provide inhabitants with the neces­
sary goods at reasonable prices. Justice was lacking owing 
to the partiality and collusion of the municipal alcaldes, 
and to the delays in appealing to higher courts. O'Reilly 
recommended that a special court be established in Havana 
to expedite the handling of appeals which theretofore had 
gone to the Audiencia at Santo Domingo.^
This report was submitted to O'Reilly's immediate su­
perior, the Conde de Ricla, then to the Marques de Grimaldi, 
and finally to Don Julian de Arriaga, Minister of the Coun­
cil of the Indies. In concluding his report to Grimaldi, 
O'Reilly made all of his recommendations in the hope that 
the king would approve them. Moreover, he petitioned that 
he might return to Spain, as he felt his mission had been 
completed. Grimaldi noted in reply that the king had taken 
these considerations under advisement. The Minister of 
State cited his approval for the advancement of agriculture
^O'Reilly to Arriaga, April 12, 1764, A.H.N., Papeles 
de Estado, Legajo 3025.
9Ibid.
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as recommended by O’Reilly. Nothing was said of O ’Reilly's 
suggestion to encourage immigration to Cuba, but Grimaldi 
agreed that foreign commerce could not be totally excluded 
from the island. The general was ordered to remain in Cuba 
until the inadequately trained troops were considered to be 
an effective unit of the island's military establishment.̂ 0
Late in 1764, O'Reilly was recalled to Spain and pro­
moted to the position of Inspector General of Infantry.^
To the task of Inspector General, O'Reilly applied enthus­
iasm and vigor. He was expected to re-train the Spanish army 
in the Prussian methods of warfare, and for this purpose he 
established at Avila a military academy for officers.
Rodriguez-Casado commented on the general's perhaps 
excessive enthusiasm for this project and noted that the 
academy later fell into disuse due to opposition within the 
Spanish officers' corps. This group had consistently re­
sisted the reforms introduced by O'Reilly. Perhaps this 
opposition was due, in part, to O'Reilly's origin.^ As 
military governor of Madrid, a position to which he was
•^Grimaldi to O'Reilly, San Ildefonso, August 5, 1764,ibid.
H-Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros a nos de dominacion espan- 
ola, pp. 299-300; Bjork, ''Alejandro O'ReTlly and the Span­
ish Occupation of Louisiana," in New Spain in the Anglo- 
American West, p. 167, citing A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-6.
-^Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacion espan- 
ola, p. 300.
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appointed in 1765, O'Reilly was able once again to advance 
his career. When riots occurred in Madrid in 1766, owing to 
Charles Ill's promulgation of unpopular decrees, O'Reilly 
acted promptly to protect the palace from a hostile mob.
His action in safeguarding the king's person gave him a 
preferred place at the court.^ Because of the king's high 
regard for O'Reilly and the general's excellent military 
and administrative record, he was raised to the rank of 
lieutenant general on July 15, 1767.-^
Thus, in 1769 when the king sought the right man to 
suppress the rebellion in Louisiana, it was with good rea­
son that Alejandro O'Reilly was chosen. His military back­
ground, his experience in Cuba, and his effective quelling 
of the riots in Madrid well recommended him for the mission. 
When the royal cedula was issued appointing O'Reilly comman­
der of the expedition to bring order to Louisiana, it not 
only made clear O'Reilly's powers but also bore testimony to 
the esteem in which the king held the general.
THE KING
Don Alejandro O'Reilly, Knight Commander of the Or­
der of Alcantara, Lieutenant General of My Armies:
l^wiiiiam Keman Dart, "Alessandro O'Reilly," The 
Tulanian, Vol. II, No. 6 (April, 1906), pp. 12-13.
■^Expedientes personales Alejandro O'Reilly, Archivo 
Geperal de Simancas, Letter from the Director of the Ar­
chives at Simancas, April 21, 1967.
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Having great confidence in your well known zeal and 
activity in behalf of my Royal Service, I have de­
cided to send you to America with several missions. 
Since the most important is to take formal possess­
ion of the Colony of Louisiana, which my most worthy, 
Christian and beloved cousin has ceded to me, I have 
decided that as soon as you reach the island of Cuba 
and organize the proper number of soldiers and ammu­
nition and other supplies which you feel are neces­
sary, and that after having then taken possession of 
it in my Royal Name, you make formal charge and pun­
ish according to the law, the instigators and accom­
plices of the uprising which occurred in New Orleans, 
... So that you may carry out my instructions fully,
I give you today such power and jurisdiction as shall 
be necessary for handling each matter, case and inci­
dent. .. . for this is my desire.
Dictated at Aranjuez on the 
16th day of April of 1769.15
Upon receipt of his orders, O'Reilly prepared at once 
to leave for America to carry out his mission. He set out 
from La Coruna, Spain, in May of 1769 and arrived in Havana 
aboard the frigate La Palas on June 24, 1769. There he 
presented to Antonio Bucareli, Captain-General of Cuba, his 
royal commission.I6 Pursuant to his instructions, the gen­
eral organized an expedition to take possession of New Orle­
ans. The speed with thich the men and supplies were assem­
bled demonstrated his ability in the field of logistics, as 
well as the complete cooperation given him by Bucareli. Ac­
cording to Bucareli, when O'Reilly left for New Orleans on
l^The King to O'Reilly, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. 
pp. 341-342.
l^Bucareli'to Arriaga, Havana, July 7, 1769, A.G.I.S.D., 
80-1-6, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, pp. 86- 
87.
the morning of July 6, the convoy under his command was
quite impressive:
... I have the special satisfaction of being able to 
report to Your Excellency that yesterday morning at 
six o'clock the said general (O'Reilly) set sail on 
the frigate Volante, together with twenty other 
ships,1/ carrying the troops, artillery, munitions, 
provisions, equipment, and funds shown in the at­
tached statements. ... The quality of the veteran 
troops and militia composing the troops selected could 
not be bettered, ... All of them are eager to show 
their zeal on this occasion.18
The attached list indicated a total of 2,056 men,^ includ­
ing infantry, pickets and artillery men. For his military 
supplies the general took 46 cannons of various sizes, mor­
tars, a large supply of small arms and ammunition, as well 
as medical provisions and food. In addition, O'Reilly had 
with him 150,000 pesos to pay the debts owed by the provin­
cial treasury, and for the immediate needs of his troops and 
the colony itself.^0 it seems that nothing was overlooked.
l^in addition to the Volante, there were 20 ships for 
troops and supplies, including 2 hospital ships. ("El Diario 
de la Expedicion de Alejandro O'Reilly para la Occupacion de 
Nueva Orleans /.17697j." A.H.N., Seccion de Diversos, Titulos 
y Familias, PrTego /Condado de7, microfilm.)
■^Bucareli to Arriaga, Havana, July 7, 1769, A.G.I.S.D. 
80-1-6, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, pp. 86 
87.
I9cayarre, on whom most students of this era have re­
lied, states that O'Reilly had 2,600 men. (History of Loui- 
ana, II, 296.) Although he does not indicate it, Gayarre 
might possibly have included the sailors who are not in Bu­
careli s number.
^Bucareli to Arriaga, Havana, July 7, 1769, A.G.I.S.D.
80-1-6, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, pp. 86
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The wisdom of having this overwhelming forceat his disposal 
was soon evident. The Spanish government did not repeat 
the tragic error it had made during the regime of the unfor­
tunate Ulloa.
The "Diary", or log of the voyage, has shed new light on 
the intervening days between O'Reilly's departure from Hav­
ana and his arrival at Balize. The secretary on board the 
Volante began his record on July 5 and ended it abruptly on 
July 27. ̂  Including the Volante, the ship on which O'Reilly 
sailed, the convoy numbered 23 ships. Two of these were hos­
pital ships, and the remainder included three frigates, two 
brigantines, six sloops, six schooners, two setees, one 
lighter and one paquette. The sailing instructions called 
for the Volante to lead, with ten ships in parallel columns 
on either side, with the hospital vessels between them. The 
convoy was under orders from its commander to keep this order 
throughout the journey.^2
After lifting anchor about mid-day on July 6, the con­
voy gradually pulled away from the port of Havana. Some
2-*-The abrupt ending in the middle of a sentence indi­
cates, among other possibilities, that the scribe was inter­
rupted and never finished his account, or that the remainder 
of the journal has been lost.
 ̂ ^^Relacion y diario de todo lo acaecido en la expedi- cion del Excellentissimo Don Alejandro O'Rrely(sic) desde su 
salida de la Havana tornado posesion del Orleans, A.H.N., 
Seccion de Diversos, Titulos y familias, Priego (Condado de), 
2270.
days of the journey were eventful and were recorded, others 
were omitted. On the seventh, the crew saw turtles near the 
ships and noted that the sky had some clouds. On the eighth 
the convoy was sailing in good order, in water of about 82 
fathoms. Apparently, nothing of importance occurred until 
the twelfth when a storm developed and the sea became choppy 
At the same time, a schooner was reported missing from the 
convoy, but fortunately it was found about mid-day in Saint 
Blaise's cove along the Apalache Coast. By July 16, the 
ships were within sixty leagues of Balize and, after sail­
ing into water of only fifty-nine fathoms on the seventeenth 
they were within twenty leagues of Balize by the eighteenth.
At about noon on July 20, the convoy sighted Balize at 
a distance of about seven leagues. At eight o'clock that 
night, a crewman sounded the depth and discovered that the 
ship was in only forty fathoms of water. The entire convoy 
was halted, and an expert was summoned to guide the vessels 
through the shallow water. He arrived on the following day 
and guided them to the approaches of Balize. At this point, 
the navigators estimated that they were thirty-two leagues 
from the city of New Orleans by way of the river. Accord­
ingly, they dropped their anchors.24
While aboard the Volante. General O'Reilly made his
23Ibid. 24Ibid.
63
next move preparatory to taking possession of New Orleans. 
The pen of Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Bouligny, the gen­
eral's aide de camp, provides a vivid account of the events 
surrounding the re-establishment of Spanish authority in 
Louisiana. O'Reilly himself verified this account in his 
own report to Don Juan Gregorio de Munian, a member of the 
Council of the Indies.
Bouligny was ordered by O'Reilly to carry to Charles
Aubry a letter, dated July 20, 1769, notifying the French
commandant of the general's arrival. O'Reilly stated that
he had with him his royal commission to take possession of
the colony and asked Aubry for his cooperation. Bouligny
was further ordered to see that notices of the arrival of
the Spanish forces were posted throughout the colony. It
was hoped that this would contribute to the success of the
expedition by preparing the inhabitants for O'Reilly's com- 
25m g .
Bouligny disembarked from the Volante on July 21, at 
two o'clock in the morning. He went by oar boat up the 
river and arrived in New Orleans at eleven o'clock at night 
on July 24. He had stopped at Balize to notify the French 
commander there of his intention to meet with Acting-Gover­
nor Aubry. Farther up the river the colonel met four ships, 
one English and three French. Upon his arrival at New
25 Ibid.
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Orleans, he observed five or six others.26
In the city, Bouligny was greeted by a large crowd of 
people, among whom were the three Spanish officials, Loyola, 
Gayarre, and Navarro, who had been detained by the colon­
ists. Accompanied by the Spanish officials, he went to 
Aubry's home and delivered O'Reilly's letter. As Aubry's 
knowledge of Spanish was inadequate, Bouligny offered to 
translate the document into French. Aubry responded very 
favorably to the message and said that he would cooperate 
fully with General O'Reilly and if necessary use his forces 
to aid in suppressing any o p p o s i t i o n . 27
The following morning, Tuesday, July 25, at nine 
o'clock, Aubry assembled the colonists in the Plaza and in­
formed them of the arrival of O'Reilly and his forces. Ac­
cording to Bouligny, "all, terrified merely by the name of 
Your Excellency (O'Reilly), became quiet, and only M. Mar­
quis, retired Captain of Swiss troops, and M. Lafreniere, 
Solicitor-General of the King in this Council, said that 
they had to speak with M. Aubry in private...."28
26;Bouligny's Account to O'Reilly, New Orleans, July 26, 
1769, Ms., Howard Tilton Memorial Library Archives (Tulane 




At ten o'clock of that same morning, Aubry met again 
with Bouligny in Loyola's house to inform him that all was 
well and that Marquis and Lafreniere wished to go down the 
river with him (Bouligny) to confer with the Spanish gen­
eral, and to implore his clemency. Later in the day, Bou­
ligny dined with Loyola, Gayarre and Navarro at Aubry's 
home. All agreed that the city had responded wisely in 
showing no signs of resisting the Spanish.29
Bouligny noted that he did not depart that same day 
for Balize, as the men who had rowed him up the river 
were exhausted. During the delay he had a close watch kept 
on Marquis and Lafreniere, lest they decide not to go to 
meet with O'Reilly and instead organize a resistance. On 
Wednesday he again dined with Aubry who arranged for the 
senior captain of the French garrison to return with Boulig­
ny to bring Aubry's greeting to the Spanish General. 
O'Reilly's aide noted also that he had been very cautious 
in answering any questions put to him. Doubtless, he feared 
that he might unwittingly give comfort to anyone trying to 
resist the Spanish in any w a y . 30
In the meantime, the third delegate to greet O'Reilly 
had been chosen. This was Joseph Milhet. On Thursday,
July 27, Bouligny, accompanied by Aubry's captain and the 
three delegates of the people, descended the river to Balize
29Ibid. 30 Ibid.
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to meet the Volante as it was entering the pass. Bouligny 
reported to his superior and the delegates awaited their 
interview with O ’Reilly. According to Bouligny, the three 
men were quite ill at ease upon meeting the Spanish general, 
but Lafreniere was able to compose himself and make a con­
ciliatory statement to O'Reilly in the name of all of the 
colonists. He spoke thus to the general:
M. Marquis, ... M. Milhet, ... and I, ... have been 
chosen to come to assure Your Excellency of the sub­
mission to the orders of Their Most Christian and 
Catholic Majesties and of their veneration for the 
military virtues and talents that have placed Your 
Excellency in the high position in which you find 
yourself. ... The colony never had any intention of 
straying at all from the profound respect that 
it professes for the great monarch that Your Excel­
lency represents. The severity of the nature of Don 
Antonio de Ulloa, and the subversion of the privi­
leges assured by the act of cession have been the only 
cause of the uprisings that occurred in this colony.
... The colony implores of your kindness, privileges, 
and of your equity, sufficient delay for those that 
wish to emigrate.^1
These comments seem incongruous coming from the firebrand 
that led the insurrection against Ulloa. Presumably the 
overwhelming power of O'Reilly's forces had cooled Lafren­
iere 's revolutionary ardor. 2̂
The Spanish general listened intently to Lafreniere's 
comments and replied:
3lBouligny's Account of the Occupation of Louisiana, 
Ms., Tulane Archives, Kuntz Collection.
-^The "valiant" Lafreniere described by Fortier scarce­
ly seems to fit the picture of the man painted by Bouligny. 
Cf. Fortier, A History of Louisiana, I, 209.
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Gentlemen, it is not possible for men to judge things 
without first finding out about the prior circumstan­
ces; as soon as I arrive in the city I shall devote 
all my attention to becoming informed about everything 
thoroughly, and you may be sure that my greatest plea­
sure will be to do good, and that I shall regret very 
much to see myself compelled to do harm to anyone. I 
shall be the first to provide you with the means to 
pacify yourselves. Put the entire public at ease and 
assure it of the good disposition into which I find 
myself compelled by my character. I look with pleasure 
upon the step that you have taken, for you may be sure 
that otherwise I would have made the flag of my king re­
spected, and that nothing would have stopped me, ...
Have you imagined yourselves capable of resisting the 
forces of one of the most powerful kings of Europe, 
and have you ever thought that the Most Christian King 
(Louis XV)... would have ever supported or paid any at­
tention to the cries of a seditious p e o p l e ? 3 3
Certainly the general made his position clear and left no 
doubt that the rebels would be punished. This was obviously 
what the delegates understood, for Marquis interrupted the 
general and complained of the word "seditious." O'Reilly 
bade him hold his peace and told him that in time he would 
allow them to present their case. Turning from these seri­
ous matters, O'Reilly invited the three to dine with him 
aboard the frigate. Afterwards, Marquis, Lafreniere and 
Milhet returned to New Orleans "full of admiration for his 
(O'Reilly's) talents and very hopeful of his clemency."34
O'Reilly's account of his arrival and subsequent ac­
tions through the end of August of 1769 was less colorful
33Bouligny's Account of the Occupation of Louisiana,Tulane Archives, Kuntz Collection.
34Ibid.
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and less detailed than Bouligny's, but it corroborated and 
complemented the colonel's. Don Alejandro noted his depart­
ure from Havana on July 6, and his arrival and anchorage at 
the mouth of the Mississippi on July 22. It was due to a 
lack of a favorable wind that he decided to send Bouligny 
ahead by row boat to meet with Aubry. The general noted that 
the colonists had shown some signs of resistance. However, 
as soon as they learned of the size of his forces and of his 
determination, they became "more friendly."33
The three delegates sent by the colonists had aroused 
O'Reilly's suspicions. He believed that they had accompan­
ied Bouligny to ascertain the strength of the Spanish forces 
and to determine the general's true intentions. After he 
had met with them, O'Reilly was aware that they saw it would 
be useless to resist.3^
During the interview with the three colonists O'Reilly 
was certain that they were very anxious to learn his atti­
tude toward them in particular, and toward the colonists in 
general. He professed in his letter to the Minister of State 
that he was without prejudice toward anyone, but that he 
would do whatever justice required. It is interesting to 
note that he commented in this communique to Grimaldi that
330'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, August 31, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 72, L.C. pp. 218-220.
36Ibid., pp. 221-222.
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he had not deceived the delegates as to his intentions, but
nonetheless he had not permitted them to exonerate themselves
of all guilt. To the delegates he had stated that he would
not treat them unjustly, but he refused to commit himself as
to the nature or the extent of any punishment to be inflict- 
37ed. Undoubtedly, his evasiveness during the meeting led 
many historians, including Fortier, to accuse him of dupli­
city. However, O'Reilly's statements to the three men were 
certainly adequate to make his position clear. Men such as 
Lafreniere, Marquis and Milhet could hardly have believed 
that a rebellion against the Spanish -crown would go unpun­
ished. Moreover, due to circumstances, there was ample time 
for those who wished to do so to leave the colony. They met 
with the general on July 27, and it was not until August 18 
that O'Reilly disembarked in New Orleans.
When the three colonists returned to New Orleans, 
O'Reilly sent with them Spanish officers from his expedition 
to prepare for his arrival. They were on the whole well re­
ceived by the inhabitants of the colony. The only signs of 
opposition came from the Acadians and Germans who lived along 
the coast. Consequently, these two groups were warned by 
O'Reilly's emissaries of the destruction that awaited them 
if they dared to take up arms to resist the Spanish forces.38
37Ibid., pp. 223-224. 
38Ibid., pp. 225-227.
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After these preparatory moves, the general moved the 
convoy toward New Orleans. To avoid all unnecessary actions 
that might cause resistance, and to prevent the flight into 
English territory of some of the rebels, the convoy moved 
quietly into the New Orleans port during the night of Aug­
ust 16. The people living in and near the city were awakened 
on the morning of the 17th by cannon shot from the flotilla. 
When they arrived at the river's bank, they found the entire 
Spanish force anchored in the river. 9̂
Later during the day of the 17th, Aubry, the French 
Commissary Nicholas Foucault, and other French officials 
came aboard the frigate Volante to confer with General 
O'Reilly. Aubry pledged his loyalty to the Spanish king 
and gave his submission to O'Reilly. Foucault seemed to 
have nothing to offer but complaints against the former 
Spanish administration. O'Reilly, for his part, did not 
reveal his intentions to the French.^ Thus, for the 
remainder of the 17th the situation remained static. The 
stage was set for the impressive and near heraldic events 
that were to follow on the 18th--events quite in contrast 
to those surrounding the arrival of the first Spanish
3^0'Reilly to Munian? New Orleans, August 31, 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., 87-3-10, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi 
Valley, p. 91.
^ 0 'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, August 31, 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 72, L.C. pp. 228-230.
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Antonio de Ulloa. Bouligny vividly narrated these events:
Everything was ready for the 18th when pos­
session was taken of the Plaza with all the form 
and ceremony appropriate. Our troops in the center 
of the Plaza occupied the three sides of a square 
and the French militiamen closed the square. The 
General disembarked at 5:30 P.M., and came to the 
center of the Plaza, where he presented to M. Aubry 
that which he was waiting for, the order of His 
Most Catholic Majesty. Immediately the latter 
placed at his feet the keys of the city. At the 
same time, several Spanish flags were run up in all 
parts of the city, and the artillery of the Plaza 
and all the troops fired a general salute. After 
this, our General, with the French commandant and 
all the officers who were not under arms went into 
the Church where the Te Deum was sung as an act of 
Thanksgiving.̂ 1
After taking possession of Louisiana in the name of 
Charles III, O'Reilly again conferred with Aubry that same 
day. The general made it clear to Aubry that he intended 
to obtain all the necessary documents: "... para fundar la
causa contra los motores ..." of the rebellion.^ He left 
no doubt that he would do his utmost to punish the leaders 
of the insurrection. That there had existed a rebellion was 
public knowledge. The general's task was to ascertain the 
true causes of the uprising and to punish its leaders. To 
do this, witnesses would have to be called and all available 
information gathered and examined. The following day O'Reilly 
ordered Aubry to prepare an account of the events surrounding
^Bouligny' s Account, Tulane Archives, Kuntz Collection.
^ 0 ' Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, August 31, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, L.C. p. 235.
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the rebellion.^
The prompt cooperation given by Aubry indicated his 
devotion to duty and his desire to cooperate with the Span­
ish general. He was indeed able to fulfill O'Reilly's re­
quest. His testimony was important to Del Rey, the Prose­
cuting Attorney, in the conviction of the rebel leaders. The 
conspirators named by him in this report were Chauvin de La- 
freniere, Procurator General (Attorney General) of his col­
ony; Pierre Marquis, elected Colonel-general of the militia; 
Jean Baptiste Noyan, a militia captain; Ensign Bienville de 
Noyan of the French Navy; Nicholas Foucault, the French Com­
missary; and Joseph Villere", captain of the militia. Due 
to the urgency of O'Reilly's order, Aubry's report was but 
a preliminary one. He did not name all of the conspirators, 
nor did he give a full account of the causes of the insurrec­
tion. He promised O'Reilly that a complete report would be 
forthcoming.̂
On August 21, O'Reilly again conferred with the French 
governor. Later that day, each of the men (except Nicholas 
Foucault) who had been implicated by the witnesses as the 
prime movers and chief accomplices in the consipracy were
^ 0 ' Reilly to Aubry, New Orleans, August 19, 1769,
ibid., Doc. 72, "B," L.C. p. 257.
^Aubry to O'Reilly, New Orleans, August 20, 1769,
ibid., Doc. 72, "C," L.C. pp. 261-264.
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summoned to O'Reilly's residence. Upon their arrival, 
they were accused of sedition and treason and were arrested 
by the Spanish guards. Those detained were: Chauvin de La-
freniere, Hardi de Boisblanc, Balthasar Massan, Joseph 
Villere,^^ Pierre Marquis, Pierre Poupet, Joseph Petit,
Pierre Carresse, Julian Jerome Doucet, Jean and Joseph Mil- 
het, Jean Baptiste Noyan and M. Le Braud.^
The manner of their seizure was not unusual in Spanish 
procedure. Each man was charged with sedition and treason 
and arrested in the name of the king. Then they were "... 
taken as prisoners two by two and accompanied by various com­
panies of grenadiers; they passed through a throng of people, 
stunned to see exercised a justice that up to then they were 
not acquainted with."^8 Two 0f those arrested were put in 
confinement in the treasury building, eight were placed on 
the Spanish ships anchored in the port, and three were placed
^Bouligny's Account, Tulane Archives, Kuntz Collec­
tion.
^According to Fortier, Joseph Villere" was arrested 
later. (A History of Louisiana, I, 215.)
4?List attached to letter from O'Reilly to Grimaldi,
New Orleans, August 31, 1769, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 
72, "D," L.C. p. 265.
Le Braud was released since he presented the "Memorial" 
on order to Foucault, his superior. (Cf. Gayarre, History 
of Louisiana, II, 313.)
^Bouligny's Account, Tulane Archives, Kuntz Collec­
tion.
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under guard in the barracks area.^
The dread i n s t i l l e d  in  the people  by th e se  sudden a r ­
r e s t s  made O 'R e i l l y  see  the n e c e s s i t y  o f  q u i e t i n g  t h e i r  
f e a r s .  T h er e fore ,  he summoned the merchants o f  the c i t y  and 
spoke to  them r e a s s u r in g ly :
Gentlemen, may what you have just seen not cause the 
slightest uneasiness in anyone. That is a precise 
justice in order to assure for you and this entire 
city the quiet and tranquillity which it has lacked 
for so long. The prisoners will be judged; each one 
will be granted all possible means to justify himself; 
the innocent will be set free, and the guilty will 
suffer the penalty of the laws. Notwithstanding this, 
the many confederates that the prisoners had in this 
country have caused an almost general desolation; fear 
has overcome the rest, and I believe that this alone 
will be sufficient so that they will never (again) 
think of departing from the legitimate obedience of 
their sovereign .5”
Shortly after this, the general commanded that a Proc­
lamation, dated August 21, 17 69, be posted on the doors and 
the corners of buildings throughout the city. It granted a 
general amnesty to the populace of New Orleans and of Louisi­
ana who had "... allowed itself to be led astray by the in­
trigues of ambitious ... people." Each citizen, the decree 
stated, should consider himself thankful that he was the sub­
ject of so merciful a king as Charles III, and out of grati­
tude should show unswerving fidelity to His Most Catholic
^ O ' R e i l l y  to Grimaldi, New Orleans, August 31, 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 72, L.C. p. 239.




Another proclamation was issued by the Spanish governor 
on August 23, 1769. It ordered all of the inhabitants to 
assemble on the following day before the dwelling in which 
O'Reilly was lodged. Here the citizens were commanded to
C Otake the oath of fealty to Charles III. However, the 
actual procedure of administering this oath to all the 
classes of citizens was not completed until August 26th, when 
everyone, including the clergy, promised his allegiance to 
the Spanish monarch. Each person signed his name to the 
formulary, which, along with other documents, was sent to 
Don Juan Gregorio de Munian, member of the Council of the 
Indies.53
In the meantime, O'Reilly ordered the arrest of Nicholas 
Foucault, the French Commissary. In a communication to 
Aubry on August 23rd, the general noted that he had before 
him the original of a paper called, "The Memorial of the 
Inhabitants and Merchants of Louisiana," printed by M.
Le Braud under orders from Foucault. This document was
^Proclamation of Amnesty, New Orleans, August 21,
1769, Bancroft Library copy in French, in Kinnaird, Spain 
in the Mississippi Valley, p. 89; Proclamation of Amnesty,
New Orleans, August 21, 1769, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 
72, L.C. p. 274; Bouligny's Account, Tulane Archives, Kuntz 
Collection.
^proclamation, August 23, 1769, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 
2543, Doc. 72, L.C. p. 279.
53o'Reilly to Munian, New Orleans, August 31, 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., 87-3-1, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi 
Valley, pp. 90-91.
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most offensive to His Catholic Majesty and to the Spanish 
nation. Because of Foucault's orders to have this paper 
printed and because of the grave accusations implicating 
him in the rebellion, O'Reilly requested that Aubry order 
his a r r e s t .  ̂ 4- In his reply, Aubry told O'Reilly that he 
had immediately ordered the arrest of Foucault. Moreover, 
he noted that even if O'Reilly had not ordered the commi- 
sary's arrest, he would have taken him into custody. Aubry 
maintained that not only had Foucault ordered the printing 
of the "Memorial", but he had abused his authority, and had 
been a chief leader among those who had aroused the people
Iin the rebellion. Aubry had chosen M. Baube, Foucault's 
assistant to replace the c o m m i s a r y T h a t  Foucault as a 
French official, was beyond the jurisdiction of the Spanish 
courts is thus clearly indicated by this exceptional action 
taken by Aubry at O'Reilly's request.
In his report to Munian, O'Reilly summed up the events
of the first few days of his occupation, giving a clear
picture of the state of affairs in the colony:
"... On the 21st, I had all the principal 
leaders and instigators of the recent up­
rising arrested; on the 26th, the inhabi­
tants of all classes took an oath of
5^0'Reilly to Aubry, New Orleans, August 23, 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, L.C. pp. 275-277.
S^Aubry to O'Reilly, New Orleans, August 24, 1769,
ibid., p. 278.
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fealty before me, each one signing his name 
in the order in which Your Excellency will 
see from the attached formulary No. 1.
... The edict, of which I enclose a copy, 
reassured the populace, which was greatly 
terrified.
... With the leaders already imprisoned 
and their property confiscated, their trials 
are now proceeding in accordance with the 
laws, before the judges whom I brought from 
Havana for this purpose .... Not an officer 
or even a soldier has said a single improper 
word to these people. This great moderation
and good conduct has filled these natives
with confusion, as they (through malign in­
fluences) had so greatly wronged our nation 
without knowing us.... My measures up to 
now have produced as favorable effects as 
might be desired for the King, the public, 
and my own satisfaction...."5d
Indeed, the new subjects of the Spanish king seemed to 
be overwhelmed by O'Reilly's military power and his adminis­
trative tactics. He had combined the swift arrest of the
leaders of the insurrection with a general amnesty for the 
average citizen. Within ten days after his arrival in New 
Orleans, he had established order and imprisoned the leaders 
of the rebellion. In the communique to Munian, the general 
confidently assured the minister of the Council of Indies 
that within four months all of the tasks assigned to him in 
Louisiana would be performed, and he would then be ready to 
depart for Havana. There he planned to await whatever
5^0'Reilly to Munian, New Orleans, August 31, 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., 87-3-1, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi 
Valley, pp. 90-92.
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further instructions the King chose to send him.-^ His 
optimistic view of the amount of time needed for settling 
the affairs of the colony was not far wrong. Within two
r
months of the predicted period he had brought order to 
Louisiana and had departed for Havana.
57 Ibid. , p. 92 .
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THE TRIAL OF THE REBELS
The trial of those indicted as leaders of the rebellion 
against Don Antonio de Ulloa began late in August, 1769, and 
did not terminate until October 24. It was conducted accord­
ing to the standard Spanish judicial procedures. The promotor 
fiscal, or royal prosecuting attorney, was Felix del Rey, 
advocate of the Royal Audiencias of Santo Domingo and of New 
Spain. He was assisted by the official scribe of the expe­
dition, Francisco Xavier Rodriguez.-*- The Spanish court set 
out to prove that there had been a conspiracy to oust Ulloa, 
and that treason and sedition had been committed by the 
leaders of the rebellion. The prosecutor began the trial by 
obtaining sworn statements from many witnesses. His key 
witness was the acting French governor, Charles Phillipe 
Aubry, whose testimony was basically the same as that in 
Aubry's letter to O'Reilly on August 20. On that day the 
Spanish general had told Aubry that as a witness to the
•*-0'Reilly to Bucareli, Havana, June 27 , 1769, Dis­
patches of the Spanish Governors, 1766-1791, Book I, Vol.
I, (translated 1937-38), Survey of Federal Archives,
Tulane University, New Orleans, La.
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insurrection, he (Aubry) was expected to give: "... the
true causes, with the names of the persons who led the 
people to commit the offense of being present in this 
Plaza, for the purpose of bringing about the violent ex­
pulsion of Don Antonio ..."^ Aubry immediately answered 
this letter and provided an account of the causes of the 
rebellion, with the names of most of the men arrested as 
leaders in the conspiracy.^
Before giving the names of the rebel leaders and the 
parts they played, Aubry sketched the background of the 
revolt against Ulloa. In explaining the circumstances 
surrounding the insurrection, he listed as one of its 
important causes a shortage of troops in Louisiana, which 
resulted from the fact that the expected enlistments of 
the French soldiers in the Spanish army had not occurred.
Due to this drastic shortage of troops, the French and 
Spanish commanders had even been forced to pool their man­
power to defend the colony. They had placed their few men 
at posts along the Mississippi where they found British 
fortresses or troop concentrations on the river's east bank.
Aubry further noted that the colonists meanwhile had 
accepted Ulloa as the legal governor. They had acknowledged
^O'Reilly to Aubry, New Orleans, August 19, 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 72, "B," L.C. pp. 257-260.
3Aubry to O'Reilly, New Orleans, August 20, 1769, 
ibid., Doc. 72, "C," L.C. pp. 257-260.
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Spanish authority and knew that Spain was the source of 
their money supply and that the Spanish government also 
issued the passports for the colony. It was Aubry's 
opinion that the shortage of troops had prevented Ulloa 
from taking possession of the colony at New Orleans. The 
French commander commented that another factor in encourag­
ing the revolt was undoubtedly the issuance by Spain of the 
two restrictive mercantile decrees of 1766 and 1768 
respectively. But in the last analysis Aubry held that the 
chief cause of the insurrection was the Superior Council's 
ambition to become the supreme governing body in the colony.4
The men named by Aubry as the leading conspirators
/  vwere: Cnauvm de Lafreniere, Procurator General of the
colony; Nicholas Foucault, French Commissary; Balthasar Massan, 
Chevalier of Saint Louis; Pierre Marquis, retired Commandant 
of the Swiss company under Louis XV; Chevalier Bienville 
de Noyan, Ensign of the Royal French Navy;^ Joseph Villere, 
Captain of the militia along the German Coast; Jean Baptiste 
Noyan, retired Captain of French cavalry;^ and Jerome Julian 
Doucet, a lawyer recently arrived from France. These men
4Ibid., pp. 261-264.
CJThis Bienville was a nephew of the famous governor of 
Louisiana, the Sieur de Bienville.
^Noyan was also a nephew of Sieur de Bienville.
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had set out to destroy Aubry's efforts to induce the
colonists to accept Spanish rule. Moreover, they had
convinced the people that the Spanish governor was a
tyrant and that if the Spaniards remained in control of
Louisiana, the colonists would be no better off than 
7slaves.
According to Aubry1s testimony the conspiracy among 
these men was so well guarded that it was not until four 
days before the actual revolt, that is, on October 25,
1768, that their plans were discovered. The French 
commandant said that he had informed Ulloa of the plot 
so that the two men could act together in this serious 
matter. Then, on October 26, he called together his 
officers and men and informed them that he wished no harm 
to come to the Spanish governor. Unfortunately, Aubry 
had at his command only about one hundred regulars. On 
that same evening, October 26, the French commandant con­
ferred with Attorney General Lafreniere, who told him that 
he had in his possession a petition from the colonists 
addressed to Commissary Foucault. This document asked 
Foucault to call a special meeting of the Superior Council 
to plan measures to remove Don Antonio de Ulloa and the other
^Aubry to O'Reilly, New Orleans, August 20, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 72, "C," L.C. pp. 261-264.
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Spanish officials from the colony. Lafreniere, moreover, 
told Aubry that the entire male populace of New Orleans 
and its environs was armed at that very moment.
Seeing the extent of the conspiracy, Aubry said he 
appealed to Lafreniere and Foucault to halt it, but 
Lafreniere answered that it had progressed too far, and 
Foucault was noncommittal in his reply to Aubry. On October 
27, Ulloa agreed to hear the Council's demands in order to 
avoid bloodshed. The colonists were expected to have 
delegates at the meeting to present their case, and they 
had promised to attend unarmed. On the following day, how­
ever, the situation worsened considerably, as large groups 
of armed men were gathering near the city. At that point, 
Aubry said that he had feared for Ulloa's safety. The 
French governor convinced the Spanish governor that he and 
his family should take refuge aboard the Spanish frigate 
Volante, where they could be more readily protected by the 
French and Spanish troops.
By October 29 approximately one thousand armed men led 
by members of the Superior Council, were in the Plaza 
carrying white flags and shouting, "Long live the King of 
France", and "We want no other King." Braving this mob and 
trying to-quiet them, Aubry said that he addressed himself 
to the Superior Council and reminded its members that Ulloa's 
person was sacred and that he represented a great monarch.
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In spite of these efforts, as Aubry noted, the insurrection 
continued. After Ulloa's departure, Marquis with a company 
of sixty or seventy men, went in pursuit of Don Antonio's 
ship. Hearing of this, Aubry commanded Marquis and his men 
to return to New Orleans. The French commandant noted that 
for the first time since the rebellion had begun, they obeyed 
him. 8
Aubry then made his charges against individual rebels.
He asserted that Marquis had consistently refused obedience 
to him, the supreme commander. The only occasion on which 
Marquis had obeyed orders was in the incident concerning the 
pursuit of Ulloa's ship. Moreover, after Ulloa's expulsion, 
Marquis had proposed the establishment of a republic, there­
by demanding independence even of France. Aubry stated that 
Doucet had helped to compose the infamous "Memorial of the 
Inhabitants and Merchants." He testified that Joseph
Villere had defied him, and had stirred up the Germans and
the Acadians who lived along the coast. Villere^ had also 
accompanied the Acadians in their march on the city of New
Orleans. Massan, he noted, had held meetings with the
conspirators in his house, and had spoken out against Spanish 
rule in virulent language. Aubry leveled no definite charges
8Ibid., p. 264-271.
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against either Ensign Bienville or Noyan, but he named them 
as accomplices in the insurrection.^
In a later statement to O'Reilly, Aubry gave detailed 
accusations against Commissary Foucault. He charged Foucault 
with calling the Council into session to discuss the "Memorial" 
on October 28, and of later ordering the printing and dis­
tribution of that same "Memorial" among the people. More­
over, as Aubry noted, instead of siding with him, Foucault
/ Vhad supported Lafreniere and the other rebels in inciting 
the people to revolt. Aubry held that these actions were all 
the more offensive and worthy of condemnation, as Foucault 
in his official capacity as commissary knew that the colony 
was a Spanish possession. He had been officially informed 
by the Duke de Praslin in a letter of February 23, 1767, 
that once Don Antonio de Ulloa arrived in Louisiana the 
colony was to be considered Spanish.10
Charles Garic, the chief scribe of the Superior Council, 
also testified against Foucault. He stated that the Com­
missary had abided by the Council's decision to oust Ulloa, 
and that he had gone with Lafreniere to ask Aubry to assume
^Aubry's testimony, A.H.N., Papeles de Estado (herein­
after cited as P.E.), Legajo 20.854, Foxas 21-26, ^cited in 
Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacion espatiola, 
pp. 396-399.
■^Aubry's testimony concerning Foucault, attached to 
O'Reilly's letter to Grimaldi, October 17, 1769, A.G.I.S.D., 
Legajo 2543, "E", L.C. pp. 327-332.
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11the reins of government.
O'Reilly resolved to accept Foucault's claims that 
since he was a French official directly appointed by Louis 
XV he was not subject to the Spanish tribunal. Nevertheless, 
the governor chose to obtain a statement from him before 
sending Foucault to France for trial. Although charged 
with all of the above offenses by Aubry, Foucault refused 
to make any answer to them, except to admit that he had 
ordered the printing of the "Memorial." He was finally
12sent to France in the custody of a Spanish sergeant major.
It is clear that there was weighty evidence against 
Foucault. Had he been subject to the Spanish tribunal he 
would have undoubtedly been convicted along with the other 
leaders of the insurrection. As it was, he arrived in France 
at La Rochelle and was arrested there by French officials on 
December 30, 1769. From La Rochelle he was taken to the 
Bastille. His hearing and trial proceedings continued 
there until June of 1771, at which time his case was dis-
Garic's testimony concerning Foucault, attached to 
O'Reilly's letter to Grimaldi, New Orleans, October 17, 1769, 
ibid., 7," L.C. p. 339.
•^Ibid. , Enclosure "E," L.C. pp. 327-332; O'Reilly to 
Grimaldi, New Orleans, October 17, 1769, ibid., L.C. pp. 317- 
320.
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1 ̂missed and he was set at liberty. J
Another key witness for the prosecution was Don Esteban 
Gayarre, chief auditor under Governor Ulloa. Gayarre im­
plicated Lafreniere, Foucault, Carresse, Villere, Marquis, 
Noyan and Massan. He stressed the vital role played by 
Lafreniere in organizing the conspiracy, stating that: "... 
acting among them as chief or head was the said Lafreniere, 
with whose consent the others worked in everything related 
to the conspiracy; and the writings or papers leading to 
it which publicly manifested his consent (to it) and his 
hatred of the Spanish nation, were produced (with his con­
sent), ..." He further stated that Marquis was the leader 
of the rebellious militia units and that Massan had been a 
militia commander under Marquis. Noyan and Villere" were 
also named by him as leading conspirators, and Villere was 
accused of stirring up the Germans and the Acadians.^ Thus, 
in addition to corroborating Aubry's testimony against Lafren­
iere, Foucault, Massan, Villere, Marquis and Noyan, Gayarre 
added Carresse to the list of conspirators.
The next witness for the state was Don Martin Navarro, 
royal treasurer for the colony of Louisiana under Ulloa. He
■^Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacion espa- 
nola, pp. 332-333.
■^Testimony of Don Esteban Gayarre, A.H.N.P.E., Legajo 
2_0.854, Foxas ll-vL2, printed in Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros 
anos de dominacion espanola, pp. 388-391.
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^ \also testified that Lafreniere had been the main leader of
the insurrection. He then named Foucault, Massan, Marquis,
/Carresse and Noyan as conspirators. Villere, he stated, had
stirred up the Germans and the Acadians. His testimony
corroborated Gayarre's indictment of Carresse, supported
sAubry's charges against Villere, and added weight to the 
charges made against Foucault, Massan, Marquis and Noyan. 
Navarro gave further testimony naming Jerome Doucet as a 
main accomplice. This man had been accused by Aubry of 
helping to draw up the "Memorial". Navarro then added new 
names to the list of conspirators and accomplices when he 
accused the Milhet brothers, Jean and Joseph, of leading 
their respective militia units against Governor Ulloa.
Moreover, Joseph Petit, according to Navarro, had been a 
prime mover in the rebellion, while Pierre Poupet and Hardi
*1 Cde Boisblanc had been leading accomplices. The case for 
the crown was indeed becoming strong.
Another important witness was Jose Melchor de Acosta, 
captain of the frigate Volante. He gave evidence against ten 
of the twelve who were to be later convicted. His accusations, 
with those of Aubry, Gayarre and Navarro, gave the state two 
reliable witnesses testifying against each of the accused.
*! C-‘--’Testimony of Don Martin Navarro, A.H.N.P.E., Legajo
20.854, Foxas 14, 15, 16, ibid., pp. 392-394.
After swearing that he would tell the truth, the captain 
noted that four or five days prior to the rebellion he had 
heard rumors of a possible uprising and had immediately 
informed Don Antonio de Ulloa. De Acosta then went on to
recount his experiences during the last stages of the in­
surrection:
...presently on the evening of the day 
preceding the rebellion, he encountered
M. Lafreniere in Aubry's house and
observed that he was beside himself with 
anger, and that he allowed himself to 
say, while walking about his room, that 
M. Foucault was an evil man, and Lafreniere 
was even worse, ..."
De Acosta continued to testify that Aubry had told him that 
he (Aubry) had tried to learn from Lafreniere what was trans­
piring in the colony. From this conversation with Lafreniere, 
Aubry was convinced that the conspiracy was being instigated
^  ^  1 /Iand led by Foucault and Lafreniere.
He further noted that Boisblanc and Carresse had been 
associated with the chief conspirator, Lafreniere; and he 
then accused Joseph Milhet of joining the rebel band that 
gathered in New Orleans. He said that Villere had accompanied 
the Acadians. Foucault, he commented, had ordered M. Denis 
Braud to print the "Memorial," which Doucet had helped to 
draw up. Massan was accused of allowing the conspirators to
^Testimony of Captain Jose Melchor de Acosta, A.H.N.P.E., 
Legajo 20.854, Foxa? 8-11, ibid., pp. 383-387.
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meet in his home, and of being a member of the revolutionary 
Superior Council. De Acosta also accused Boisblanc and 
Petit of being collaborating members of the Council. He 
named Poupet as its treasurer, and he cited Jean Milhet 
for leading his militia unit in pursuit of Don Antonio on 
the vessel which was taking him to Balize for safety.^
This extensive testimony was given by presumably trust­
worthy men, who were either French or Spanish officials. 
Consequently, it is little wonder that the prosecutor for 
the Spanish crown had no difficulty in presenting a con­
vincing case against the rebels. Felix del Rey, the pro- 
motor fiscal, very carefully stated the case for the crown.
In his preliminary statement, he reviewed the background of 
the rebellion. Next he drew up the case against the leaders 
and chief accomplices. Finally, he elaborated upon the 
Spanish laws under which the accused were to be sentenced, 
if proven guilty.
In his opening statement, the prosecutor pointed out 
that by an act of cession the colony of Louisiana had been 
transferred from France to Spain; that Don Antonio de Ulloa 
had been sent by His Most Catholic Majesty to take possession 
of the colony; that Ulloa, due to a shortage of troops, had 
decided to postpone the formal act of possession until more
17 Ibid.
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troops had arrived from Spain; that Governor Aubry and 
Governor Ulloa had worked together in the administration 
of the colony; that some months after Ulloa's arrival, 
formal possession had in fact been taken by Ulloa at the 
post of Balize, and the Spanish flag had been raised at 
the other posts of the colony; "... Don Carlos Aubry made 
formal delivery of the fort at Balize and of all other posts 
in the Province to Don Antonio, ... as the person destined 
for that end by His Most Catholic Majesty, the new Lord of 
this country, ..."^® He maintained, in effect, that as a re­
sult of this transfer and Ulloa's actual administrative 
actions, the colony of Louisiana was not only de jure, but 
also de facto Spanish. For further proof he noted that the 
military, civil and ecclesiastical officials recognized Ulloa 
as the rightful Spanish governor. Moreover, Spanish money 
supported the colony; salaries of officials were paid by 
the Spanish commissary; military posts were built and old 
ones were repaired at Spanish expense; churches were like­
wise repaired and new ones built by the Spanish; and, finally, 
passports were issued by the Spanish authorities. All of 
these things proved, Del Rey stated, that the colony was in 
law and in fact under the dominion of Spain. In addition to
1 8J-°Acusacion de Promotor Fiscal, attached to letter from 
O'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, October 28, 1769, A.G.I.S.D., 
Legajo 2543, Doc. 78(2), L.C. pp. 360-364.
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this, the Duke of Praslin himself had informed Commissary 
Foucault in 1767, that henceforth in Louisiana the only 
legal money was Spanish. No further evidence, Del Rey 
commented, was needed to prove that Louisiana was in fact 
a Spanish colony.^
The prosecutor then discussed the origins of the 
rebellion. He noted that there were a few individuals who 
had been dissatisfied with Spanish rule. These had spoken 
out against the commercial decrees issued by the Spanish 
government, declaring that the colonists would be worse 
off than slaves under Spanish rule. Meanwhile, the con­
spirators induced a number of men to sign a petition of 
grievances against the new government, and presented it to 
the Superior Council. This petition contained many state­
ments offensive to the Spanish nation, demanding among other 
things the expulsion of Don Antonio and his followers.
It was under the leadership of Nicholas Foucault and 
Chauvin de Lafreniere that the rebellion took form. These 
were joined by Balthasar Massan, Ensign Bienville, Jean 
Baptiste Noyan, Pierre Marquis and Joseph Milhet. Under the 
guidance of Lafreniere and Carresse, the "Representation" 
was soon drawn up. Joseph Villere, meanwhile, was inciting to 
rebellion the Germans along the coast, while Noyan stirred
^ Ibid. , pp. 364-365, 391-392. Del Rey' s convincing 
arguments seem to render untenable Fortier's defense of the 
justice of the rebels' cause and his assertion that the col­




Continuing his case, del Rey noted that when Aubry 
learned of the conspiracy on October 25, he tried to get 
Lafreniere to dissociate himself from it. But the latter 
stated that events were beyond his control, and nothing he 
might do could halt the insurrection. On October 28, the 
"Memorial" had been presented to the Superior Council which 
debated it and accepted it the following day. That same 
day, October 29, Marquis led his militia units into the 
Plaza and was joined there by the rest of the conspirators 
who were at the head of groups of armed men. These develop­
ments forced Governor Ulloa and his followers to depart 
from New Orleans on the French ship Ulloa had chartered.
Del Rey held that these crimes against the Spanish nation 
were the fruits of a conspiracy whose leaders and accomplices 
were the following: Chauvin de Lafreniere,^ Jean Baptiste
Noyan, Balthasar Massan, Pierre Marquis, Joseph Villere^ (dead 
at the time of the trial), Pierre Carresse, Hardi de Bois- 
blanc, Joseph Petit, Jean and Joseph Milhet, Pierre Poupet, 
Jerome Julian Doucet, Nicholas Foucault and Ensign Bienville. 
The last two, as officials of the French government, were 
not considered by O'Reilly and del Rey to be subject to the
^There is no evidence that Lafreniere, although also 
appointed by the French king, was ever considered by O’Reilly 




The prosecutor went on to state that although all who 
took part in the rebellion were in fact guilty of treason, 
nevertheless, due to the great mercy of His Most Catholic 
Majesty, only the leaders and leading accomplices would be 
prosecuted. The rebel leaders were guilty of a crime which 
was "... against the Person of the Prince and is by its nature 
(a crime) of lese majeste and subject to the punishment of 
natural death and confiscation of goods. ..." However, the 
Promotor Fiscal stated that he did not wish to rest his case 
on the general principles involved in the crime of lese
majeste, but rather on those laws of Spain which applied
7 7specifically to the crimes of sedition and treason.
In his proof of sedition and treason, del Rey said that 
the leaders had convinced the people that their liberties 
were being violated. Consequently, the conspirators told 
the people they had a right to take up arms to defend their 
alleged rights. The leaders then persuaded the populace in 
and around New Orleans to rise up against its legitimate 
ruler, Don Antonio de Ulloa, the representative of the 
Spanish king. Del Rey logically concluded that as Ulloa 
was the king's representative, the rebellion had been a 
crime against the monarch's authority, and: "... those who
21-Acusacion de Promotor Fiscal, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, 
Doc. 72(2), L.C. pp. 366-382.
22Ibid., p. 383.
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so rise up are traitors and~mdst die for it and lose what­
ever they possess."23
Thus the leaders were guilty of both sedition and 
treason when they caused the rebellion. This crime carried 
the penalties of death and confiscation of all property. 
Undoubtedly the leaders of the rebellion were guilty of 
breaking these laws for:
The insurrectionists conspired openly against 
the Realm, drawing the colony away from the 
Catholic domination, execrating laws, the 
government, and the nation, with furious 
invectives, and this is in hatred of the 
crown, ... which is also covered by this 
last law: "In hatred of Him or of the
Realm."24
Due to yet another law that made it treasonable to entice 
away from the rule of Spain any of its legitimate subjects, the 
leaders of the insurrection were doubly guilty. The violation 
of this law also demanded the penalties of death and confis­
cation of all p r o p e r t y . 25 The Crown's attorney had no doubt 
that the accused had violated these laws, as the colony of 
Louisiana was the legitimate possession of Spain, having 
been ceded to Charles III by the Louis XV. The act of transfer 





... that crime was perpetrated against 
His Most Catholic Majesty and his State 
... in this colony, which he (Charles III) 
had gained possession of through the min­
istry of Don Antonio de Ulloa, and the 
right to which he held by virtue of the 
act of cession from the Most Christian 
King, which (act) was obeyed by the 
Council and was made public in the 
colony by his order. ...26
After the witnesses had given their testimony and del 
Rey had lodged these formal charges against the accused, he 
began to question the prisoners. Each man was interrogated 
separately. Each was told of the crimes with which he was 
charged and was confronted with the testimony made against 
him by the witnesses for the State. Those indicted then 
either denied or admitted the accusations. There was no 
trial by jury in Spanish law nor was the trial held in a 
public court. Trial by jury was a tradition of Anglo-Saxon, 
not Roman law; but Spain, as well as the other countries of 
Europe, then had a government which derived its legal system 
from Roman jurisprudence.
The procedures in this trial, therefore, must be viewed 
in the light of the standards set for Spanish trials as they 
were conducted in the eighteenth century.
The first of the conspirators to be examined was Lafren 
iere. As he was the procurator general for the colony, the 
prosecutor considered him the most culpable. He was guilty
26Ibid., p. 388.
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of abusing his position of power by using it to instill
sedition in the hearts of the people. The promotor fiscal
so accused him:
He was the first who had put into the minds of 
the people the execration of the government and 
of the Spanish nation, using to the utmost the 
influence he had gained by his intrepedity and 
by his position as attorney general, to put into 
the minds (of the people) the spirit of rebellion 
and to bring them over to his faction; and it 
(the spirit of rebellion) began to grow stronger 
among a group of his relatives, ... he, together 
with Foucault, was the author of these seditions; 
he directed the "Memorial" and he arranged with 
Carresse for the Council to decree the expulsion 
of Don Antonio de Ulloa; ... he named to the 
Council, with Foucault, councillors of his 
faction, to foment and to favor his views; and, 
finally, in the Council on October 29, of the 
preceding year, he aided with excessive fervor 
and extraordinary vehemence, the pretensions of 
the rebels, and he resolved that taking possess­
ion (of the colony) could not be proposed, nor 
was it intended, through any means except new 
orders from His Most Christian Majesty....27
Furthermore, del Rey said that Lafreniere knowingly acted
against the wishes of both the kings of France and of Spain,
whose commands he knew were above any acts of the Superior
Council. As procurator general he should have sided with
Aubry and not with the rebels.2®
Lafreniere’s explanation for his actions at the time of
the rebellion were not convincing to del Rey. The defendant
stated that he had not sided with Aubry at the time of the
27Ibid., pp. 395-396.
28Ibid., pp. 397-400.
meeting of the Superior Council, since protocol did not 
allow him to be present when the governor was attending a 
meeting. He denied all of the charges against him, ad­
mitting only that he had read the "Memorial" to the 
members of the Council. He did ask pardon, however, for 
not having softened the violent expressions contained in 
the "Memorial." He further protested that he was not one 
of the rebel leaders. He insisted that it was Carresse 
and not he who was responsible for the drafting of the 
"Memorial" on October 27, 1768, and who, together with 
certain others, had presented this document to him. Never­
theless, the prosecution was able to show, on the basis of 
the testimony of reliable witnesses, that the said "Memorial 
was in Lafreniere's possession prior to the date claimed 
by the defendant. The defendant also claimed that he could 
in no way have complied with Aubry's request that he stop 
the insurrection. The prosecutor replied that his key 
position in all matters relating to the rebellion certainly 
enabled him to quell the u p r i s i n g . 29
29ibid., pp. 401-402, 409. Lafreniere's denial that he 
was a rebel leader, his shifting to Carresse all blame for 
the drafting of the "Memorial" and his apology for not re­
moving offensive statements from that protest are noteworthy 
and revealing. During the trial he appears a much different 
person from the one portrayed by Fortier, who praised 
Lafreniere's "patriotism, boldness, and heroism." The trial 
documents reveal a man who seems frightened, one whose im­
plication of others hardly becomes the patriot or hero. (Cf 
Fortier, A History of Louisiana, I, 232.)
99
Finally, in his defense Lafreniere offered the argu­
ment that Ulloa had not taken formal possession of the 
colony. Consequently, Ulloa had been expelled as a private 
individual, and not as a representative of the Spanish 
crown; treason, therefore, was out of the question. Lafren­
iere based his argument on the fact that the Spanish flag 
had not been raised at New Orleans but rather at Balize 
and other posts. This, the prosecutor noted, was a weak 
argument in light of all of the facts presented in the 
opening statement to prove that the colony was both de jure 
and cte facto a Spanish possession. Had not, commented 
del Rey, Lafreniere received his salary as procurator 
general in Spanish money, paid by the Spanish treasury in 
Louisiana? By this very fact Lafreniere himself had recog-
onnized the actual possession of the colony by Spain. In­
deed, there were too many witnesses against Lafreniere for 
his defense to be acceptable. Aubry, Navarro, and Trudeaux 
had all testified that he was one of the chief leaders in 
the rebellion. The prosecution's case against the procurator 
general was too strong to be shaken, without some overwhelm­
ing evidence to the contrary. Lafreniere was unable to 
offer any such evidence in his defense.
^Confesion de Senor Lafreniere, A.H.N.P.E., Legajo
20.854, Foxas 356,-363, £ited in Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros 
ahos de dominacion espanola, pp. 474-482.
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The case for conspiracy against Jean Baptiste Noyan 
appears equally convincing. Felix del Rey charged him with 
inducing the Acadians to take up arms and to march to the 
city of New Orleans, thereby adding to the threat against 
Ulloa. He was further accused of being: "... one of those
who concurred with the cabals, prior to the event (rebellion); 
spreading complaints against Don Antonio de Ulloa, freely 
speaking out with others who were desirous of his (Ulloa1s) 
expulsion. ...". In addition to these charges, Noyan was 
accused of urging the Superior Council to vote for the ex­
pulsion of Ulloa. Moreover, from the beginning of Ulloa's 
arrival in Louisiana, Noyan had refused to accept Spanish rule, 
and he had spoken of keeping "our lives always French and 
never Spanish, ..."31
In his statement before the prosecutor Noyan admitted 
doing and saying all of the things of which he was accused.
His defense, however, was that his words and actions had 
never been seditious. He claimed that he had only acted in 
a manner that he considered loyal to his master, the French 
king. Noyan's defense, although unacceptable to del Rey, 
does illustrate that Noyan was firm in his resolves, unlike 
Lafreniere who sought to disavow involvement in the con­
spiracy. The promotor fiscal commented in regard to Noyan 
that he had confessed only to those things with which he was
•̂̂ ■Acusacion de Promotor Fiscal. A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 
2543, Doc. 78(2), L.C. pp. 423-425.
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charged and not to crimes of which he had not been accused.
He also noted that Noyan had signed the confession as he 
always signed his papers and documents,in a steady hand and
O Oin his usual manner.  ̂ These comments were apparently made 
to indicate to the Spanish court that the confession had not 
been forced from him but had been freely made. General 
O'Reilly and his prosecutor obviously took great pains to 
see that the trial was carried out properly. No evidence 
of any torture has been found.
As in the case against Lafreniere, so in the case 
against Noyan, the court proved conclusively that any attempt 
to demonstrate that the actions of the accused were merely 
the actions of loyalty to Louis XV, and not actions disloyal 
to Charles III, was pointless. The prosecution had fully 
proven that owing to the act of cession and the orders of 
both monarchs, none of the inhabitants of Louisiana could 
legally deny the authority of the Spanish governor without 
defying both the French and Spanish kings.
Pierre Marquis who held the elected office of colonel 
general of the Louisiana militia was also charged with serious 
offenses. Against the express command of his superior, 
Governor Aubry, ha had incited the militia to rebel against 




although he did finally return to New Orleans at the command 
of Aubry. He had been named to the new sindico for the 
rebellious colony after the departure of Ulloa and had 
accepted this position in the new illegal government. 
Reflecting the sentiments of his homeland, Switzerland, he 
was charged with advocating a republic in Louisiana. Had 
this idea been accepted, del Rey noted, not only would the 
colonists have openly defied Spain, but also France, the 
nation to which the rebels allegedly were loyal. Marquis, 
furthermore, had voted for the approval of the "Memorial" 
against the Spanish.^3
Marquis in his defense claimed that he had always held 
the post of colonel general of the militia with the approval 
of Aubry. This the court could not accept in the face of 
Aubry's testimony to the contrary. It was impossible for 
the prosecutor to believe that Aubry could have continued 
to approve as colonel general a man involved in the rebellion 
against the legitimate Spanish governor whom Aubry accepted. 
In addition to this, the defendant denied that he had 
endeavored to establish a republic in the colony. The court 
had too much testimony to the contrary to accept this claim. 
Finally, he denied being a leader of the rebels at the 
meeting of the Superior Council, stating that he went there
3^Ibid.% pp. 434-436.
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merely because he had been requested to be present. Such 
"non-rebellious" statements from a man considered by Fortier 
as a forerunner of men like George Washington and John Adams 
are not what one would expect of a sincere patriot in a true 
revolution.
Regardless of whatever else he might have denied, Marquis 
had to admit that he had indeed led the militia units into 
the Plaza on the day Ulloa was forced to leave New Orleans 
on the French vessel, the Caesar. The court also maintained 
that he had led others in armed rebellion against the 
legitimate representative of Charles III and therefore was 
guilty of sedition and treason. That Louisiana was de jure 
and de facto a Spanish colony had been amply shown in the 
opening statements of the trial. It was as useless for 
Marquis as it was for the other accused to claim that the 
transfer at Balize was not sufficient to make the colony a
o /
Spanish possession. Such was the prosecutor’s reasoning.
Pierre Carresse was also charged with serious offenses 
against the crown. He was accused of leading armed bands of 
Acadians into the city of New Orleans, of going with the 
militia units to pursue Ulloa to Balize, and of accepting 
nomination and election to a post on the new sindico of the 




... the one who after spreading among 
the colonists the seeds of sedition, by 
which he and other leaders were able to 
excite their spirits, he drew up the 
Memorial in the name of the inhabitants 
and merchants, and he made many sign it 
and handed it personally, together with 
Marquis and Massan, to Foucault, proving 
himself in these documents to be an 
instigator and principal accomplice, as 
well as having been one of those who 
made arrangements for the Acadians to 
stay in the house of M. Denville. ...35
In addition to these crimes, he supported the illegal 
government of the colony after the departure of Don Antonio 
by helping to form the colony's new independent bank, the 
Bank of Mount Piety. Finally, he had been one of those who
Of.sought the expulsion of the frigate Volante.
In defense of himself, Carresse claimed, as did the 
others, that Louisiana was not legally a Spanish possession 
at the time of the uprising. He further maintained that the 
colonists had a legitimate complaint: namely the oppressive
commercial decrees issued by the Spanish government. To these 
objections, the court answered that no rebellion would have 
occurred, in spite of the unpopularity of the commercial 
decrees, without the leadership of men who, like himself, 
were held in high esteem by the common people. That the 
colony was legally Spanish had been conclusively proven in
35Ibid.. p. 441. 
•^Ibid., pp. 441-445.
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the court's opening statement. Finally, the court stated 
that it was in possession of a letter from the accused to 
Lafreniere, which clearly implicated Carresse in the uprising. 
Also, the witnesses for the State against Carresse and the 
documents proving the legality of Spanish possession of the 
colony were evidence sufficient to convict the accused. The 
defendant's claim that new orders were needed from the French 
king for the transfer was an unacceptable assertion. Louis 
XV had already made it clear through the Duke of Praslin 
that the colony was to be considered Spanish when Don Antonio 
arrived to take possession.37
In reply to Carresse's denial that he was a key figure 
in the insurrection, the prosecutor offered not only the 
statements of the Crown's witnesses, but also a letter from 
Carresse to Lafreniere fully implicating the former in the 
rebellion. If more proof were needed that Carresse was a 
leading conspirator, additional testimony had been offered 
that he was among those who at first favored resisting Don 
Alejandro O'Reilly when the general arrived at Balize in 
July, 1769. The court left no reasonable doubt that the
O Qaccused was guilty as charged.
Another leader of the rebels was Joseph Milhet. Del Rey 




seditious ideas among them. He was also accused of helping
to promote the conspiratorial decisions of the Superior
Council. Milhet was denounced by the court as follows:
... he was one of those who worked in 
gathering signatures for the Represen­
tation which brought about the decree 
of the Council, and he persuaded some, 
who were excusing themselves from 
signing, by assuring them that this 
was an affair directed by men of great 
judgment, and that all measures had 
been taken to make sure that no one 
would lose anything that was owed to 
him by the Spanish.39
This, del Rey noted, was certainly sedition, for Milhet had
tried to convince the common people that by driving out the
Spanish they would be acting for their own true and righteous
interests. It was he, who with Noyan and Ensign Bienville
on the night before the rebellion, had stirred up the Acadians.
In addition to these accusations, it was also asserted that
Milhet had accepted a position in the new sindico of the
illegal government of the colony, and that he had solicited
funds, after the expulsion of Ulloa, to keep the rebel regime
in power.
In his statement of defense, Joseph Milhet admitted that 
he had indeed taken part in all of the events mentioned by 




these events as being seditious or subversive of the legal 
order of the colony. He defended his actions among the 
Acadians by asserting that he was only trying to help them 
collect the money owed them by the Spanish colonial treasury. 
The court's answer to this was that it was unreasonable to 
think that a man of Milhet's intelligence could not have 
realized that his actions were acts of sedition and, as such 
were conducive to rebellion against the legitimate Spanish 
regime. An even greater absurdity, del Rey stated, was to 
maintain that Milhet, as a leader of the militia, did not 
realize that in stirring up the Acadians and in leading his 
own forces against the Spanish, he was committing sedition 
and treason.
The court's answer to Milhet's final argument, that in 
leading his forces be only obeyed his commander, colonel 
general Marquis, was incisive. Del Rey declared that it 
must have been obvious to Milhet that his chief commander, 
Governor Aubry, was attempting to halt the insurrection, and 
that his rightful obedience should have been to him. Had 
not Milhet led his forces in pursuit of Ulloa in defiance 
of Aubry's open opposition to the rebellion? According to 
the prosecutor, the accused had no reasonable defense to 
offer for his crimes. He stood guilty as charged, a 
seditious and treasonable man, and a key leader in the 
insurrection. By his own confession he had admitted taking
108
part in all phases of the rebellion, even to the extent of 
aiding it financially. This was, in summary, the state's
case against Joseph Milhet.^
x 42Although Joseph Villere had died in prison, the court
saw fit to offer in its report the evidence it had gathered
to prove that he was a prime conspirator and, as such, guilty
of sedition and treason. The evidence given by the court
plainly implicated him:
... He stirred up the Germans, whose captain he was, 
making them sign the Representation that was formu­
lated to bring about the expulsion of Don Antonio de 
Ulloa and of all of the Spanish, and he led them to 
the city to join the rebels in order to keep alive the 
insurrection, as was verified that day; and he was in 
command of them, as has been declared by the witnesses 
who testified to this in the Proceedings.
^ Ibid., pp. 460-465; Confesion de Jose Milhet, A.H.N. 
P.E., Legajo 20.854̂ , Foxas 324-329, cited in Rodriguez- 
Casado, Primeros anos de dominacion espanola, pp. 452-457.
^There is still uncertainty about the circumstances of 
Villere's death. From the official report sent by O'Reilly 
to Grimaldi, it is clear that the Spanish governor had learned 
of Villere's death from Captain de Acosta. The attached trial 
account stated that he had a seizure of some sort and died 
shortly thereafter. Beyond this, no other explanation was 
offered. According to legend, Villere had struck a Spanish 
soldier and in the ensuing struggle received bayonet wounds 
which resulted in his death. It has not been ascertained 
whether he was attempting to escape, or whether the struggle 
with the soldiers was caused by some attack of his upon them, 
or for some other reason. Gayarre claimed that Villere had 
become angry upon being arrested, as Aubry had led him to 
believe that hê Jhad nothing to fear in returning to New Or­
leans. (Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 304.) According 
to another document in the Spanish Archives, Villere died a 
natural death on August 31, 1769. Thi.s report also says he 
was buried by the Capuchins on September 1, 1769 (A.H.N.P.E., 
Legajo 20.854, folio 723).
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Further, it was Villere^ who had prevented the money taken by 
M. Maxent to pay the Germans and the Acadians from reaching 
them. In this way, he was responsible for these people 
believing that the crown still had not met its obligations. 
Consequently, the Germans and the Acadians were induced to 
march to New Orleans in the hope that they would receive 
their money.^ This latter accusation was supported by both 
Aubry and Don Esteban Gayarre.
After dealing with the chief conspirators in the re­
bellion, the prosecution indicted a number of accomplices. 
Joseph Petit was considered by the court as a major accom­
plice. Although this charge was a serious one, it did not 
carry a compulsory death penalty. Del Rey accused Petit of 
speaking out publicly against the Spanish commercial regu­
lations and of cooperating, before the rebellion, with the 
leaders and chief instigators to bring about the expulsion 
of Ulloa:
... In public he spoke against the already 
known commercial regulations, which caused 
the people to be stirred up, attended the 
meetings leading up to the insurrection, 
and showed himself among the rebels with 
his weapons, giving orders and acting as 
their main leader; being so insolent that, 
with the assistance of his followers, he 
untied the ropes that moored the frigate 
on which Don Antonio was expelled, as he 
(Petit) was impatient with the slowness 
of the sailors in this task, ...
^Acusacion de Promotor Fiscal, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 
2543, Doc. 78(2), L.C. pp. 493-494.
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Added to this, with others of his own social group he had 
helped to force the sailing of the frigate Volante from New 
Orleans on April 20, 1769. Moreover, he had been associated 
with Lafreniere m  attempting to persuade Aubry to give his 
word of honor that he would use his influence to force the 
Spanish frigate Volante to depart from the port of New 
Orleans. Finally, he was one of those who was prepared to 
set out for Balize to offer resistance to O'Reilly in July, 
1769.44
Petit's defense seems weak. He claimed that he had been 
in New Orleans on October 29 merely to hear the proceedings 
of the Superior Council. Furthermore, he denied that he had 
been armed when he was in the Plaza with the populace on 
that date. However, his denials were of no avail, for the 
testimony of many witnesses contradicted him. That he was 
guilty as charged had been sworn to by de Acosta and Navarro. 
Nevertheless, the prosecutor considered him as important 
accomplice, rather than an instigator and leader of the in­
surrection.4  ̂ This fact was to prove to be of vital im­
portance to him when he was sentenced by the court.
Balthasar Massan was another influential accomplice.
He was accused of having forced some o f the citizens to sign 




Council for consideration. Also, he was alleged to have
cooperated with the rebels before and after the insurrection.
According to the prosecutor, he was implicated as follows:
... in which he accepted the position of, 
and acted as, the chief fiscal officer of 
the rebels, promoting the ideas that 
followed upon the rebellion; and among 
these, on two occasions, he urged the 
violent expulsion of the frigate of His 
Catholic Majesty along with the officers 
and troops who were loyal to Don Antonio 
de Ulloa.
The court maintained that Massan, who was a Knight of the 
Order of Saint Louis, should have restrained the people 
during the events surrounding the rebellion. Instead, he 
aided the rebels, and refused to support Governor Aubry in 
maintaining order. His loyalty to Louis XV should have made
him loyal to Charles III, to whom the French king had ceded
L.f\Louisiana.
In spite of Massan's denials of all of the charges 
brought against him, the state's case appears convincing. 
Governor Aubry had testified to his presence at the meetings 
of the Superior Council and to his involvement in forcing 
the withdrawal of the frigate Volante. He had been one of 
the officials to whom the French governor had presented Don 
Antonio as the man chosen by Charles III to take possession
46Ibid.. pp. 415-418.
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of Louisiana. Furthermore, on the basis of testimony given
by Gayarre and de Acosta, he had been implicated in the
actual insurrection. The case against him was strong.
Accordingly, the prosecutor indicted him as a leading
47
accomplice in the rebellion.
Jerome Julian Doucet, a lawyer who had lived in the
colony for only a short time prior to the rebellion, was
also accused of being an accomplice. It was not considered,
however, that he played a major role in the insurrection; so
he was indicted as a minor accomplice, and del Rey stated:
... who cooperated with Carresse in the 
drawing up of the Memorial made in the 
name of the inhabitants and merchants 
for the expulsion of Don Antonio de 
Ulloa and of all the Spanish, ... but 
what is constant is the terrible crime 
of having drawn up the Memorial of the 
Inhabitants and Merchants, ... together 
with many other writings directed to 
sustain and to justify in law the crimeof insurrection.^8
Doucet, therefore, was regarded only as a collaborator 
in the drafting of the "Memorial", which had stirred up the 
colonists to rebellion. He was also charged with collaborat­
ing in later writings which sought to sustain and to justify 
the accomplished rebellion. The prosecutor noted that those 






on the theory of natural law. They proposed to the world 
the view that the rebels had only followed the example of 
those many others in history who had sought to protect their 
natural rights against an oppressive government. They main­
tained that the rebels had not committed any crime against 
the highest law, the natural l a w . ^ 9
Doucet attempted to defend himself against the accusa­
tions of the prosecutor. He denied responsibility for the 
most inflammatory statements in the "Memorial" and in the 
writings published after the insurrection. He was unable, 
however, to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he 
had not had an essential role in their preparation. The 
prosecution, for its part, admitted that it could not prove 
that Doucet had a key role in drawing up the "Memorial" or 
in drafting the later writings. Nevertheless, there was no 
doubt, the court asserted, that he had collaborated in these 
works, which were offensive to the Spanish Crown and nation. 
These documents had helped to further inflame the people of 
Louisiana, and to sustain them in their resistance to their 
legitimate ruler. Since it had not been clearly proven by 
the court that he was a chief accomplice, the prosecutor 
charged instead that Doucet was an accessory to the crime 




Jean Milhet, lieutenant of militia and brother of 
Joseph Milhet, was also involved in the conspiracy. The 
court accused him of being a major accomplice in the rebell­
ion. He was charged with publically speaking out against 
the two commercial decrees that the Spanish government had 
issued for Louisiana. Moreover, he had allegedly approved 
of the "Memorial" and had sided with Foucault and Carresse. 
Witnesses testified that he had led his militia unit into 
the Plaza on the day Ulloa was ousted, and that he had later 
led his troops, under Marquis' command, in pursuit of the 
French vessel, the Caesar, as it sailed toward Balize with 
Ulloa and his family. That he was a lieutenant of militia 
who, in violation of Aubry's orders, took part in the actual 
rebellion was the most important charge against him:
... he took up his arms to back the 
rebellion, ... but without permission 
of the chief military officer of the 
colony (Aubry) and even against his 
express orders, which had been given 
the night before, as Milhet himself 
admitted in his confession; and he 
took up his arms and joined his com­
pany. As a result of this there is 
no doubt that he was one of the main 




In spite of the phrase, "principal accomplice", in the 
charge, Milhet was not ultimately so convicted. Rather, he 
was convicted of being a collaborating or minor accomplice.
He offered no denial of the charges made against him by del 
Rey; his defense rested on a legal technicality. It was his 
claim that he had acted as a private citizen, and not as a 
member of the militia, when he took part in the expulsion 
of Ulloa and in the pursuit of the Caesar. He asserted that 
he had not acted in the course of the rebellion as a militia 
lieutenant. The court was unwilling to accept this reason­
ing, for as the head of a militia unit he must have realized 
that he was acting against the explicit commands of Aubry 
who had tried to stop the rebellion. Furthermore, as the 
leader of a militia unit, he could not divest himself by a 
technicality from that position. He was, therefore, judged 
guilty of being a minor accomplice in the rebellion.52
Pierre Poupet was also charged as an accomplice. In 
essence he was accused of being an accessory to the rebellion 
after it had already taken place:
... He acted as the treasurer of the rebels, after 
the insurrection had come about. Several meetings 
were held in his house to plan the means to sustain 




The main charge against Poupet was that he had given 
financial aid to the rebels after they had expelled Ulloa.
In addition, he was accused of being in the company of 
Doucet, Noyan and Joseph Milhet in the house of a certain 
M. Desiller, where the movement to incite the Acadians was 
alleged to have begun. Also, he was charged with carrying 
arms and mingling with the rebels in the Plaza on October 29,
5 3and of having been involved in the printing of the "Memorial".
Poupet denied some of the charges made against him.
He refused to admit any involvement in the events leading 
up to the rebellion. He confessed, however, that he had 
accepted the post of treasurer for the rebels and had made 
personal contributions to the rebel cause. He further 
admitted that he was present and armed among the rebels on 
October 29.
The prosecutor agreed that the evidence at hand supported 
the claims of the accused, namely, that he had been an "after- 
the-fact" accomplice. However, he had cooperated with an 
illegal regime and had accepted the post of treasurer in a 
government established in defiance of the legitimate ruler, 
Charles III, and his representative, Don Antonio de Ulloa.
In view of these circumstances, the prosecutor contended that 
Poupet had violated the Ley Julia, which forbade a Spanish
53Ibid., pp. 476-478.
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subject from joining, as an official, a regime established 
in opposition to the legal government. In effect, he was 
guilty of a mitigated form of sedition and should be 
punished accordingly.^
The last of the accused was Pierre Hardi de Boisblanc.
He was also considered an accomplice, but not an instigator
of the rebellion. Yet, he had been more involved in the
uprising than had Poupet. Del Rey charged him with being:
... the banker of Louisiana, ... he was 
named by Foucault and Lafreniere to 
deliberate about the Memorial of the 
Inhabitants and Merchants, ... and he 
intervened in the drawing up of the 
already mentioned Memorial, ... he 
directed the establishment of the 
bank, called Mount Piety.
Thus, he was cited as the banker for an illegal regime 
established after Ulloa's departure, and as the man who had 
directed the establishment of that bank. Moreover, he was 
accused of conspiratorial association with Lafreniere and 
Foucault prior to the insurrection. Even though it was known 
that he visited with Lafreniere and Foucault on October 28, 
the court could not prove definitely that he had prior 
knowledge of the revolt. Hence, he was not indicted as a 
prime mover in the rebellion.
Boisblanc's defense was that he had not been involved 




his visit with Lafreniere and Foucault on October 28. How­
ever, he denied complicity in the rebellion. The remaining 
charges he could not, and did not, deny. It was known that 
he had signed the "Memorial" on October 29. It was also 
common knowledge that he was the financier for the colony's 
illegal government, and that he had directed the establish­
ment of the Bank of Mount Piety. Therefore, he was adjudged 
guilty as an accomplice to the rebellion. The fact that he 
had thus joined a rebellious movement, and later an illegal 
government, made him guilty of the crime of sedition and 
treason. His guilt, however, was deemed less than that of 
the men who had instigated the insurrection.-^ Thus ended 
the charges against the accused.
The trial had been conducted with thoroughness and 
apparent impartiality. It is unlikely that by the end of 
the proceedings any of the accused thought he would be 
acquitted. Each had been accused of sedition and treason, 
and must have realized that he might receive the death penalty. 
Yet, the Spanish governor had exercised great moderation since 
his arrival at New Orleans in August of that year. The general 
amnesty he had granted to the populace was evidence of his 
spirit of leniency and forgiveness. Perhaps some or all of 
the accused expected that the full penalty demanded by
56Ibid.. pp. 485-487.
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Spanish law would not be incurred by them. No available 
records disclose their sentiments.
On October 24, 1769, General O'Reilly imposed the
sentences on the rebels. His verdict made it clear that
the Spanish government, while not being vindictive, was
unwilling to allow a rebellion against legitimate authority
to go unpunished. The twelve convicted men were sentenced
as follows:
"... condemned to the penalty of death 
were Nicholas Chauvin Lafreniere, Jean 
Baptiste Noyan, Pierre Carresse, Pierre 
Marquis and Joseph Milhet as heads and 
main leaders; and ... Joseph Villere, 
already dead, ... Joseph Petit was con­
demned to perpetual exile in prison;
... Balthasar Massan and Julien Jerome 
Doucet were condemned to ten years in 
prison, and Jean Milhet, Pierre Poupet 
and Pierre Hardi de Boisblanc were 
condemned to six years in prison."57
O'Reilly's sentences must be judged in the light of the 
evidence made available by the trial proceedings. In the 
eighteenth century, treason was considered a most grievous 
crime by all nations. That only six men were condemned to 
death, while the other six were given prison terms, indicates 
that the Spanish governor wished to assess fairly the extent 
of the individual guilt or complicity of the rebel leaders.
As none of the six men sentenced to imprisonment was con­
sidered to have been a leader, without whom the rebellion
57Ibid., pp. 501-503, 510.
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could not have occurred, each was granted that "justice tem­
pered with mercy" which the general wished to exhibit toward 
the new subjects of Charles III. It seems that this was as 
far as the Spanish governor could go in granting leniency.
Because there was no hangman in New Orleans, Felix del 
Rey requested that O'Reilly have the execution carried out 
by a firing squad. This was done and the condemned were put 
to death on the day following their sentencing. On October 
25, 1769, Lafreniere, Marquis, Noyan, Joseph Milhet, and 
Carresse, (Villere was already dead), were taken into the 
barracks area of the Lisbon regiment. There, away from the 
sight of the other colonists, they were executed by soldiers 
of that regiment. These proceedings were carried out under 
the supervision of M. Ganderat, Jean Baptiste Garic, and 
Lieutenant Juan Kelly of the Spanish artillery. The con­
demned were shot and were then pronounced dead. For veri­
fication of the trial and the sentencing, the signatures of 
O'Reilly and del Rey were affixed to the document. The 
execution was verified by General O'Reilly, del Rey and Jose 
Urrutria, the assessor. The entire proceedings were certi­
fied as true and accurate by Francisco Xavier Rodriguez, the 
scribe of O'Reilly's expedition.-*® Thus ended the futile 




In his letter to Grimaldi, to which was appended an
account of the entire trial proceedings, O'Reilly stated
that he considered that the trial had been conducted fairly
and that the sentences imposed were just. He believed that
the people realized the justification for what he had done,
and he hoped his actions had been pleasing to the king.59
O'Reilly's own sentiments regarding the trial and its
outcome are more fully revealed in a subsequent letter to
the Minister of the Council of the Indies, El Bailio Frey
Don Julian de Arriaga. In addition to a full account of the
proceedings, the Spanish governor indicated to Arriaga a
deep concern that all had been done properly, and as His
Majesty had desired. He wrote to Arriaga as follows:
... The case that was being prosecuted against the 
twelve leaders; ... has been concluded. Full 
satisfaction has been given for the offense com­
mitted, ... Everyone recognizes the necessity, 
justice and clemency of the proceedings, and this 
example will remain eternally graven on the hearts 
of all. Respect for the authority of the King is 
greatly augumented by the strict justice and great 
celerity with which it has been carried out.
Henceforth, I shall receive without discrimi­
nation those who were seduced and signed the first 
representation to the council, and it will be the 
greatest consolation to the public to know that I 
shall not leave in the province any memory of that 
ill-considered act. I shall reconcile and calm 
their minds by all means possible, and none is 
more effective than to let them know that there is 
and always will be entire forgetfulness of the past, 
and that everyone will find in the government the
“̂ O'Reilly to Grimaldi, October 27, 1769, A.G.I.S.D.,
Legajo 2543, L.C. pp. 353-354.
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protection and favor of which he is deserving....
I hope that I have carried out his royal in­
structions, and if I have attained this happiness, 
my satisfaction will be complete.... 60
O'Reilly was not left in doubt as to whether or not he
had acted according to the wishes of the king. A favorable
reply came to him soon after the receipt of the documents in
Madrid. Answering for His Majesty, the Marques de Grimaldi
wrote to O'Reilly on January 27, 1770, assuring him of the
king's approval:
... The complete justification of the proceedings 
against those condemned to death and prison, the 
moderation in reducing the punishment to what was 
absolutely necessary to bring about the tranquility 
and the good of the province, and your assurance to 
the rest that no reminders of their crime will sub­
sist, are very conformable to the pious soul of the 
King. Your Excellency was well advised of the royal 
intentions, put them into full effect, and the 
assurance which I gave him of this may serve as a 
source of satisfaction.61
Official public approval in Spain for O'Reilly's accom­
plishments in Louisiana came in June of 1770, in a notice 
appearing in the Gaceta de Madrid. The article noted that 
the general had been awarded a gift of 2,000 pesos, and upon 
his arrival in Madrid had been received and welcomed by the 
King. He was praised for completing the tasks given him by 
Charles III, especially the one which he had recently
^0'Reilly to Arriaga, October 27, 1769, A.G.I.S.D., 
80-1-7, No. 9, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valiev, 
pp. 105-106.
^Grimaldi to O'Reilly, El Pardo, January 27, 1770,
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 174, No. 5, ibid., pp. 181-182.
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finished in the colony of Louisiana.62 There is no doubt, 
therefore, that he had carried out the wishes of the King 
in a satisfactory manner.
Although the trial was over, there were additional 
problems connected with it which had to be solved by O'Reilly. 
The property of those condemned to death had been confis­
cated and had to be liquidated. O'Reilly had this done with 
promptness, so that the widows, the creditors, and the royal 
exchequer would be satisfied. As a result of his rapid 
settlement of these estates, the general noted that the 
colonists realized that the Spanish dealt with their subjects 
justly and equitably.^
A final letter to Arriaga concerning this matter was 
sent by O'Reilly just before he left New Orleans on March 
1, 1770. He pointed out that the widows of the condemned 
men had received their dowries, the creditors their debts, 
and the state its due, as required by law. Furthermore, he 
stated that the sum paid to the assessor, the promotor fiscal 
and the scribe for their work was only 2007 pesos. This 
small remuneration, especially considering the distance each 
had to travel for the trial, in O'Reilly's judgment, was
^Gaceta de Madrid, June 18, 1770, cited by Rodriguez- 
Casado, Fnmeros alios de dominacion espanola, p. 301.
63o'Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, December 10, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-9, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, pp. 127-128.
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enough to convince the widows of the executed men, as well 
as the populace, of the Spanish officials' disinterested­
ness and sense of justice.64
Although the leaders of the rebellion were tried and 
convicted, the status of other individuals, who later might 
prove to be a source of discontent in Louisiana had to be 
considered. M. d'Arensburg, his sons and daughter, who was 
the widow of Joseph Villere, were also considered potential 
trouble makers. Since d'Arensburg and his family had great 
influence among the Germans along the Mississippi River above 
New Orleans, O'Reilly ordered the family to sell its property 
and to leave the area. Due to his advanced age (seventy- 
seven) , the elder d'Arensburg was allowed to live in New 
Orleans, but the sons were commanded to move to Opelousas. 
Relatives and friends offered surety for them, thereby 
making themselves responsible for their good behavior. 
O'Reilly asserted that d'Arensburg, who had been a comman­
dant of the German settlement during Ulloa's regime, should 
have tried to stop the rebellion. Instead, he had remained 
neutral during the events leading up to the insurrection, 
even though he knew of the involvement of Joseph Villere,
his son-in-law.65
6^0'Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, March 1, 1770, 
ibid., pp. 160-161.
^0'Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, December 10, 1769,
ibid., pp. 127-128.
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Another undesirable, M. de Sasier, deputy of the 
Superior Council, had gone to France after the uprising.
Since the Spanish general felt that he had shown little 
respect for law and order, he was not permitted to return 
to Louisiana.^
Still others, in O'Reilly's judgment, presented a danger
to the peace of the colony. In a communique to Arriaga in
December of that year, the general listed twenty-one men
that he had ordered expelled from the colony as a threat to
the peace and security of the community. Three Jews were
also expelled because of their religion and because of a
67reputation for questionable business transactions.
The fate of the six who had been imprisoned in Havana 
soon took a turn for the better. In a short time they had 
a number of advocates pleading for their release. As early 
as January of 1770, the Conde de Fuentes, Spanish ambassador 
to France, sent to the Marques de Grimaldi, Spanish Minister 
of State, a letter noting that Pierre Hardi de Boisblanc had 
many men of influence in France who were speaking in his 
behalf. Among these was the brother of the prisoner, a
66Ibid.
67^0 details were offered as to exactly what dubious 
things these men were doing. O'Reilly to Arriaga, New 
Orleans, December 17, 1769, A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-7, ibid., 
p. 103.
126
priest, who was the Provincial of the Order of Recolets for 
the Province of Aquitaine, and Predicateur de Roi, a special 
honor for any cleric. Claiming that his imprisoned brother 
was a victim of circumstances, he begged for clemency now 
that peace was restored in Louisiana.
In time, these pleas which made their way to the Spanish 
court for the release of the imprisoned rebels had their 
effect. By the summer of 1770, the Marques de Grimaldi 
notified Governor Unzaga of Louisiana that the six rebel 
leaders were to be released. He noted that the Duke of 
Choiseul had pleaded for mercy for them in the name of Louis 
XV, and that His Most Catholic Majesty: "... desiring to
manifest to the Most Christian King the regard which he has 
for any suggestion of his, has seen fit to grant all of them 
their liberty, and to order the governor of Havana to be in­
structed to send them to Santo Domingo.... He is to warn 
them before they leave never to enter again the domains of 
His Majesty under penalty of death."69 However, it is note­
worthy that in no way did Grimaldi imply that any injustice
^^Fuentes to Grimaldi, January 22, 1770, A.G.I.S.D., 
Legajo 2543, Doc. 94, L.C. pp. 64-65. Pere Hardi to Fuentes, 
Attached to Fuentes' Paris letter to Grimaldi, ibid.
^ G r i m a l d i  to Unzaga, San Ildefonso, August 25, 1770, 
A.G.I.P.C., Legaio 174, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi 
Valley, pp. 181-182.
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had been done to them. The release was, accordingly, an 
act of mercy on the part of Charles III. It did not indicate 
any criticism of the actions and judgments of the Spanish 
tribunal under O'Reilly.
Antonio Bucareli, Captain-general and Governor of Cuba, 
in pursuance of the order of the king, released the prisoners 
who had been held at Castle Morro. The six were put aboard 
the British brigantine once used in the trade of the Asiento 
granted by Spain to England, and from Havana they sailed by 
way of Puerto Rico to the French colony of Saint Domingue.^O
With the release of the six rebel leaders, the story of 
the trial and its aftermath ends. O'Reilly's decisive actions 
in dealing with the rebels gave political stability to 
Louisiana. His work, however, was far from over, and he 
continued the task of integrating Louisiana into the Spanish 
empire. With that same determination that he had shown in 
handling the occupation of Louisiana and the trial of the 
rebels, he completed the other assignments given him by 
Charles III.
^ B u c a r e l i  to Arriaga, Havana, December 12, 1770, 
A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-9, ibid., p. 189.
IV
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
SPANISH GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS, 
PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL
Once order had been established in Louisiana and the reb­
els had been tried and punished, the various other problems 
pressing on O'Reilly were gradually resolved. Carefully in­
terpreting his instructions, O'Reilly established in Louisi­
ana that same law under which all of the Spanish dominions in 
America were governed.^ The legal system set up in Louisiana 
was a condensed version of the Recopilacion de Leyes de los 
Reinos de las Indias, supplemented by La Cour Philipique,
■^Proclamation Establishing the Cabildo, New Orleans, No­
vember 25, 1769, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley,
pp. 108-110.
2 < ^^Recopilacion de Las Indias, as it is generally called, 
was based on earlier laws of Spain, namely the Leyes de Toro, 
which were compiled as the Nueva Recopilacion. The 
Recopilacion de las Indias was first promulgated in Spain 
on May 18, T680. It was comprised of 9 books, 218 titles 
and 6447 enactments, and dealt with every possible phase of 
law for the colonies. It was upon this vast pyramid of law 
that the Code O'Reilly was based. (Cf. Wallach, as cited be­
low, and Henry Plauche Dart, "Courts and Laws in Colonial 
Louisiana," Report of the Louisiana Bar Association, 1921,
Vol. XXII /New Orleans, 1921/, pp. 53-55.)
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and the Recopilacion de Leyes de Castilla.3
As previously noted, O'Reilly appointed Luis de Unzaga 
to succeed him as governor, effective upon his departure.
The intendant, the treasurer, and the contador, Jose de Loy­
ola,^ Martin Navarro, and Esteban Gayarre, respectively, had 
retained their offices when O'Reilly arrived. Except for 
these three men, nothing of the limited structure of govern­
ment established under Ulloa remained. Consequently, for 
the permanence of the Spanish regime an adequate governmental 
and legal system had to be established.
In the governor rested the highest executive and judicial 
powers. He could issue proclamations which had the effect of 
law. He was, however, subordinate to the captain general of 
Cuba.’ Appeals might be made from the governor to the special 
tribunal established by the king at Havana, or to the Audien- 
cia of Santo Domingo, the Council of the Indies, or the king.
^Kate Wallach,"Research in Louisiana Law," Louisiana State 
University Studies, Social Science Series, No. 6 (Baton Rouge. 
T95B), "pp. 207-218'.
^Loyola died in September 1769. A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, 
L.C. pp. 593-594. Communique to O'Reilly from Madrid, Decem­
ber 26, 1769.
^Gayarre seemed uncertain whether the governor of Loui­
siana was under the captain general of Cuba. (History of Lou­
isiana . Ill, p. 5 and p. 104.) His subordination to the cap­
tain general is definitely verified by documents. Cf., Cedula 
putting Louisiana under the captain general of Cuba, San II- 
defonso, August 11, 1772, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. pp. 
534-541.
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The intendant had commercial, naval and fiscal powers. 
Hence, he often clashed with the governor over matters of 
jurisdiction. Among other things, it was intended that he 
serve as a restraining power on the governor in the Span­
ish American Colonies. The contador was the auditor for 
the whole province. The treasurer was the official who kept 
the funds for the colony and was responsible for informing 
the governor and intendant of the financial status of the 
colony.*’
For these key provincial officers, the crown appointed 
advisors. An auditor of war and assessor of government ad­
vised the governor (and others, if necessary) on legal mat­
ters. There was also a legal advisor for the intendant, 
called an auditor of intendancy. Moreover, there were sec­
retaries to the governor and the intendant and such minor 
officials as storekeepers and interpreters. Since all of 
these existed under Ulloa,7 this chapter will deal in de­
tail only with those offices initiated under O'Reilly's ad­
ministration which have not been dealt with in previous chap­
ters. There is no need to discuss the function of the lieu­
tenant governors, as these officials will be treated in de­
tail in Chapter VII.
Relying on powers given him by Charles III, O'Reilly had
^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, III, 5-6. 
7Ibid.
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determined as early as October of 1769 to establish the Span­
ish legal system in Louisiana.8 Contrary to assumptions by 
various historians that O'Reilly was not so empowered, the 
following instructions, available for many years, prove that 
he acted as commanded:
... that in both the military and civil spheres you 
establish proper administration of justice and man­
agement of the Royal Treasury, organizing the form 
of government and its administrators in the manner 
which you consider most suitable. So that you may 
carry out my instructions fully, I give you today 
such power and jurisdiction as shall be necessary 
for handling each matter, case and incident. And I 
desire, should it become necessary, that you use the 
soldiers and weapons that will be at your orders, and 
that to take care of matters pertaining to finances 
and the treasury, you take as your adviser and prose­
cutor such lawyers as you see fit, who having been 
appointed by you, will perform these tasks with full 
authority, for this is my will.9
There can certainly be no doubt as to the plenipotentiary 
powers contained in O'Reilly's commission and to the King's 
desire that Spanish colonial law be established in Louisi­
ana. The manner of executing these instructions was left 
to O'Reilly's discretion, and the approval found in cedulas 
later issued by Charles III, fully attests to the fact that
®0'Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, October 17,1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 77, L.C. pp. 303-304.
^Cedula of Charles III commissioning O'Reilly, dictated 
in Aranjuez, April, 1769, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. pp. 
341-342. The draft is not dated. For date, April 16, 1769, 
see Bjork, "Alejandro O'Reilly", in New Spain in the Anglo- 
American West.
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the Spanish general faithfully carried out the royal inten­
tions . 10
On November 25, 1769, O'Reilly issued two proclamations 
and two legal ordinances. By the first proclamation and or­
dinance, he abolished the old Superior Council, which had 
helped to engineer the rebellion, and established in its 
place a cabildo. Under this ordinance were included the reg­
ulations for the perpetuation of the cabildo and the provis­
ions for the election of judges to try civil and criminal 
cases in New Orleans. Included also was a list of the re­
sponsibilities of each of these officials.^- The second 
proclamation and ordinance dealt with the instructions for 
instituting civil and criminal suits and the general adminis­
trations of justice in the c o l o n y . 12 a brief analysis of 
each of these documents will illustrate the importance of 
Spanish law by showing the relationship of the Spanish legal 
system to its French forerunner and to the civil code later
l^Cedula approving O'Reilly's Establishment of the New 
Orleans Cabildo, San Ildefonso, August 17, 1772, ibid.. L.C. 
pp. 442-444. Cedula approving O'Reilly's Establishment of 
Spanish law, tribunals and justice in Louisiana, San Ilde­
fonso, August 17, 1772, ibid., L.C. pp. 470-471.
1^0'Reilly's Proclamation, New Orleans, November 25, 
1769, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, p. 108.
F. French, Historical Memoirs of Louisiana, New 
York, 1853), V, 269.
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established by the state of Louisiana. The proclamation of
November 25, 1769, states in part:
Don Alejandro O'Reilly, .... We establish, in his royal 
name, a city council or cabildo, for the administration 
of justice and preservation of order in this city, com­
posed of six perpetual regidores. in conformity with 
the second statute, title ten, book five, of the Recop­
ilacion de las Indias. Among these shall be distributed 
the offices of alferez royal, provincial alcalde mayor, 
alguacil mayor, depositary general, andreceiver of 
penas cf¥ camara, or fines, awarded to the royal treas­
ury. TKese shall elect, on the first day of every year, 
two judges, who shall be styled alcaldes ordinary, a 
syndic general, and a manager of the income taxes of 
the city such as the laws have established for good gov­
ernment and administration of justice.13
The attached instructions promulgated by O'Reilly made clear 
the duties incumbent upon the cabildo's members and the offi­
cials elected by them. The members of the cabildo and the 
other officials mentioned were either elected by the exist­
ing cabildo, or they bought their offices. The governor had 
the power to prevent a person from taking office in either 
case. Meetings of the cabildo were held every Friday and 
were presided over by the governor, or, in his absence, by 
the ranking alcalde ordinary.^
The cabildo was entrusted with the maintenance of public 
order and care of the public welfare. It regulated the price 
of food, especially that of meat, looked after public
13proclamation of O'Reilly, November 25, 1769, in Kin- 
naird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, p. 108.
l^Cabildo, ibid., pp. 110-113.
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buildings, including churches, and the streets; and it col­
lected fines.15
Certain limited judicial powers also resided in the ca­
bildo. It had the right to. hear appeals from an alcalde or 
a commandant in civil cases involving not more than 90,000 
maravedis.16 Amounts above this went to the Havana appeals 
court.17 The cabildo, as a body, seems not to have had any 
original jurisdiction. In order to hear appeals in the cases 
mentioned, the cabildo appointed two of its regidores to de­
cide, in conjunction with the alcaldes or commandant who had 
original jurisdiction in the case, whether or not the appeal 
should be heard. No appeal in criminal cases was allowed 
the cabildo, for these appeals were to be sent to the super­
ior tribunal which, upon O'Reilly's recommendation, Charles 
III later established at Havana for that purpose.1®
The clerk of the cabildo was either appointed by the 
governor or he bought his office. The duties of the clerk 
were essentially those of the secretary of any council. He
15Ibid. , p. 112.
maravedi was the smallest Spanish coin. Gayarre^ 
says 90,000 marayedis was $330.88. (Cf. Gayarre, History of 
Louisiana, III, 4.)
17Gayarre says alcaldes heard cases up to 90,000 mara- 
vedis and that the cabildo heard appeals for amounts over 
90,000. (Ibid.) This assertion is not justified in the light 
of the documents. (Cf. Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi 
Valley, p. 112.)
■^Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, pp. 108-
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acted as the chief archivist, preserving all of the papers 
concerning the cabildo, as well as its trial proceedings. In 
order to insure his honesty, he was required to note the fee 
charged at the bottom of each document, and he was subject to 
the prescribed penalty for charging more than was allowed un­
der Spanish law.
The alcaldes ordinary, who were elected by the members 
of the cabildo, were judges. They were usually two in num­
ber, and had original jurisdiction in both civil and criminal 
cases falling within their assigned jurisdiction. The juris­
dictional area included the city and its dependencies assigned 
to a particular alcalde. They were not permitted to handle 
criminal cases of grave importance, and their civil cases 
were only those which involved a very small sum, twenty pias­
ters, unless the litigants both agreed to have the alcalde 
hear the case; otherwise the governor had jurisdiction in the 
case.
No alcalde could be deprived of his jurisdiction in a 
case legally brought before him, not even by the governor. 
However, the governor could, by a written order, demanded 
by the litigants, require the alcalde to render speedy jus­
tice conformable to law. If the jurisdiction of the alcalde 
was in doubt, the dispute had to be decided by the governor.
19The Clerk of the Cabildo, ibid..pp. 123-124.
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But if one of the alcaldes claiming jurisdiction tried the 
case before the governor reached his decision concerning the 
jurisdiction that alcalde automatically lost jurisdiction, 
and the other alcalde took charge of the case.
If the authority of an alcalde was challenged by a liti­
gant, he could continue on the case only in conjunction with 
the other alcalde. If both alcaldes were challenged, a regi- 
dor was associated with them to hear the case. If the liti­
gant wished to exclude an alcalde from hearing the case, he 
had to present, in writing, evidence to substantiate his 
claim that the alcalde was unable to render an impartial ver­
dict. Two men, one chosen by the alcalde, and the other by 
the litigant, were to decide whether or not the litigant's 
evidence warranted exclusion of the alcalde from the case.
If they could not agree, a third man was appointed by the 
alcalde, and then the decision reached by the majority was 
binding. This feature of judicial procedure resembles the 
Anglo-Saxon system of challenging jurors, and provided a 
reasonable procedure for the administration of j u s t i c e . ^
That clemency existed under Spanish law was shown by 
the prison rule for the eves of Christmas, Easter and Pente-
ZOAlcaldes Ordinary, ibid.. pp. 114-116. This analysis 
of the alcaldes ordinary is based upon the Code O'Reilly and 
the following secondary sources: Caroline Burson, The Stew­
ardship of Don Esteban Miro (New Orleans, 1940); J.W. Caughey, 
Bernardo de Galvez; Charles Gayarre, History of Louisiana,
III; Henry Plauch§ Dart, "Courts and Laws in Colonial Louis- 
iana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, Vol. IV (July, 1921).
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cost. On those days, the alcaldes, the alguacil mayor and 
the clerk accompanied the governor in a tour of the prisons. 
They released those who had been arrested for criminal cases 
of little importance, as well as those imprisoned for debts, 
on condition that they arrange to pay their debts in the fu­
ture.21 Thus, Spanish law had a number of safeguards to 
prevent the indefinite detention of prisoners prior to their 
trial, or their lengthy imprisonment for minor offenses. 
Consequently, it seems to have compared favorably with the 
legal system in the British colonies of North America.
The regidor of the cabildo, who exercised the office of 
provincial regidor alcalde mayor, had jurisdiction over crim­
inal cases outside of the city and villages and over crimin­
als fleeing from a city. If, however, one of the alcaldes 
ordinary or the governor had the case before him when the 
criminal fled, that case was to remain within his jurisdic­
tion and not that of the provincial regidor alcalde mayor, 
even if the criminal was later apprehended by agents of the 
regidor alcalde mayor. In effect, he had jurisdiction over
those vast areas of the colony which were not specifically
22under the control of other alcaldes or the governor.
21Alcaldes Ordinary, Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi 
Valley, pp. 115-116.
22A case was tried in the court of alcalde Jacinto Panis 
in June of 17 82 which shows the vast extent of the jurisdic­
tion of an alcalde. The defendant, Evan Milly, was a resident 
of Opelousas. Panis ruled for the litigant, John Henderson.
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In order that the regidor alcalde mayor be unhindered in 
the administration of justice in remote places, there was to 
be no appeal from his judgment.^3 Accordingly, he was in­
structed to conform to the letter and spirit of the laws and 
to consult a lawyer in the cases brought before him. Until 
lawyers were available, the instructions issued under 
O'Reilly's orders were his guide. Any conflict of jurisdic­
tion was to be resolved in the same manner as that prescribed 
for situations involving a conflict of jurisdiction between 
the alcaldes ordinary, or between an alcalde and the govern­
or .24
and ordered the commandant at Opelousas to carry out the de­
cision. (Cf. Henry P. Dart and Laura L. Porteous /eds./» "In­
dex to the Spanish Judicial Records," Louisiana Historical 
Quarterly, Vol. XVIII /October. 1935/, p. 103.)
The extent of the alcalde's jurisdiction was governed 
by custom in the different colonies. (Cf. 0. Garfield Jones, 
"Local Government in the Spanish_Colonies," Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly, Vol. XIX /July, 19l£/, pp. 75-76.)
23flenry Plauche Dart, "Courts and Laws in Colonial Lou­
isiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, Vol. IV (July, 1921), 
p. 275.
^Provincial Alcalde Mayor, Kinnaird, Spain in the Miss­
issippi Valley, pp” 116-118. To assist the provincial alcal­
de mayor in the administration of justice in rural areas, 
Spanish law established the Santa Hermandad, a court made up 
of citizens whose duty it was to bring justice to the king's 
domain outside of cities and villages. These men not only 
served as judges but, like the provincial regidor alcalde 
mayor. they were also charged with the pursuit and arrest of 
fugitives within their jurisdiction. The provincial regidor 
alcalde mayor presided as the chief judge of this courtV the 
Santa Hermandad. The Santa Hermandad does not seem to have 
functioned in Louisiana. (Cf. Burson, Miro; Caughey, Galvez; 
Jack L. Holmes, Gayoso, The Life of a Spanish Governor in the 
Mississippi Valley, 1789-1799 (Baton Rouge. 1965).
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The regidor. who, according to law, was chosen as algua- 
cil mayor, was, in that capacity, charged with the execution 
of sentences and judgments rendered in the courts. This in­
cluded the seizure of goods for sale, receiving payments or­
dered by the court, imprisoning and punishing criminals. He 
was also charged with the supervision of the prisons, and 
was the official who appointed (subject to the governor’s 
confirmation) the jailers and keepers of the prisons. If 
anyone broke the peace, he or his aides had the right and the 
duty to arrest the offenders. The regidor who held the of­
fice of alguacil mayor was, in effect, a chief of police and 
exercised only peace-keeping and restraining powers. In no 
way did he possess judicial power, as did the provincial 
regidor alcalde mayor.
Another regidor was named depositary general. This off­
icial acted as the chief treasurer of the city's funds. He 
is not to be confused with the city steward, who could dis­
burse city funds.^6 Before assuming his office he gave a
^Appointees to Cabildo by O ’Reilly, December 1, 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. p. 345. Cedula approving ap­
pointees, San Ildefonso, September 11, 1772, ibid., pp. 536- 
632. Proceedings of the Cabildo for December 1, 1769, and 
December 2, 1769, in Records and Deliberations of the Cabil­
do , (typescript translation by Adolph Baum and Arthur Tro- 
nosco, June, 1934), City Archives, New Orleans, Louisiana, 
Book I, pp. 3-7.
Joseph Ducros was named depositary general and James 
Durel was named city steward. Hence, Gayarre errs in making
Valley, pp
Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
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bond together with an accounting of his financial situation, 
which insured the safety of the deposits made with him. His 
surety had to be approved by the governor, the alcaldes and 
the cabildo. The clerk of the cabildo recorded this bond 
in the book used for the recording of deposits. If, at any 
time, the cabildo became apprehensive about the surety 
offered by the depositary general, he could not receive any 
more deposits until the cabildo had reassured itself as to 
his solvency.
Upon demand by the cabildo or governor, the depositary 
general presented the money deposited with him, and in the 
same coin. He was not permitted to make any substitutions 
whatsoever in kinds of money. At all times he kept a record 
of the deposits in a book similar to that used by the cabildo 
clerk. In compensation for his services, the depositary gen­
eral received three percent of the funds deposited with him. 
These items and other details were fully explained in the 
commission delivered to him at the time of his appointment. 7̂
Another office held by a regidor of the cabildo was that 
of the receiver of fines. He kept a record of all fines
"two" offices "one." (History of Louisiana. Ill, 3-5). Bur 
son, in Miro, refers to the depositary general and the city 
steward as separate offices (p. 14).
^The Depositary General, Kinnaird, Spain in the Miss­
issippi Valley, p. 120.
141
imposed by the alcaldes or the governor, and had custody of 
the funds obtained from this source. In order to insure the 
receiver's honesty, the clerk of the cabildo kept a record of 
the fines imposed and in his possession. This document also 
required the governor's signature. To further protect the 
funds in his possession, he was required to give a bond sim­
ilar to the one given by the depositary general. At the end 
of the year, his sureties were investigated to ascertain the 
soundness of his financial status. Spanish law obviously 
provided many precautions to insure the honesty of the king's 
officials. It was primarily the opportunities for wealth, 
abetted by the distance from the center of Spanish power, that 
gave occasion to the acts of peculation and dishonesty among 
colonial officials.
The penalties collected by the receiver of fines could 
not be used at his own discretion. As they were the property 
of the king, they could be used only upon order of the gover­
nor, the alcaldes or other judges. To insure that only law­
ful disbursements were made, the receiver of fines had to 
give an accounting to the comptroller or auditor of the prov­
ince at the end of each year. He was, however, allowed ten 
percent of all fines received into the treasury in compensa­
tion for his work. As he was responsible for the collection 
of those fines at his own expense, this was perhaps not an 
exorbitant amount.28
28The Receiver of Fines, ibid., pp. 121-122.
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Another regidor held the office of alferez real, or 
keeper of the royal ensign or standard. This official was 
the custodian of the royal standard, which he carried at 
certain public ceremonies. This office was primarily one of 
social prestige.
Of the remaining elected or appointed officials, the 
two most important were the attorney general and the city 
steward. The former, elected by the cabildo, differed much 
from the attorney general of today. It was his duty to pro­
mote justice for the people. Theoretically, he was not 
wholly a prosecutor. Rather, he acted for the people, as 
did the ancient Roman tribune. Associated with this duty 
was his responsibility for seeing that all of the public or­
dinances were observed, and for remedying any situation which 
might cause public harm. He collected also the public debts 
and revenues due to the city. In addition to these duties, 
the attorney general was charged with protecting the inter­
ests of the crown by supervising the activities of the mem­
bers of the cabildo, the depositary general and the receiver 
of fines, to insure that they faithfully discharged their du­
ties. Finally, he took part in all public matters of import­
ance, especially in the allotment of l a n d s . 29
The city steward, or manager of income and taxes of the 
city, was elected by the cabildo, as was the attorney general.
29xhe Attorney General, ibid., p. 122.
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The steward was the keeper of the city's funds derived pri­
marily from taxes. He was responsible for keeping a strict 
record of all the sums received as taxes or income for the 
city. When a person paid his taxes, the steward gave him 
his receipt. He was permitted to draw drafts on the cabil- 
do's funds, derived from taxes and their income, but not on 
any other funds available to the cabildo. If he lent the 
funds of the city to any individual whatsoever, he was held 
personally responsible for repayment, lost his position, and 
forfeited any right ever again to hold office in the king's 
realms.
The public funds in the city steward's custody could be 
used for public works undertaken by the cabildo, and for pub­
lic mourning in the event of a death in the royal family. 
However, the cost for construction and upkeep of bridges was 
not paid for by the city, but rather by those who used those 
facilities. This would indicate that the extent of what the 
government considered to be public was considerably different 
from comparable ideas of today. Possibly the arrangement for
the payment for bridges is reflected in the toll bridge of 
inmodern times. u
The jailer, who had charge of the prisons, was appointed 
by the alguacil mayor. Since it was the alguacil mayor who was 
charged with guarding the accused and executing sentences of
3(̂ The City Steward, ibid., pp. 112-123.
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imprisonment, it was logical that he should choose the jail 
er. The appointment, of course, had to be approved by the 
governor. Once he was approved, the jailer was required to 
present himself before the cabildo and take an oath to ful­
fill his duties faithfully. He, too, had to give a bond, 
although only a small one of two hundred piasters. This 
was to discourage bribery on the part of prisoners and to 
insure that no prisoner held for failure to pay his debts 
would, because of bribery, be released without an order 
from the proper judge. The jailer was to keep a list of 
the prisoners and to see that they were properly cared for 
according to the laws of the realm. He was to be content 
with his prescribed fees, and under penalty of punishment 
was forbidden to take anything from the poor.^l
During O'Reilly's regime, all of the other officials 
necessary to administer the Spanish legal system for the 
entire colony were appointed. Those not already discussed 
will be briefly mentioned in the following chapter in con­
nection with an explanation of the general principles and 
procedures of Spanish law.
31-The Jailer and the Prisons, ibid., pp. 124-125.
V
PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES 
IN SPANISH LAW
That section of the Code O'Reilly describing the insti­
tution of suits, civil and criminal, was a condensed version 
of the special laws dealing with these matters in Spanish Am- 
erica. It was based upon the Nueva Recopilacion de Castilla 
and the Recopilacion de las Indias, and was entitled "...In­
structions as to the manner of instituting suits, civil and 
criminal, and of pronouncing judgments in general, in con- 
formity to the Nueva Recopilacion de Castilla, and the Recop­
ilacion de las Indias, for the government of judges and par­
ties pleading,...." Drawn up by O'Reilly's legal advisers, 
Felix del Rey and Jose Manuel de Urrutria, it was intended to 
serve as the law for the colony of Louisiana until there was 
common knowledge of Spanish procedure.^- Together with the 
regulations for the cabildo and its officers, it was the 
only code under which the Spanish governed Louisiana during 
their stay in the colony.
These instructions are divided into six sections, to 
which is appended a list of the various offices held in the
. F. French, Historical Memoirs of Louisiana, V, 269.
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colony and the fees allowed to each official for the various 
types of duty performed. The instructions are supplemented 
by explanations and clarifications based on commentaries.^
On the whole, it is an able synthesis of a vast code of law 
and the fact that it remained in force until Spain returned 
Louisiana to France testifies to its worth.
The first section of the instructions concerned civil 
judgments in general. The instructions noted that no member 
of a religious order could bring a suit into court without 
the permission of his superior; no wife could so act without 
her husband's permission; no son without his father's permis­
sion; and no slave without his master's consent. One excep­
tion to these rules was that a son could bring suit in re­
gard to possessions that he had gained as "spoils of war."
In suits involving more than 100 livres, the case had 
to be presented to the judge in writing, and full justifica­
tion for the claim had to be shown. Then the defendant was 
informed of the nature of the suit against him, and was given 
nine days in which to present his defense or pay the claim by 
default. Witnesses were examined in secret by the judge, but 
upon the demand of the other party involved in the case the 
testimony had to be made public.-*
^Dart, 'Courts and Laws in Colonial Louisiana," Louisiana 
Bar, p. 54.
^French, Historical Memoirs of Louisiana, V, 269-271.
The second section of these instructions dealt with ex­
ecutory proceedings. If a claimant had proper acknowledge­
ment of debts signed by a notary, the judge could immediately 
order that the debts be paid by the defendant. The alguacil 
mayor was charged with summoning the debtor and informing him 
that he was bound by law to pay his debt. If he did so, the 
case was closed; if he refused, the alguacil mayor imprisoned 
him and seized his property. This property was held by the 
depositary general. Once the property was seized, two men 
were chosen by the alguacil mayor to examine and evaluate it. 
There was a nine-day delay in the sale of personal property, 
and a thirty-day delay in the sale of real property. During 
this period, the debtor could pay his debt and thereby fore­
stall the sale of his possessions. The debtor's property 
was not sold until the judge was satisfied that the debt 
had not been paid, and not before notices of the sale of the 
seized property had been given at intervals of three days. 
After the final notice, if the debt was judged unpaid, the 
property was sold and the creditor was reimbursed. The al­
guacil mayor received one tenth of the value of the property 
for his fee, and the other officials received their fees as 
allowed by law.4
It is interesting to note that in cases of payment of 
debts, the creditor had to give surety for the amount paid
4Ibid.. pp. 272-274.
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to him if an appeal was lodged by the debtor.^ If the judg­
ment was upheld, then his surety was returned. If the deci­
sion of the lower court was reversed, and the debt declared 
invalid, then the surety served to reimburse the debtor for 
the property lost, and to pay the court costs.^ This system 
of executing judgment in civil cases before the appeal was 
heard was a grave weakness in Spanish law, for it caused 
serious harm to an accused debtor who later won his case. 
Unfortunately, this procedure is still a part of Louisiana 
law.
The third section of the instructions for instituting 
suits, etc., dealt with judgment in criminal cases. The 
litigant could present a bill of information before a judge 
and request the judge to begin criminal proceedings. If no 
one appeared in court to institute proceedings, the judge 
himself drew up a proces-verbal and began to gather inform­
ation concerning the alleged crime.
Once the investigation began, witnesses were called, 
and the accused, if he was available, was brought before the 
judge. It was the duty of the alguacil mayor to demand the 
surrender of the accused or seek him out if he did not sur-
^This appeal, if less than 90,000 maravedis were in­
volved, went to the cabildo. Otherwise, it went to a special 
appeals tribunal in Havana. (Ibid., pp. 271-272. Cf. also, 
Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, p. 112.)
^French, Historical Memoirs of Louisiana. V, 273-274.
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render . The accused was given nine days in which to appear 
before the court, and if did not do so in this time and offer 
his defense, the proceedings against him began in his absence. 
Once the accused appeared on his own, or was captured, the 
proceedings were reviewed by the judge.
If the accused was present in the court from the begin­
ning, he would be questioned in private by the judge, after 
which he was permitted to offer his defense and to call wit­
nesses in his behalf. The court, or the litigant if there 
was one, presented its case against the accused and brought 
its witnesses before the judge to be examined. This was also 
done privately. When the prosecution's case was made, the 
accused was allowed to read it or to have it read to him, 
thereby learning of the names of his accusers and their tes­
timony against him. In like manner, the prosecution read the 
statement of the defendant's case. If either the prosecution 
or the defense objected to a witness, that the other had used 
in the case, on the grounds of prejudice or unreliability, 
the testimony of that witness was thrown out. It goes with­
out saying that sufficient cause was required before a wit­
ness would be rejected. The regulations for ruling out the 
testimony of witnesses in criminal cases were the same as 
those for civil cases.
If the accused was found guilty in a criminal case, he 
was sentenced by the judge. If the conviction was based on 
the testimony of at least two reliable witnesses, his penalty
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was imposed according to the letter of the law, in strict 
justice. If, however, he was convicted on the testimony of 
one witness and circumstantial evidence, the sentence was 
not that demanded in strict justice by the law; rather a 
lighter penalty was chosen at the discretion of the judge.
The reason for this leniency was stated in the Code O’Reilly, 
namely, that when two reliable witnesses were not available 
it was better to err in the way of mercy. The Code noted 
that it was preferable to allow a guilty man to go free than 
to convict an innocent man. The common assumption of injus­
tice in Spanish judicial procedures is not borne out by these 
provisions for the protection of individual rights.?
The fourth section of the instructions concerned appeals 
in both criminal and civil cases. An appeal of less than 
90,000 maravedis was heard by the regidores of the cabildo, 
as well as by the judge who had original jurisdiction in the 
case. Fifteen days were allowed for appeal, and then another 
fifteen days were allowed for the other party to present his 
case. The judges were required to render their decision no 
later than ten days after the complete time allowed the par­
ties for the presentation of their respective cases. In 
these proceedings, all of the pertinent documents were cop­
ied, and the originals were forwarded to the cabildo where
^The procedures described in this section were basic­
ally followed in the trial of the rebel leaders who were 
tried under O'Reilly.
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the two regidores and the judge of the trial court could 
either affirm or reverse the decision of the lower court, 
depending on the evidence offered them. In all of the ap­
peals, the appellant’s only recourse was to show that the 
judgment had not been in conformity with the laws of Spain. 
The appeals were appeals in law and not appeals in fact. 
Appeals in matters of over 90,000 maravedis went to the 
special appeals tribunal, established at Havana for that 
purpose, and its decisions were final.®
Appeals in criminal cases under this jurisdiction were 
allowed only if the alcalde^ of the trial court permitted 
them.Appeals were made to the special tribunal at Hav­
ana, from which there was no further resort in minor cases. 
Appeals from the special tribunal in capital cases went to 
the Council of the Indies in Spain. Naturally, the king 
himself could always override any decision of his tribunals.
®French, Historical Memoirs of Louisiana, V, 272-279.
Cf. also, William W. Pierson, Jr. ’’Some Reflections on the 
Cabildo as an Institution," Hispanic American Historical Re­
view, Vol. V (November, 1922), p. 588.
^ O n l y  the governor could pass judgment on crimes carry­
ing the death penalty. (Dart, "Courts and Laws in Colonial 
Louisiana," Reprint: Louisiana Historical Quarterly, Vol. IV. 
No. 3 /July, 19217, pp. 267-288.
l%)art notes that there were many instances of such ap­
peals being granted, but he clearly states that the appeal 
was granted by the alcalde’s favor, not by right, ibid.. d d . 
284-285. ----
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No judgment in a criminal case could be executed before an 
appeal had been heard.^
The fifth section dealt with the nature of punishments 
for various crimes. Although these are described in consid­
erable detail, only a few examples need be cited in order to 
understand the concept of justice that existed at that time. 
Actually, the punishments imposed by Spanish law differed 
little from those prevailing in other European nations dur­
ing the eighteenth century. For example, the crime of blas­
phemy against the Savior or His Virgin Mother was punished 
by cutting out the tongue of the offender and confiscating 
all of his property, one half of which went to the treasury 
and the other half to the informer. This is reminiscent of 
the laws of Puritan England, where blasphemy was punished by 
death. In each case, the penalty bore the mark of the Mosaic 
Law. However, there is no known instance of this law being 
enforced in Louisiana.
Another crime to which a severe penalty was attached 
was that of reviling the king or any member of the king's 
immediate family. Depending on the extent of the defamation
lllbid., pp. 277-279; Dart, "Courts and Laws in Colon­
ial Louisiana, Louisiana Bar, pp. 56-57.
It is clear from O'Reilly's instructions to his lieu­
tenant governors and other officials, including alcaldes. 
that any serious offense must be sent to the governor for 
trial. Lesser officials could only gather facts in serious 
cases, and the governor alone could pass judgment. As noted, 
even his decision could be appealed. (Cf. Burson, Miro. d d . 
194-195.) . ----
153
or detraction, the person was given greater or lesser bodily 
punishment, the nature of which was left to the discretion 
of the judge. However, death was never inflicted on the 
guilty party. The offender's property was also confiscated, 
and one half of it was given to the treasury and the other 
half to his children. If he had no children, two thirds 
went to the treasury, and one third to the informer.
Another cited crime, and a very serious one in all eras 
of history, was that of treason. Anyone convicted of this 
crime was condemned to death, and his property confiscated. 
The crime of insurrection was associated with treason. This 
was defined as taking up arms against the state for any rea­
son, even under the pretext of defending alleged liberties 
or rights. For this crime, the penalty was also death and 
confiscation of property. It was according to these laws 
that six of the Louisiana rebels tried by Felix del Rey were 
condemned to death. The other six received lesser sentences, 
as they were accomplices, not prime instigators, of the re­
bellion. That the strict enforcement of this feature of the 
original code was not carried out by O'Reilly is clear. Only 
those without whom the rebellion could not have occurred were 
given the full penalty of the law.
Murder was mentioned among the other crimes for which
12N o  case of this sort seems to have occurred in Spanish 
Louisiana.
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death was the usual penalty. Assassins and robbers on the 
highways were likewise subject to the death penalty. Assault 
was punished according to the seriousness of the injury done 
to the victim.
The sixth and final section of the instructions dealt with 
testaments. A student of Spanish institutions in Louisiana has 
commented that the system for drawing up and executing wills 
under the Spanish regime was very similar to that which obtains 
under the present Louisiana Constitution.^ This is not sur­
prising, as the Louisiana legal system rests to some degree up­
on Spanish law, although the Napoleonic Code was used as the 
prime source for the Louisiana Civil Code drawn up in 1808.
Under Spanish law, a nuncupative will required for vali­
dity the signatures of three witnesses before a notary. If 
no notary was available, as was often the case in those days 
in remote areas, five resident, or seven non-resident, wit­
nesses were required to sign the document. Codicils could 
be added, but in no instance could a codicil alter the names 
of heirs. A new will was required to change the heirs. If 
the will was a mystic will--that is, a secret one--then seven 
witnesses had to sign in the presence of a notary. When any 
will was probated, all of the witnesses, if available, were 
required to appear before the judge and verify their signa-
l^French, Historical Memoirs of Louisiana. V, 279-281.
l^Dart, "Courts and Laws in Colonial Louisiana," Lou­
isiana Bar, p. 58.
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tures.
If the deceased had died intestate, then special provi­
sions were made in law for the procedures required for the 
distribution of his property. First of all, after capable 
men had made an evaluation of the property, the debts of the 
party had to be proven in court and then paid from the estate. 
An executor appointed by the court carried out these provi­
sions. Then, one-fifth of the estate was to be set aside 
for the offering of Masses for the repose of the soul of the 
deceased. The remainder of the estate was then divided among 
the heirs, after the deduction of court costs, according to 
the shares allotted to them by law. If there were no heirs, 
then after the wife had received her one-half share of the 
estate and one fifth had been set aside for Masses, the re­
mainder was given to charities.
In making the will, the testator worked within certain 
limitations regarding the distribution of his estate. One 
of the most obvious restrictions was that while a testator 
could give an heir his share before the will was made he 
could not bequeath to him more than the law permitted. If 
only a part of the heir's legal share had been given to him 
before the death of the testator, then the remainder could 
be left in the will. Generally, the testator was quite free 
to dispose of his property. He could entail it, in whole or
■^French, Historical Memoirs of Louisiana, V, 281-283.
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part. He could leave his property to legitimate or illegi­
timate heirs. Furthermore, the parents by an advance agree­
ment between them could disinherit any one or all of their 
children.
For one dying intestate the laws carefully regulated the 
distribution of the property among the heirs, the wife inher­
iting one half and the children sharing the rest. If the de­
ceased had no legitimate heirs, his relations to the fourth 
degree shared the property not due the wife. Illegitimate 
children could succeed to what was due their mother upon her 
death. In summary, it was a clear and well thought out sys­
tem of testaments.̂
Appended to these legal instructions was a list of fees 
allowable to various officials, such as judges, attorneys, 
scribes, and the like, for the various duties which they per­
formed. For example, a judge who verified titles, judgments, 
decrees and the like received as compensation four reals in 
milled dollars. A scribe who sat in court in the city re­
ceived fifteen reals per diem, but if he sat in court in the 
countryside he received thirty reals for his work. A survey­
or received three ducats per diem for performing his duty.
The alguacil mayor received twelve reals for every free man 
he held in prison, while for every slave he received only 
eight reals. These are but a few examples of the various fees
16Ibid., pp. 283-285.
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allowed by law to each official for a specific duty per­
formed.-^ There was merit in this, for by these regulations 
the crown had a standard by which to judge any official who 
might exact more than his due. That some peculation existed 
under the Spanish regime, even in the face of these regula­
tions, cannot be denied, but it was no worse than the well 
known corruption occurring in Louisiana during the post civil 
war era, and the early 19301s.
At every stage of the process of establishing the Span­
ish Code of Law for Louisiana, O'Reilly knew that he had the 
opportunity to exercise great discretion. Nevertheless, he 
knew also that he had to submit his plans to the king for 
formal ratification. He had written to the Minister of State, 
the Marques de Grimaldi, in October, 1769, telling him of his 
plans to abolish the Superior Council and to establish a ca­
bildo and apply the Spanish legal system to Louisiana. Fur­
thermore, he had suggested that it would be advisable for the 
court to establish at Havana a special tribunal for hearing 
civil and criminal appeals from Louisiana.19 in December,
17Ibid., pp. 285-288.
l^Dart asserts the existence of peculation in the Loui­
siana government, but states that he had found no proof that 
it existed in the judicial branch ("Courts and Laws in Colon­
ial Louisiana," Reprint in Louisiana Historical Quarterly,
Vol. IV, p. 287).
1^01 Reilly to Grimaldi, October 17, 1769, A.G.I.S.D.,
Legajo 2594, Doc. 5, L.C. pp. 240-245.
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he wrote Grimaldi again, telling him of the actual estab­
lishment of a cabildo and the application of the Laws of the 
Indies in Louisiana.^O "
Approval for O'Reilly's plans was forthcoming from the 
king. To O'Reilly's proposals for the establishment of a 
cabildo, the application of the Laws of the Indies in Louis­
iana, and the establishment at Havana of a special tribunal 
for appeals from Louisiana, Charles III gave his complete ap­
proval, and commanded the general to pursue his present 
course. The king further noted that cedulas were being drawn 
up for the formal ratification of O'Reilly's actions. He 
stated also that the special tribunal which had been requested 
would soon be established.21 After O'Reilly had returned to 
Spain, the royal cedulas approving the governor's actions were 
promulgated. In these cedulas, Charles III noted that 
O'Reilly had acted according to his instructions in establish­
ing the Spanish system of law, and that in all things his 
royal will had been carried out. The letter and the cedulas 
left no doubt that all had been executed as the Spanish mon­
arch desired.^2
^O'Reilly to Grimaldi, December 10, 1769, ibid.. Doc.
19, L.C. pp. 212-224.
^E1 Pardo, Royal Communique to O'Reilly, January 27, 
1770, ibid., pp. 369-371.
^Royal Cedula, San Ildefonso, August 7, 1772, ibid., 
pp. 442-444; Royal Cedula, San Ildefonso, August 7, 1772, 
ibid.. pp. 470-471.
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Besides the well known Code 0 'Reilly, which was promul­
gated in November of 1769, the Spanish governor issued other 
special instructions, decrees and regulations for the govern­
ment of Louisiana. Among these were the orders sent to minor 
officials or commanders who handled lesser civil and criminal 
cases in areas of the colony outside of New Orleans. The ti­
tle of these officials was tenientes particulares de la Costa, 
or, in French, lieutenants particuliers de la dite Cote.23 
They resided at such places as Opelousas, Pointe Couple, 
Iberville, La Fourche, and St. Genevieve. These officers 
were instructed to hear only those civil cases involving less 
than 20 piasters otherwise the case had to be referred to 
the governor of the province. They were also empowered to 
process and execute wills under certain conditions. If the 
will involved less than 100 piasters, the lieutenant was to 
go to the residence of the deceased and distribute the es­
tate according to the terms specified, or, if the person 
died intestate, according to Spanish laws provided for per­
sons so dying. If the will involved more than 100 piasters, 
the lieutenant appointed two men to make an inventory of the
^Petty officials who governed posts, generally along 
the banks of a river. (Cf. Gayarre, History of Louisiana,
III, 21.)
24\Judge Martin says that twenty piasters was twelve 
dollars. (History of Louisiana, p. 157)
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estate. Once the estate was evaluated, it was distributed 
according to the terms of the will, if one existed, or ac­
cording to laws providing for persons dying intestate. If 
the heirs contested the will or the distribution of the prop­
erty, they could make an appeal to the governor of the prov­
ince .
Wills could be made in the presence of the lieutenants, 
since there was a great shortage of notaries in the colony.
In these areas, remote from populated places, only two wit­
nesses were needed to validate a will. Moreover, the lieu­
tenant could act as a notary for contracts, and could require 
only two witnesses to validate them. Even marriage contracts 
were drawn up and certified by the lieutenant, who later sent 
a certified copy to the clerk of the cabildo for his records.
In criminal cases, if the violation was a minor one, 
the lieutenant settled the issue himself. If the issue in­
volved was serious, the lieutenant took the testimony of wit­
nesses, at least two for the same action, and forwarded the 
transcript to the governor, who then heard the case.
Besides these judicial duties, the lieutenants were 
also charged with keeping the peace in their districts. They 
were not to allow any new person to come to live within their 
districts unless this person had written permission from the 
governor of the colony. Furthermore, the lieutenant was in­
structed to keep a close watch over commercial activities to 
see that no illegal trading took place, especially with
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English ships. Finally, an annual report of the conditions 
of the area under his command had to be sent to the governor 
at New Orleans.25 These instructions, as well as the appoint 
ment by O'Reilly of the various men to fill the posts of ten- 
ientes particulares, were all approved by the king.26
Since slavery existed in Louisiana under the French re­
gime, it was necessary for O'Reilly to issue regulations in 
this regard. In a proclamation of August 24, 1769, the gov­
ernor noted that many slaves had been buying and selling 
goods in the city of New Orleans, contrary to a decree of Oc­
tober 12, 1765. Anyone who sold to slaves or bought from 
them was subject to a fine of 500 livres, and both the goods 
bought and the money received were confiscated. This did 
not apply if the slave had permission from his master to en­
gage in this trade.27
Three days after the decree of August 24, 1769, con­
cerning sales and purchases by slaves, O'Reilly issued a de­
finitive proclamation concerning slavery in Louisiana. He 
believed that in order to maintain this system the laws con­
cerning slaves must be clearly understood and effectively 
enforced. Hence, he ordered that the Black Code, or Code
26Instructions for lieutenants particuliers de la dite 
Cote, New Orleans, February 12, 1770, ibid.. ppT 3T5^1:9̂
26R0yal Cedula, San Ildefonso, August 17, 1772, ibid., 
pp. 507-512.
27Rinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valiev, pp. 89-90.
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Noir, issued at Versailles in 1724, be observed as it had 
been under the French regime and under Ulloa. This code reg­
ulated matters of justice, discipline and the government of 
the slaves within the colony of Louisiana, as well as the 
conditions of the slave trade. To see that it was fully en­
forced, Governor O'Reilly appointed two Creoles, M. Fleurian 
and M. Ducros, as administrators of the Code Noir.28 Each 
of these men later became regidores of the cabildo.^9
Another important regulation issued by O'Reilly was his 
proclamation for the distribution of land in Louisiana. He 
noted that new and clearly stated regulations were necessary 
regarding the conditions and terms of land grants. He felt 
that an increase in land ownership was needed to encourage 
the agricultural pursuits of the colonies. He established 
these conditions for a land grant: Each new family that
settled along the banks of the Mississippi was ceded a plot 
of ground six to eight arpents wide and forty arpents deep. 
Levees had to be built to protect the land, and the land 
must be improved within the first three years of acquisi­
tion in order to retain ownership. Furthermore, the new 
laws required that the roads near the land be kept up by the 
grantee. If, at the end of the three years, it was judged
^proclamation on Code Noir, August 27. 1769. A.G.I. S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc.“707 T77U7 p. 216.
29Document of Appointment, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. 
p. 345.
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that the specified improvement had not been made, the prop­
erty reverted to the crown. This was probably done to keep 
speculators from buying large tracts of land. In certain 
areas of the colony, as many as twelve arpents of land could 
be granted along the Mississippi, if at these points the river 
curved so as to cause these sites to be of less than normal 
depth. In the areas of Opelousas, Atakapas, and Rapides, 
larger grants of 42 arpents by 42 arpents were permitted, 
but only if the grantee possessed one hundred head of tame 
cattle, some domesticated horses and sheep, and at least two 
slaves to care for this live stock. All grants were made by 
the governor of Louisiana in the king's name.
These instructions also contained regulations in regard 
to the raising of cattle. These animals were permitted to 
roam at large only between November 11 and March 15, doubtless 
due to the shortage of grass on enclosed pastures during those 
months. Such cattle, however, must be branded; any cattle not 
branded were considered as strays, and could be confiscated 
and slaughtered after July, 1771. Persons allowing their 
branded cattle to roam at any other time were liable for dam­
ages they caused to other settlers' property.30 In this mat­
ter of the new land regulations, O'Reilly's actions received 
the approval of the Council of the Indies and the King.
*2 Q■^Instructions para repartimiento de tierra, ibid., Doc. 
12, L.C. pp. 328-338.
31Cedula on Land Grants, San Ildefonso, August 17, 1772, 
ibid., pp. 513-519.
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This resume of the Spanish system of law established by 
O'Reilly for Louisiana illustrates the nature of the new re­
gime under which the people of Louisiana were intended to 
live. That the systems did not always function as intended 
was not O'Reilly's fault. Moreover, it was not, as was 
asserted by Francis Xavier Martin, the 19th Century Louisiana 
judge and historian, a system forced upon the people by 
O'Reilly against the expressed instructions of the king. 
Historians who attacked O'Reilly also held that the Spanish 
laws were alien, and therefore incompatible with Louisiana 
customs. This is true only in that it was the system of a 
country other than France. But the law existing in France 
and her colonies closely resembled that of Spain and the 
Spanish Indies. Both systems were based upon Roman, and not 
Anglo-Saxon, law, and both had developed in a similar way.
The Bourbon dynasty reigned in both France and Spain, a 
fact that further increased the similarity of the legal sys­
tems. In addition, the French Code Noir, as was noted, had 
been adopted intact by O'Reilly.
To better illustrate the similarity of the two legal 
systems, a comparison of the Superior Council with the ca­
bildo may be made. The Superior Council was first estab­
lished in New Orleans under Crozat in 1712; was given per­
manent status in the city and the colony in 1716; and was 
reorganized in 1719, at which time it took its final form.
The Council was comprised of a First Councillor, or presid-
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ing judge, a Procurator General, or attorney general, and 
other members who were themselves not necessarily lawyers.
It acted as a court for the city of New Orleans and the col­
ony of Louisiana. Crozat, and later the directors of the 
Company of the West, appointed its members, subject to the 
king's approval. When Louisiana became a crown colony in 
1731, the members were appointed by the king.32
In dealing with civil and criminal cases, the French 
judges were bound to written pleas only in important cases.
In minor cases, they held informal hearings. In the early 
days of the colony, the Superior Council had original and 
exclusive jurisdiction in all cases, but towards the end of 
the French era local judges held court, and appeals were 
made to the Superior Council. Appeals from a decision of 
the Superior Council could be made only to the king's Privy 
Council.33
As has already been noted in the summary of the func­
tions of the cabildo, that body was also a judicial one. 
However, it served primarily as a court of appeals, and its 
jurisdiction was more limited than that of the Superior Coun­
cil. The special tribunal established at Havana heard ap­
peals in civil cases involving more than 90,000 maravedis.
3^Dart,'Courts and Laws in Colonial Louisiana," Loui- 
siana Bar, pp. 22-27.
33Ibid., pp. 28-35.
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Furthermore, the latter tribunal, and not the cabildo, heard 
appeals in all criminal cases.3^ In spite of these differ- 
ces, however, the two councils were sufficiently similar to 
justify the statement that the cabildo was not, in essence, 
alien to the people of Louisiana. The greatest difference 
was that the Superior Council had powers which the Spanish 
chose to vest in the governor, or in others, like the appeals 
tribunal at Havana, rather than in the cabildo.
The Superior Council and the cabildo both cared for the 
public welfare and controlled public works, fixed food prices, 
and the like. However, the Superior Council had jurisdiction 
over the whole colony, whereas the cabildo was, in theory, 
restricted to local affairs in New Orleans. Although tech­
nically the cabildo had no power over land grants, it was 
able to tax lands. If an owner failed to pay his taxes or 
did not keep up his land, the cabildo could force him to do 
this or forfeit his land.35
Again, as the cabildo members came from powerful families, 
they also exercised some influence in other affairs beyond 
their legal jurisdiction. In one instance, they were able to 
resist Carondelet's efforts to educate the slaves as required 
by Spanish law.36
3^The Cabildo, Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valiev, 
pp. 109-114.  L
35c.R. Arena "Landholding and Political Powers in Louisi­





On the other hand, by the end of the Spanish period,
the cabildo in New Orleans had lost to the intendant some
of its financial control. Logically the cabildo should have
37retained fiscal powers within the city, but it did not.
Unlike the Superior Council, the cabildo, in spite of some 
influence over colonial affairs, never acquired vast gov­
erning powers. It remained basically subordinate to the 
governor in Louisiana, just as it did in the rest of the
opSpanish colonies in America.
Another item worthy of note is that the personnel of the 
cabildo appointed by O'Reilly was entirely of French extrac­
tion.-^ This fact alone would make the judgments of that 
body akin to those of the French Superior Council. On the 
whole, one might say that the cabildo was a weak reflection 
of the Superior Council. It differed from that powerful body 
not so much in regard to its basic structure, but in regard 
to the extent of its powers.
An example of an actual case will further illustrate the 
closeness of the two legal systems. In criminal trials, the 
procedure for investigating and questioning witnesses and ac­
cused was nearly identical. A certain murder case handled by
0 7 Herbert I. Priestly, "Spanish Colonial Municipalities," 
Louisiana Historical Quarterly, Vol. V (April, 1922), pp. 
141-143.
O O XJOHenry Plauche Dart, "The Cabildo of New Orleans," Lou­
isiana Historical Quarterly, Vol. V, pp. 279-281.
39Documents of Appointment, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594,
L.C. p. 345.
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the Superior Council shortly before the end of the French 
period of domination will illustrate this likeness. The ac­
cused was arrested at Natchitoches, put in chains, and taken 
to New Orleans, where he was placed in a dungeon. The Procu­
rator General started the proceedings against the accused, 
who in the meantime remained in prison. The accused was not 
given a notice of the indictment specifying the charges 
against him. Evidence was gathered at Natchitoches, the 
scene of the murder. Once this testimony was assembled, the 
accused was told of the charges against him, and was given 
the name of the chief witness for the state. The accused de­
nied the testimony against him, after which the witness was 
brought from Natchitoches to attempt identification. This 
prisoner was identified as the murderer by the one witness, 
but was not permitted to question the witness himself. The 
chief judge of the trial, however, questioned the witness.
The Council then decided on the basis of the testimony of this 
witness, and other circumstantial information, that the man 
was guilty.^ He was then sentenced to death by breaking on 
the rack and hanging, but as an act of mercy the Council had
^ In comparing this case with the trial of the rebels 
as described in Ch. Ill of this work, one notices particular­
ly that the French and Spanish methods of questioning the 
accused, and of obtaining information and witnesses was iden­
tical. The most notable difference was the fact that two 
witnesses were required by the Spanish for the death penalty, 
whereas the French considered one witness and circumstantial 
evidence adequate.
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bis body broken after the hanging.^ A similar case under 
Spanish law would have required two witnesses for the impo­
sition of the death penalty. The Spanish Code stated that 
it was better that a guilty man should go free, than that 
an innocent one should be falsely convicted and punished.
But aside from this, the procedures were nearly identical 
to those required by French law. Such a case, however, 
since it was a capital offense, would have been tried by the 
governor, not the cabildo.
A final important factor to be considered in the study 
of Spanish law in Louisiana is the impact that this system 
of law has had upon law as it exists in Louisiana today. A 
brief comparison of some section of the Civil Code of Loui­
siana with the Code 0 1 Reilly will illustrate the considera­
ble influence which the latter had on the former. Section VI 
of O'Reilly's instructions dealing with civil and criminal 
proceedings indicates the close connection between the Span­
ish laws and current Louisiana laws. Section VI dealt with 
wills and their execution. One finds that the Civil Code of 
Louisiana strongly reflects this section, since, for example, 
the nuncupative will must be attested by five witnesses, as 
was the case previously noted in Section VI of the Code 
O'Reilly. Both the Code O'Reilly and the Civil Code of Lou­
isiana further required that these witnesses be residents of
^Proceedings of Superior Council, cited by Dart, "Courts 
and Laws in Colonial Louisiana," Louisiana Bar, pp. 35-37.
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the place where the will was signed, and if they were not 
residents seven witnesses were r e q u i r e d .
Again, according to Spanish law, the mystic or secret 
will had to be witnessed by seven persons. The 1825 Civil 
Code of Louisiana required the same number. However, the 
1870 code reduced the required number to three witnesses.^
Section II of the instructions, as has been noted, dealt 
with executory proceedings. These proceedings concerned pri­
marily the settlement of debts by legal means. In this sec­
tion, for example, Spanish law stated that the property was
the debtor's, even after seizure, until it was sold to settle
the debts. If the debtor paid the creditors prior to the 
sale of his property, his property was automatically returned 
to him. This exact provision is found in the Civil Code of 
Louisiana, wherein it is noted: "As a debtor preserves his
ownership of the property surrendered, he may divest the cred­
itors of their possession of the same, at any time before 
they have sold it, by paying the amount of his debts, with 
the expenses attending the session."44
According to Section II of the instructions, for the set­
tlement of a debti property could be sold only by those who
^Benjamin Wall Dart (ed.), Civil Code of the State of 
Louisiana. Revision of 1870 (Indianapolis, 1947), Article 
1581, p. 398.
43Ibid., art. 1584, p. 399.
44Ibid., art. 2178, p. 540.
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had been appointed by the judge for this purpose, under speci­
fied conditions. In the Civil Code of Louisiana it is provid­
ed that the appraisal and sale should take place under similar 
co nditio n s T h e s e  few examples illustrate the direct in­
fluence of the Spanish legal system on the laws of the State 
of Louisiana.
Thus, the Spanish code of laws, as instituted by O'Reilly, 
has been shown, first of all, to have been that system desired 
by his monarch, and not a set of laws imposed by the general 
on the people of Louisiana contrary to his instructions. 
Moreover, it was ft system not basically alien to the French 
population of Louisiana, but one closely resembling the laws 
under which Louisiana was ruled by France. Finally, it has 
been noted that this system of law, although it held sway in 
Louisiana for only thirty-four years, influenced the Civil 
Code of the present state of Louisiana in an appreciable de­
gree. The importance of the influence of Spanish legal con­
cepts and procedure in the development of the present state 
code has been a reality previously either denied or given 
inadequate coverage.
*̂•5Ibid. , art. 2184, p. 541.
VI
THE SPANISH LEGAL SYSTEM 
BEGINS TO FUNCTION UNDER 
GOVERNOR O'REILLY'S SUPERVISION
Within a few days after the promulgation of the Code 
Q 'Reilly the Spanish legal system began to function in Lou­
isiana. Following his instructions, O'Reilly had notified 
Don Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga^ on November 29, 1769, that he 
would succeed him as governor of Louisiana. Also, he in­
formed Unzaga that a cabildo would be established on Decem­
ber 1, 1769, at which time Unzaga would be given control of 
the civil and military government of New Orleans and the sur­
rounding territory. Complete authority would be turned over 
to Unzaga when O'Reilly departed for Havana. Unzaga's salary 
was six thousand pesos per annum, to which was added a three 
thousand pesos allowance for a residence.^ The king's ap­
proval for these measures drawn up by O'Reilly was received 
by Unzaga after the latter had succeeded the general as gov­
ernor:
■̂ ■Unzaga came to Louisiana with O'Reilly as the Colonel 
of the Havana Regiment. (Gayarre, History of Louisiana, III, 
44.)
2O'Reilly to Unzaga, New Orleans, November 29, 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. pp. 231-233.
^O'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, December 10, 1769,
ibid., pp. 225-230.
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The King has taken note that his royal intentions 
have been complied with in this respect. I shall 
continue to inform Your Lordship of what his maj- 
esty commands with respect to the colony, as I 
have already done in the previous mails, on the 
supposition that upon receipt of my letters, the 
said lieutenant general (O'Reilly) will have al­
ready left there and that Your Lordship will be 
in possession of that command. ,
El Pardo, 24th March, 1770. Grimaldi
In accordance with the information given to Unzaga on 
November 29th, O'Reilly established the cabildo on the first 
day of December. Having notified the appointees, he called 
them before him to take the oath of office, and then gave 
each his commission. It was also at this meeting that Un­
zaga was formally appointed military and civil governor of 
New Orleans and the territory surrounding it, and was named 
governor-elect for the entire province. The men, all of 
French descent, who were appointed to the cabildo as regi- 
dores were: Francis Marie Reggio, Alferez Roya1; Charles
Baptiste Fleurian, Alguacil Mayor; Peter Francis Olivier de 
Vezin, Alcalde Provincial; Joseph Ducros, Depositary General; 
Denis Braud, Receiver of the Fines; and Anthony Bienvenu, 
Regidor
The following day, December 2, 1769, the cabildo began 
to function. At the first meeting, the elected officials of
^Grimaldi to Unzaga, March 24, 1770, A.G.I.P.C., Lega- 
jo 174, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, p. 163.
^List of Appointees, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. p. 
345; and Proceedings of December 1, 1769, Records and Delib­
erations of the Cabildo, Book I, pp. 3-5 (ZX-2B).
the cabildo and the other city officials took office. The 
senior alcalde ordinary was Anthony de la C h a i s e the junior 
alcalde ordinary, Louis Trudeau; the attorney general, Louis 
Ranson; and the city treasurer, John Durel. These four took 
the oath in the presence of Unzaga. The meeting was notarized 
by Charles Garic, formerly clerk of the Superior Council, who 
had since become clerk of the cabildo.7 Thus, the basic or­
gan for the government of the capital city and the colony 
under Spanish rule came into being.®
During the three month period between the establishment 
of the cabildo and O'Reilly's departure for Havana on March 1, 
1770, there were only a few administrative items considered by 
that body. Some meetings dealt with the public welfare, but 
most of them were concerned with the various appointments made 
by O'Reilly. On December 23, 1769, Henry Depres was sworn in 
as a notary public by O'R e i l l y and again on February 23,
^Gayarre^says that de la Chaise was the brother-in-law of 
Joseph Villere (History of Louisiana, III, 31).
^List of Appointees, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. p. 345 
and Proceedings of December 2, 1769, Records and Deliberations 
of the Cabildo, Book I, pp. 6-7 (4A). According to Gayarre, 
Garic purchased this office (History of Louisiana. Ill, 31).
®This author has found no documentary evidence that any 
of these officials purchased their offices. Since the prac­
tice, however, was common in the eighteenth century, it may, 
therefore, be true that the offices were bought.
^The function of a notary public was basically the same 
under O'Reilly as it is now in Louisiana.
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1770,two other men were appointed as notaries public.^
Most of the remaining business carried on during this period 
was supervised by Unzaga, who was acting as governor of New 
Orleans. However, as he did not yet exercise full guberna­
torial powers, all of the appointments were made by O'Reilly.
Prior to the day of his departure, only one other impor­
tant official action was taken by O'Reilly in regard to the 
cabildo. In February, he sent to that body a letter of in­
structions, clarifying the duties of the members of the ca­
bildo with regard to city administration and judicial pro­
ceedings. It also gave instructions for the other judges 
within the province.11 Until he gave official notice of his 
departure to the cabildo on March 1, 1770, there was no other 
important communication from the general. The administration 
of the city had indeed been left almost exclusively to gover­
nor-elect Unzaga from the very day of the establishment of 
the cabildo, as was intended by O'Reilly and approved by the 
Spanish Court.
While the administrative proceedings of the cabildo were 
few during the remainder of O'Reilly's time in Louisiana, the 
judicial proceedings of the new government were quite numer­
ous. The first suit instituted under the new government had
■^Proceedings for December 23, 1769, Records and Delib­
erations of the Cabildo, Book I, pp. 14-15 (7B-8A-8B); pro­
ceeding s for February 23, 1770, ibid.. Book I, Part II, p. 2.
llProceedings for February 23, 1770, ibid., Book 1,
Part II, p. 10.
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been initiated under the late Superior Council on January
3, 1769, and the judgment rendered in May of that year.
But, since this decision had never been executed, the
petitioner had requested the new Spanish government to
execute the judgment. One Elias Hughes had been awarded
17,133 livres, 16 sols and 10 derniers against Misters
Detour and Villefranche. The plaintiff had departed for
France, so a certain Nicholas Delasise had been chosen to
act in his stead. There was a new hearing according to
Spanish laws, and finally on January 8, 1771, the case was
decided in favor of Hughes. Everything was in complete
accord with the instructions set down by O'Reilly for these
proceedings, even to the fees alloted to the officials
hearing the case. Governor-elect Unzaga presided over the 
i ohearing. Because of the large amount involved, the case 
had to be tried in the governor's court.
An interesting case also concerning a debt collection 
was initiated on January 16, 1770, in Unzaga's court. A 
certain John Pomet, captain of a ship named the Thetis, 
brought suit against M. Adamville, the only one of a group 
of debtors who had refused to comply with the governor-elect's 
order of January 17, 1770, to pay for goods received from the
l^Dellasise v . Villefranche, Spanish Judicial Records, 
4053, January 3, 1770, cited by Dart and Porteous (eds.), 
"Index to Spanish Judicial Records," Louisiana Historical 
Quarterly. Vol. VI (October, 1923), pp. 683-684.
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captain. Adamville was being sued for 168 livres, and 
court costs and fees. The case against Adamville was pre­
sented on July 12, 1770, by Leonard Mazange, a lawyer, who 
petitioned the court for collection of the debt. The 
alguacil mayor. Charles Fleurian, seized two notes payable 
to Adamville by Charles Le Conte in the amount of 543 livres, 
and deposited them with the receiver general for safe-keeping. 
At that point the case became complicated, for Le Conte 
claimed that Adamville owed him money from an old debt, thus 
balancing out these two notes destined for Adamville. All 
of this the latter denied. In the end, the court ordered 
Pomet to be satisfied with these notes in payment of his 
debts, and commanded that from the notes payable to Adamville 
the court costs and fees be deducted. This was the final
decision of the court in regard to the debt owed to Pomet
by Adamville. In all aspects of this case, the regular
13Spanish procedure was followed.
One of the civil cases illustrative of the proceedings 
of the early days of the Spanish era was instituted on 
January 22, 1770, in the court of Governor-elect Unzaga, by
Louis Diard against John Datchurut for loss of a boat and
its cargo. Diard said that Datchurut had left St. Louis, 
at that time under the jurisdiction of lieutenant-governor
13john B. Pomet v. Adamville, Spanish Judicial Records, 
10649, January 16, 1770, ibid., pp. 685-686.
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Pedro Piernas, an O'Reilly appointee, to deliver the 
merchandise to him but instead had gone with it to New 
Orleans. Furthermore, a worthless boat was returned to 
him in place of his own, and the hides and flour had dis­
appeared. The plaintiff had hired this second boat, 
leaving 800 livres with the officials in Illinois for 
surety.
Governor-elect Unzaga appointed Attorney General, Louis 
Ranson, and Receiver of Fines, Denis Braud, to arbitrate 
Diard's claims. After considered judgment, they ordered 
the defendant, Datchurut, to pay all the demands. In order 
to carry out this judgment, the plaintiff and the defendant 
had to journey to St. Louis, where the shipment originated, 
to present themselves before Pedro Piernas. He decided on 
June 9, 1770, that the hides and flour should be valued at 
357o of their original cost. Meanwhile, the case continued 
at New Orleans. In February of 1770, all of Datchurut's 
property was seized, as required by law, and placed in the 
keeping of the Receiver General, Joseph Ducros. Later in 
January of 1771, Unzaga sent a dispatch to Piernas authoriz­
ing him to seize the property of Datchurut in Illinois in 
order to pay the owner of the boat. Finally, on December 
30th of 1773, a receipt for payment in full was signed by 
the defendant at St. Genevieve, thus ending the case.^^
^Louis Diard v. Jean Datchurut. Spanish Judicial Rec­
ords, 40^1, January 22, 1770. ibidTT pp. 695-696.
I
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Naturally, the majority of the cases were heard outside 
the governor's court. Most of these came under the cognizance 
of an alcalde. A good example of one of these was the case 
of Duforest vs. Chaperon, which was heard in the court of 
the junior alcalde ordinary, Louis Trudeau. Duforest was 
the attorney for a M. Montegue who sued Chaperon for the 
amount due Montegue on a note signed by Chaperon on June 12, 
1769. The latter failed to appear before the court, and 
judgment was rendered against him by default. This was in 
accord with the instructions issued in the Code O'Reilly.
In December of 1770, Chaperon still had not paid the note as 
the court ordered, so Duforest asked that the defendant be 
summoned to verify his signature and the validity of the 
note. On December 22, 1770, Duforest asked that the note be 
returned for future use, and that the proceedings be dis­
continued. This was granted and the case was closed. Since 
the plaintiff did not request the full enforcement of the 
law by demanding seizure of Chaperon's property, the pro­
ceedings rested at this unresolved point.
An interesting case regarding freedom for slaves was 
recorded during O'Reilly's stay in Louisiana. On February 
16, 1770, Pierre Joseph D'llle Dupard and his wife petitioned 
General O'Reilly that an agreement of theirs be recognized
^Duforest v. Chaperon, Spanish Judicial Records. 4019. 
JanuarylTTTTTO, ibTdT. p. 700. ’
in law as binding at the time of their deaths. In this
petition, they specified that if four named slaves served
them faithfully until their demise, they were to be freed
and accorded all the rights of free men upon probation of
their wills. Governor-elect Unzaga, to whom O'Reilly
assigned the case, passed judgment on the petition and
granted it as requested. The petitioner, M. Dupard, was
required, as was customary in manumission cases, to give
120 livres for pious works. This money was turned over to
Denis Braud, the Receiver of Fines, for use at the Maison
de Charite. Attached to this agreement were all of the
documents proving that the petitioners had legal title to
the mentioned slaves.^ Although the petition was addressed
to O'Reilly, the judicial records show that he gave all
such cases to Unzaga, who either handled them himself, or
17gave them to an alcalde. However, outside of business 
involving a notary, no cases were begun under the new Spanish 
regime until January, 1770. O'Reilly was following his 
instructions in turning over the civil government to Unzaga 
as soon as possible.
1 fiSale of Estate of Joseph Dupard. Spanish Judicial 
Records, 4030, February 16, 1/70, ibid., pp. 706-708.
■^Dart and Porteous (eds.), "Index to Spanish Judicial 
Records," Louisiana Historical Quarterly. Vol. VI (January, 
1923), pp. 145-163, passim.
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One phase of the administration of the colony that 
O'Reilly kept completely in his own hands was that of the 
military. Not only did he maintain full control over the 
defense and garrisoning of Louisiana, but he also kept 
military trials under his supervision. For example, one 
military case involved five enlisted men of the company of 
Captain Riu. They had been cited by their commander for 
insubordination. The accused were sergeant Thomas de Cobas, 
corporal Manuel Martinez, and privates Pedro de Leon,
Miguel Pinexo and Joseph Avellando. The formal charge 
stated that they had ignored their superiors, and had on 
various occasions, behaved in a manner not conformable to 
the military service.
A court martial board was ordered by O'Reilly. This 
body was headed by Captain Jerome Campani, and it continued 
the hearing from December 24 until December 30. During the 
trial the accused made counter-charges asserting they they 
had suffered grave injustices at the hands of their super­
iors, Lieutenant Fernando Gomez and Captain Riu. The com­
mander of the company introduced witnesses to prove that 
two of the accused were guilty as charged. These were 
privates Pedro de Leon and Miguel Pinexo, both of whom were 
sentenced to six years at hard labor. The sergeant, the 
corporal and the remaining private were acquitted. On the 
other hand, the court gave credence to the charges made by
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sergeant de Cobas that he had suffered grave injustices at 
the hands of Lieutenant Gomez and Captain Riu. Consequently, 
the accusations against Riu and Gomez were further investi­
gated.'*’®
O'Reilly was particularly concerned over the alleged 
injustices that had been done to sergeant de Cobas. He 
believed that, if true, they were not only harmful to the 
sergeant, but were also dangerous for the morale and dis­
cipline of the entire military corps in Louisiana. The 
general was also concerned about the pending promotion of 
Riu to lieutenant colonel. Because of the accusations 
against the captain, O'Reilly told Grimaldi that he was 
withholding the captain's appointment to the rank of 
lieutenant colonel until an investigation could be made 
into the charges.Later, both Gomez and Riu were allowed 
to go to Havana to defend themselves against the charges
onmade by sergeant de Cobas. w Before departing for Havana, 
General O'Reilly had made these arrangements with governor- 
elect Unzaga.
'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, January 2, 1770, 
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, Doc. 86 and enclosures, L.C. pp. 
595-605.
19Ibid., pp. 599-605.
20The records available for this case did not indicate 
the outcome of the court martial.
21-0'Reilly to Unzaga, New Orleans, February 14, 1770,
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 181.
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O'Reilly's continued control of the military is explained 
by his position as Inspector General and his responsibility 
not only for Louisiana's defense, but also for that of the 
Spanish West Indies. Even after his return to Spain, as 
the concluding chapter will disclose, he took a vital part 
in the military affairs of these areas, especially those of 
Louisiana. His subsequent concern with these areas derived 
from his office as Inspector General of Infantry, and from 
a recognition by the Spanish government of his knowledge of 
the strategic potential of this section of the Empire.
VII
MILITARY AND INDIAN AFFAIRS
After the establishment of law and order in the colony 
of Louisiana, the most difficult problems which O'Reilly had 
to solve were those of military affairs and Indian relations. 
A system of defense had to be set up in the vast newly ac­
quired territory which was adjacent to Spain's traditional 
enemy, England. Defense had been of great concern to 
Governor Ulloa, but the rebellion destroyed the work he had 
done. Ulloa had attempted to build effective forts at 
strategic places adjacent to the English posts. As he had 
so few troops and so little money, he had not been success­
ful. Although much of Don Antonio's first year spent in 
Louisiana was devoted to the building of forts, O'Reilly 
felt compelled to revamp a great part of the system and re­
vise the approach to the defense of the colony.^
0 'Reilly's basic plan for the protection and garrison­
ing of the colony was outlined in a letter to Don Julian de 
Arriaga in October, 1769. The general decided to reduce 
the number of forts in the colony, which he felt were too
^O'Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, October 17, 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-7, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi 
Valley, pp. 96-98.
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scattered to be effective. Furthermore, trying to keep so
many forts was an unnecessary expense to the royal treasury.
Next, he hoped to reduce the number of regular troops to a
minimum, so that while having enough on hand to maintain
control, he would not require so great a number of regulars
as to overburden the royal treasury. Militia units would
replace regulars. Finally, he realized that the allegiance
of the Indians was necessary to insure the colony against
any raids. Moreover, the Indian allies were an excellent
obarrier to British expansion.
These general plans were soon supplemented by specific 
action, both in regard to forts and to troops. At the mouth 
of the Mississippi River, Governor Ulloa had established a 
new fortress, which he had built on an island composed of 
mud and shifting sands, named the Isla Real Gatholica de 
San Carlos. It was located at a site along the river which 
today is called Spanish Balize, nearly adjacent to the French 
fortress of Balize. While O'Reilly admitted that the general 
area had been well chosen, the site of the fort was basically 
unsatisfactory because of the shifting sand and sinking mud
^Ibid., p. 96; and O'Reilly to Arriaga, Havana, April 
12, 1764, A.H.N.P.E., Legajo 3025; and Jack D. L. Holmes, 
Honor and Fidelity. The Louisiana Infantry Regiment and 
The Louisiana Militia Companies. 1766-1821 (Birmingham,
1965), p. 10.
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on which it was built. He itemized a long list of faults 
to be found with the fort. Since it had been built by Ulloa
in 1766, it had so deteriorated that the repairs would come
to 1,130 pesos, with a considerable sum to be expended
annually for upkeep, due to the nature of the terrain. In
addition, the sailors and soldiers required to man the 
fortress were exposed to the full force of the wind and 
water, there being no natural protection. Furthermore, it 
was indefensible in time of war. Also it was useless against 
ships coming down the river to attack New Orleans, as it was 
too far from the opposite water channel for its guns to be 
effective. In any event, O'Reilly felt an attack by water 
would come by way of Lake Ponchartrain or Lake Borgne, 
rather than by way of the Mississippi River.^
Since the fortress was considered of no value, he planned 
to abandon it leaving only a small garrison of ten men as 
observers. In taking this action, he had followed the advice 
of competent men who had gone to investigate the island and 
the fortress. In order to verify his own observations, those 
men had signed statements attesting to their belief that the 
fortress should be abandoned.^
^0'Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, December 29, 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-9, Doc. 25, in Kinnaird, Spain in the 
Mississippi Valley, pp. 144-152.
^Ibid., attached statement signed by Unzaga et al,
January 8, 1770, Doc. 25, No. 2.
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On September 6, O'Reilly had issued a directive to the 
commander at French Balize to maintain his post and guard 
the entrance to the Mississippi River. He was to be on the 
lookout for all warships, especially foreign ones. Moreover, 
any vessel going through the pass must identify itself; 
either by showing its papers or by giving the proper signal 
before passing the fort. In his monthly report, the com­
mander was required to list all sailings. To preserve good 
order at the post, special attention should be given to 
troop discipline. The commander was also cautioned by 
O'Reilly to see to it that all of the soldiers received 
proper rations. Because it was impossible in these brief 
instructions to cover all possible circumstances, the Spanish 
governor left to the discretion of the commandant the dis­
position of any unusual problems.
Another fortress which O'Reilly decided to abandon was 
Fort Saint Louis de Natchez, which was on the west bank of 
the Mississippi, south of the British fortress of Panmure at 
Natchez. It was, he held, of no defensive value. Further­
more, due to its distance from New Orleans, it was deemed 
worthless as a trading post, and he ordered the Acadians who 
had settled there to move closer to New Orleans.
^0'Reilly to Commandant at Balize, September 6, 1769, 
Ms. copy dated February 26, 1770, A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 181.
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Still another fort to be abandoned was that at Iberville 
where a number of German families had settled. These 
colonists who had come on the English ship, The Britannia, 
had weapons of their own and could defend themselves, if 
necessary. This step would release the regular troops 
stationed at Iberville for the defense of the city of New 
Orleans.̂
After making known his plans for the abandonment of 
these forts, O'Reilly went on to a more general appraisal 
of the defenses of the entire colony. He felt that owing 
to the climate and terrain, it was useless to continue to 
build fortresses or to dig moats. Because of the rain and 
dampness, the wood of the forts easily rotted. Moats were 
impractical in Louisiana, as they could not be made deep 
enough to be of any use. With the abundance of water in 
the soil of the southern part of the province, moats were 
impossible to maintain with the engineering capabilities 
available to O'Reilly. In summary, he believed that for 
all practical purposes the province was not defensible in 
the traditional way. His plan, therefore, was to keep the 
enemy busy elsewhere, and so ward off a massive direct attack 
on Louisiana. This was especially true for the city of New 
Orleans and its environs. The people would be the best
6Ibid.. pp. 144-152.
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defense for the colony if a direct attack should come.
To one familiar with the climate and the terrain around 
New Orleans, and with the river's appearing and disappearing 
islands, the views offered by O'Reilly seem realistic indeed. 
While O'Reilly abandoned useless forts, however, he did keep 
those which he felt to be necessary. Among these, from 
south to north, were the following: French Balize; New
Orleans, itself; Pointe Coupee; Arkansas; Saint Genevieve; 
Saint Louis; and the fort at the mouth of the Missouri 
River. In addition to these key river forts, he also re­
tained the important posts of Opelousas, Natchitoches, 
Rapides, and Atakapas.^ His instructions for their preser­
vation will be noted later.
A central idea in O'Reilly's plans was the use of as 
few regular Spanish troops in Louisiana as was consonant 
with domestic security and defense. To achieve this he 
organized the Louisiana militia. In all, thirteen militia 
units were established during O'Reilly's regime.8 By Decem­
ber, 1769, the Louisiana Batallion of Infantry had been re-
^Mortimer Favrot, "Colonial Forts in Louisiana," 
Louisiana Historical Quarterly, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (July,T5‘«77"p.""T40'.
8Ibid., p. 740.
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established and reformed by General O'Reilly.^ it had a
total of 549 officers and men, comprised of one company of
grenadiers and seven of infantry. The grenadiers numbered
forty-five officers and men, six of the infantry companies
numbered seventy-seven officers and men each, and the remain-
10ing company numbered forty-two officers and men. Prior to 
O'Reilly's arrival, it was being formed in Havana, but the 
rebellion had caused a temporary halt in the organization 
of the batallion. Pasquel de Ulloa, the sergeant major was
breveted as lieutenant colonel, and the adjutant general was
11 12 Joaquin Panis. Don Jose Estecheria was named colonel.
The general revealed his military plans through his 
instructions to the commandants of the various posts of the 
colony. In November 1769, O'Reilly issued instructions to 
Athanasius de Mezieres who was already the acting commander 
at Natchitoches. O'Reilly chose him to serve as lieutenant 
governor of that district, not only because he was trust­
worthy, but primarily because he was familiar with the area
^Gayarre claims that the batallion was not established 
until after O'Reilly left (History of Louisiana, III, 50). 
However, this is hard to reconcile with the documents cited 
by Professor Holmes in Fidelity and Honor, p. 18.
•^List of Troops made for O'Reilly, certified by O'Reilly 
and Juan A. Gayarre, December 8, 1769, A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 181.
■^Holmes, Honor and Fidelity, p. 18.
•^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, III, p. 50.
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and its people. De Mezieres bad been in that community
since 1743, and had served as assistant commander under
1 3Kerlerec. Later he was acting commandant under Aubry. 
O'Reilly instructed him to keep only a small garrison of 
regulars, and to rely mainly on the militia. The latter 
unit was selected by de Mezieres himself, gubject to the 
approval of the governor. These orders were in direct 
accord with O'Reilly's overall policy of reliance on the 
militia rather than on regular troops.
To keep order in the community, de Mezieres was com­
manded to maintain a small guard and a prison. Legal in­
fractions of a minor nature were to be attended to by de 
Mezieres or other local officials, but cases of a very 
important and extraordinary nature had to be referred by 
courrier to the government at New Orleans. In carrying 
out the administration of justice, de Mezieres was directed 
to observe exactly the prescriptions of Spanish law as pro­
mulgated by O'Reilly. A copy of the Code 0 'Reilly was sent 
to de Mezieres for his study. He was further instructed 
to preserve the property of the Church and to impress upon 
the people their duty to support it.
^Herbert Eugene Bolton (ed.) , Athanase de Mezieres and 
the Louisiana— -Texas Frontier, 1768-1780 (2 vols.; Cleveland. 
1914), I, 82 anci 130-131, citing the letter of O'Reilly to 
de Mezieres, New Orleans, September 23, 1769.
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However, the directives to de Mezieres that O'Reilly 
stressed more than any other pertained to the Indians. The 
Spanish Indian policy in Louisiana followed that of the French. 
Just as it would have been too costly for the French to con­
quer the Indian lands, so also would it have been for the 
Spanish. The Spaniards, like the French, wished to control 
the Indian lands, but they chose the system of fealty and 
alliance to accomplish this in Louisiana. The Indian nations 
were considered vassals and they were kept on friendly terms 
by gifts. The French had contacted them primarily through 
traders. This practice was continued in Louisiana, as also 
was the French custom of annual gifts. It was a more humane 
method than that which the Spanish had usedin Latin America, 
but it was not so effective. Nonetheless, considering the 
vastness of the Spanish empire and its weakness at the close 
of the eighteenth century, it was the only realistic method.
An excellent example of the Spanish-Indian relations in^ 
Louisiana can be found by studying the actions of O'Reilly 
and one of his subordinates, de Mezieres. De Mezieres was 
told that the Indian tribes along the border of Louisiana 
and Texas, the Caddo, Tonkawa, and Yatasi, must realize
14Ibid., pp. 27-29.
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that all of them, by the act of cession of Louisiana, were 
now subjects of King Charles, a cousin of the French King. 
Tribes which had warred with one another, because of their 
different allegiance, must now cease their quarreling.
Without doubt, this must have been one of the most difficult 
tasks that de Mezieres was expected to accomplish. He and 
the other officials of the area were twice reminded in the 
instructions to establish peace among these Indians who 
dwelt along the border. A warning was also forthcoming 
from O'Reilly, reminding de Mezieres that further enslave­
ment of Indians was forbidden as of December 1, 17 69. Finally, 
smuggling must be guarded against and punished. In regard 
to law enforcement in general, de Mezieres was warned to 
observe moderation."^ This is worthy of note coming from 
a man So long reputed to be tyrannical.
In keeping with Spanish customs, a royal cedula approving 
O'Reilly's instructions was issued. The king sanctioned the 
appointment of de Mezieres as lieutenant governor at Natchi­
toches, and the instructions sent to him by O'Reilly. In­
cluded in this decree was royal approval of all other officials 
appointed to assist de Mezieres and of the instructions issued
l^o'Reilly to de Mezieres, New Orleans, Nov. 24, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 82, L.C. pp. 561-569.
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to them by O'Reilly.^
A series of letters between O'Reilly and de Mezieres
after the issuance of these instructions give p. clear
indication of the manner in which the Indian policy in
Louisiana was executed during O'Reilly's administration.
De Mezieres believed he needed a certain detailed list of
gifts for the Indians living in the Natchitoches area.
(These Indians came from the Grand Caddo, the Little Caddo,
the Yatasi and the Natchitoch nations). In reply to his
request, the Spanish governor stated that a supplier of
17goods, one M. Rancon, would give him what he needed. The
discretion left to the commandant at Natchitoches is worthy
of note. It is evident that General O'Reilly trusted him
and relied on his judgment which was the fruit of many years
of experience in the Natchitoches country.
Among the gifts sent to de Mezieres for the Indians, one
finds such items as guns and ammunition, knives and hatchets,
needles and cord, and luxury items such as tobacco, mirrors,
1 ftshirts and hats. ° An evaluation of these gifts sent by 
O'Reilly was made by the governor's accountant. The Grand
■^Royal Cedula, San Ildefonso, August 17, 1772, A.G.I.
S .D ., Legajo 2594, L.C. pp. 489-494.
■^O'Reilly to de Mezieres, January 22, 1770, A.G.I.P.C. 
Legajo 188-1, No. 10, cited by Bolton, Athanase de Mezieres, 
I, 132-134.
*1 QList of Gifts Attached to Letter of O'Reilly to de 
Mezieres, ibid.
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Caddo received gifts valued at 467 Reals, 7 sueldos, and 9
dineros of silver. This was much less than the sum of 776
Reals, 7 sueldos and 3 dineros spent on the gifts for the
Yatasi nation. It is to be presumed that the size and
importance of the tribe to the Spanish determined the amount
of money allotted for gifts. The sizeable amount spent for
all of the tribes tells us also how costly it was for the
19
Spanish to control the Indians through the use of gifts.
O'Reilly was also concerned for the welfare of the 
Indians. This is certainly clear from a subsequent letter 
to de Mezieres. The commandant at Natchitoches was com­
mended by the governor for his humane treatment of the 
Indians under his care. However, he was also warned that 
he would be responsible for the behavior of any trader whom 
he appointed. In particular, the general's concern for the 
Indians was shown when he praised de Mezieres for confis­
cating and freeing four young Indians who had been brought 
as slaves to the post of Natchitoches by an Indian trader. 
The lieutenant governor was ordered to have the details of 
the affair recorded, and have a proces-verbal drawn up and 
sent to the governor of Louisiana, so that the trial against
19
"Regulos ... a Las Naciones de Indios por Reglamento 
del Ex. S.D. Alejandro O'Reilly, "March 2, 1770, A.G.I.P.C, 
Legajo 274-A.
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the trader could be initiated. The commandant did as he 
was ordered.
De Mezieres' cooperation and faithful execution of his 
instructions in matters of this type are evident in a com­
munique to governor-elect Unzaga in February, 1770. A 
Christian Indian named Santiago had been returned to his 
own people by an enemy tribe which had enslaved him. This 
Indian, since he was of the same religion as the Spanish, 
came to de Mezieres to warn him of an attack by his own 
nation, the Tawehash. De Mezieres sent the Indian to Unzaga, 
who was requested to prove to the Indian that the French and 
Spanish were allied. De Mezieres hoped that Santiago would 
return to his people and persuade them not to attack the 
Spanish. The lieutenant governor also asked Unzaga to pro­
tect this Indian from an Illinois trader who at one time had 
owned him, and who might seek to enslave him a g a i n . U n z a g a  
granted his request, and the Indian returned by canoe to the 
settlement at Natchitoches after his trip to New Orleans.22
2®0'Reilly to de Mezieres, January 23, 1770, A.G.I.P.C., 
Legajo 188-1, No. 33, cited by Bolton, Athanase de Mezieres, 
I, 136.
21De Mezieres to Unzaga, February 1, 1770, A.G.I.P.C., 
Legajo 110, No. 19, ibid., p. 137-138.
^Unzaga to de Mezieres, March 15, 1770, A.G.I.P.C.,
Legajo 111, ibid., p. 152.
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Pedro Piernas had been appointed by O'Reilly as
23lieutenant governor of Saint Louis and the Illinois country. 
The instructions sent to him were essentially the same as 
those for de Mezieres, but with some few changes designed to 
meet the needs of the commander of a post so distant from 
New Orleans. Because of this great distance from the capital 
city, Piernas was admonished to strive to gain both the 
respect and love of the people committed to his care. This 
would insure greater loyalty to Spain. Furthermore, in his 
administration of justice, Piernas was ordered to observe 
all of the laws of Spain, following the Code O'Reilly. A 
full text of the Code, with a commentary drawn up by Manuel 
Urrutria and Felix del Rey, was sent to Piernas.
Piernas was also instructed to inform the Indians that 
they were now the subjects of a great and kind king. Further­
more, they were not to molest the English, as the English 
and Spanish were at peace with each other. Yearly gifts 
would be allotted to the tribes allied to the Spanish to 
reward them for their fidelity. The enslavement of Indians 
also was forbidden. Traders had to be especially licensed 
to go among the tribes and any Indians coming into the forts 
were to be treated fairly in all negotiations.
23Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, pp. 157-
159.
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For the protection of the settlers, O'Reilly established 
small garrisons at Saint Louis and at Saint Genevieve. He 
ordered the formation of militia units at both places, and 
their commanders were appointed by O'Reilly himself. Those 
designated to these positions of command in the militia were 
of French extraction in keeping with the general policy of 
O'Reilly. Piernas was ordered to keep strict control over 
the regular troops in the two posts in order to maintain the 
proper discipline. Every three months, he had to draw up a 
report pertaining to the soldiers under his command. This 
was judged necessary for the maintenance of military 
authority in so distant an area as that of the Illinois 
country.
Persons coming into the Illinois area were not permitted 
to settle there unless they had written permission from the 
governor of the province. Moreover, trading was not allowed 
without a license from the provincial governor.
For the maintenance of order, Piernas was to send regu­
lar reports to the governor at New Orleans. However, he was 
permitted considerable discretion in carrying out his duties. 
He was advised to use his own judgment in cases not specifi­
cally covered in the instructions sent to him or in the code 
of laws as explained by Urrutria and del Rey.^
^Instructions of February 17, 1770 to Piernas, attached 
to a letter from O'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, March 1, 
1770, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, Doc. 8, L.C. pp. 276-292.
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In time, a royal cedula was issued which approved the 
instructions sent to Piernas for Saint Louis and Saint 
Gerevieve. The cedula also ratified all of the appoint­
ments made for Saint Louis, and gave the king's blessing
to all O'Reilly had done in Illinois and in all of Louisi- 
25ana.
Such elaborate instructions seem almost unnecessary 
in the light of the small number of people in the Illinois 
country at that time. According to the 1770 census of both 
Saint Louis and Saint Genevieve, there were at each post 
only 103 persons, slave and free.^6 Yet, this was typical 
of O'Reilly's thoroughness in carrying out his com­
mission in Louisiana.
The instructions to the commander at the Arkansas post, 
while basically the same as those sent to Piernas, throw 
some additional light on the relations of Spain with the 
Indians and with England. The commandant was instructed to 
keep a small number of soldiers at the post: a sergeant, two
corporals, twelve privates, and an interpreter. With their 
assistance, he was to protect the post and its inhabitants
^^Royal Cedula, San Ildefonso, August 17, 1772, ibid., 
pp. 495-500.
26census of Population at Saint Louis and Saint 
Genevieve, 1770, attached to a letter from O'Reilly to 
Grimaldi, New Orleans, March 1, 1770, ibid., p. 293.
Bjork says the population of these posts was 1102. Cf.
Bjork, "Alejandro O'Reilly," in New Spain, p. 183.
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and supplies. Because of the dangers present from Indians 
not yet closely tied to the Spanish king, their new master, 
the commandant was further ordered not to allow them to 
bring their weapons inside the walls of the post stockade.
He was to impress upon the Indian the advantages in giving 
their allegiance to the king of Spain. The commandant was 
to make the usual gifts to the Indian allies on a yearly 
basis, alloting to each nation its due. He was instructed 
to protect the Indians against any white men who might 
attempt to abuse them. The commandant was further reminded 
that no newcomer was allowed to reside at the post without 
the written permission of the governor.
The instructions from O'Reilly concerning the English 
called, in particular, for avoidance of any hostilities.
Since the two countries were at peace, all Spanish subjects, 
including the Indian allies, were warned against attacking 
subjects of the English king.27 This later directive was 
similar to the one issued to Piernas, who governed the 
Illinois district across the river from English Illinois.
As was customary, a royal cedula was issued approving 
O'Reilly's instructions to the commandant of the post of
O QArkansas as well as his appointments at the post.
27o'Reilly's instructions to the commandant of the post 
of Arkansas. New Orleans, November 11, 1769, ibid., pp. 305- 
313. ----
^Royal Cedula, San Ildefonso, August 17, 1772, ibid., 
pp. 501-506. ----
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A series of letters exchanged between O'Reilly and the 
Arkansas commander, one M. Desmaseilleres, adds more know­
ledge about the handling of Indian problems under O'Reilly. 
When the commandant arrived in Arkansas he found a large 
number of Arkansas Indians in the vicinity of the post.
He had endeavored to reassure the inhabitants who feared an 
attack as he believed that the Indians would remain peaceful. 
He considered that they had been impressed with his military 
contingent and that the gifts he would provide would further 
pacify them.29
To placate the Indians, the commandant gave them the 
gifts sent at O'Reilly's orders. As a gesture of generosity 
he even made them gifts from his own p o s s e s s i o n s . This 
was probably wise, as the presents seem to have been a 
critical factor in keeping the allegiance of the Indians. 
Moreover, as the Indians had recently come under their new 
Spanish overlords, a good impression was in order. The total 
of the gifts for the three or four Arkansas nations was 
valued at 4779 reals, and 72 sueldos of silver.^ The
^^Desmaseilleres to O'Reilly, Arkansas, January 5,
1770, A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 181.
30Desmaseilleres to O'Reilly, Arkansas, (no date),
ibid.
31"Regalos ... a las Naciones de Indios," March 2,
1770, A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 274-A. — -
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general complimented the commandant for his liberality in 
giving gifts to the Indians from his own belongings. In 
this he had shown, said O'Reilly his loyalty to the king. 
However, on another issue the Spanish governor took the 
commandant to task. Desmaseilleres was rebuked for giving 
a large quantity of government owned supplies (without 
authority) to a white man and an Indian.^
O'Reilly reproved Desmaseilleres on more than one oc­
casion. While en route to Arkansas, the commandant stopped 
off at Manchac to get extra provisions and ammunition. The 
general reminded him that he should have taken care of the 
matter before leaving New Orleans and he should have first
o ogotten permission. J An even sterner reprimand was meted 
out to Desmaseilleres in another instance. The commandant 
wished to retain at his post a surgeon who had arrived to 
administer to the needs of the settlers. He was reminded 
that he should have read his instructions carefully, thereby 
avoiding this unnecessary request. Nearly three hundred 
Indian families lived nearby without a surgeon, consequently 
the post did not need one.^ Attached to the copies of
3^0'Reilly to Desmaseilleres, New Orleans, January 25, 
1770, A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 181.
^Desmaseilleres to O'Reilly, Pointe Coupee, November 
25, 1769, and O'Reilly to Desmaseilleres, New Orleans, 
January 25, 1770, ibid.
<3 / *
Desmaseilleres to O'Reilly, Arkansas, (no date), and 
O'Reilly to Desmaseilleres, New Orleans, (no date), ibid.
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these letters was a list of the possessions the commandant, 
both in New Orleans and at Arkansas, which were sold by the 
provincial government to make payment to the king's treasury. 
This was presumably to reimburse the royal treasury for 
goods used or distributed by the commandant without authori­
zation.-^^
These communiques are among the few that enable one to 
recognize in an intimate way features of the personality of 
the Spanish governor. Most of the documents coming from him 
are devoid of any expression of feeling. In these letters, 
one sees revealed a man of almost inflexible character. He 
was most careful to carry out his own orders, and he ex­
pected the same of his subordinates. He may well have been 
"unmoved," at least openly, by the tears of the ladies of 
New Orleans who wept for the men who had been condemned to 
death in October, 1769. Letters of his during his later 
life in Spain, reveal this same rigidity of character.
In addition to sending orders to the commandants of all 
of the posts in Louisiana, O'Reilly himself went on inspection 
tours, such as the one to Balize, and sent his lieutenants 
on others. Captain Eduardo Nugent and Lieutenant Juan Kelly 
inspected several of the posts which O'Reilly himself, owing 
to the limitations of time, was unable to visit. Nugent and
35q 'Reilly, New Orleans, January 25, 1770, ibid.
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Kelly visited Atacapas, Opelousas, Natchitoches and Rapides.
At these posts, according to instructions, they were to accept 
the oath of fealty to the king from the inhabitants; to accept 
petitions of complaint addressed to O'Reilly; to gather re­
ports of potential trouble-makers; to take a census and 
review the local militia.
They were further instructed to go to the post of Adaes, 
near the site of the present town of Robeline, Louisiana, and 
ascertain the identity of the person who had been selling 
guns to the Indians of that area. They were also commanded 
to assess the strength of the fortifications at this post.
Fort Adaes had been a border post of the Spanish for the 
protection of New Spain against encroachments from French 
Louisiana. It was now superfluous. Nugent's and Kelly's 
orders called for them to keep a journal of their trip, 
noting the character of the country, its products and the 
condition of the roads. The Indian allies were to be told 
to stop attacking other Indians or whites in the Texas 
territory, as all were now subject to the same ruler.
Renegade whites must be turned over by the Indians to the 
proper authorities at each fort.36 These instructions are 
somewhat reminiscent of those given to Lewis and Clark by
^instructions to Nugent and Kelly attached to letter 
from O'Reilly to Grimaldi, December 10, 1769, A.G.I.S.D., 
Legajo 2543, L.C. pp. 570-575.
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Jefferson, in that the officers were told to observe care­
fully the nature of the country and to maintain a record of 
their travels.
Kelly and Nugent left New Orleans on November 18, 1769, 
and arrived in Natchitoches on December 29. In all, they 
covered 189 leagues in forty-two days of travel. They 
visited as many villages and outposts as they could en route. 
By November 25, they had covered thirty leagues on foot.
Near the village of the Plaquemine Indians, (roughly the 
site of the present Plaquemine, Louisiana), they began to 
journey by boat, traveling on the Mississippi toward the 
Atchafalaya river. A scouting party which had been sent 
ahead, was lost, but was found on December 3. By the sixth 
of December, they had reached the Atchafalaya River, and 
after three days' journey up the river, they reached the 
village of the Chetimashas Indians. As neither this tribe 
nor the Plaquemines were considered important groups, they 
moved on toward the post of Atacapas.^7
At Atacapas, Nugent and Kelly found a small village of 
people mainly of Acadian descent. The white population
■^David Knuth Bjork (ed.), "Documents Relating to 
Alejandro O'Reilly and an Expedition Sent Out by Him From 
New Orleans to Natchitoches, 1769-1770," Louisiana Historical 
Quarterly, Vol. VII (January, 1924), pp. 21-29, documents 
copies from A.G.I.P.C., 80-1-9. The original document could 
not be found in the Papeles de Cuba, Legajo 2357 of the 
Archives of the Indies.
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included 97 men and 67 women, who owned 33 slaves (25 men 
and 8 women). They had livestock in plentiful supply, there 
being 1323 oxen, 565 pigs, 266 horses and 18 sheep. O'Reilly's 
agents noted that the land was rich and that the people were 
very industrious, and observed that the women made their 
own clothes.
As Opelousas was very close, it was the next stop for 
the Spanish officers. The inhabitants of Opelousas were 
primarily Acadians, hard-working people who had considerable 
livestock and productive lands. Of the total white population 
of 197 the men numbered 111, the women 86. They held 115 
slaves, 69 men and 46 women. There livestock were more 
numerous than at Atacapas, with 2419 oxen, 639 horses, 682 
pigs, 198 sheep, 38 goats, 13 mules, and 3 donkeys being 
counted. It is interesting to note that the crops then were 
much the same as today: rice, sweet potatoes, and corn.
Kelly and Nugent stated that if the inhabitants so desired 
they could easily produce wheat. Finally, the officers 
noted that the two settlements were close enough to be easily 
merged into o n e . 39
En route to Natchitoches by way of the Red River, they 
stopped at the small settlement of Rapides near the present
33Ibid.„ pp. 38-39.
39Ibid., pp. 29, 30, 35, 36.
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site of Alexandria, Louisiana. In the village there were 
only 17 white men and 16 women who held 18 slaves (12 men 
and 6 women). There were also 44 Apalache Indians (26 men 
and 18 women), most of whom were of the Catholic faith and 
spoke Spanish. The people of Rapides were very poor, having 
only a small amount of livestock--298 oxen, 98 horses, and 
97 pigs--and produced a little corn and tobacco. The soil, 
it was noted, was much like that of the Natchitoches area.4  ̂
Kelly and Nugent arrived in Natchitoches on December 
29, travelling from Rapides up the Red River. At Natchitoches 
they found the governor's mansion, a simple fort, a store 
house, a jail, a store room, and 80 settlers' homes. They 
observed that with the exception of the governor's house, 
the buildings were in poor repair. The fort was on a small 
hill above the river. The census at this town was more 
detailed for it divided the inhabitants into age groups.
Among the whites, there were 98 boys under fourteen, 152 men 
from fourteen to fifty, and 5 men over fifty, giving a total 
of 255 male residents. There were 94 girls under fourteen,
102 women from fourteen to fifty, and 2 women over fifty 
years old, making a total of 198 females. Among the slaves 
there were 182 males (of whom 141 were able to work), and 
129 females, with 93 able to work. The inhabitants possessed
40Ibid., pp. 31, 36, 37.
208
1752 oxen, 1268 pigs, 815 horses, 150 sheep, 50 goats, and 
30 mules. The soil was suitable for wheat, the agents 
believed, although only corn, rice and tobacco were grown.
In general, the community was deemed backward because the
people were not industrious and many had no visible means
r- 41of support. x
During their journey they had another important duty to 
fulfill. They were to administer the oath to all the people 
with whom they came into contact. This was carried out 
without incident.
It was then time for the Spanish officers to return to 
New Orleans to make their report to O'Reilly. They departed 
from Natchitoches for New Orleans on January 5, 1770.
Travel was rapid, as stops along the way were unnecessary. 
They journeyed first on the Red River, thence to the 
Mississippi, reaching New Orleans and reporting to the
/ Ogeneral on January 14. Their brief journal gives a vivid 
idea of the primitive life led by the settlers. It also 
makes one realize why the Spanish, by necessity if not by 
desire, had to adopt a policy of alliance, subsidized by 
gifts, with the numerous Indian nations of their new colony.
As in all other matters, so in Indian affairs, O'Reilly 
kept control of the most important features of his policy in
41Ibid., pp. 31, 33, 34.
42Ibid., pp. 21-23.
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his own hands. Rather than rely solely on the contact made
with the Indians by the various commanders at the distant
posts of the colony, O'Reilly himself called a meeting of
the chiefs in New Orleans. Not long after the arrest of
the rebels, he issued a summons to all of the chiefs within
sixty leagues, or 180 miles, of New Orleans to meet with him
there. He wished to impress upon the leaders the power of
their new ruler, the Spanish king. An account of the
meeting accompanying a letter from O'Reilly to Don Julian
de Arriaga is most impressive:
... At half past eleven o'clock in the morning 
there arrived at his Excellency's house nine 
chiefs, accompanied by the interpreters, each 
one respectively authorized, together with quite 
a number of Indians, singing and playing their 
military instruments.
His Excellency entered the principal hall 
of the house, and having seated himself under the 
canopy, accompanied by all the officers of the 
garrison and the principal persons of the city, 
the Indians were admitted into his presence, pre­
ceded by the interpreters. After they had placed 
their military implements at His Excellency's feet, 
each one of the chiefs saluted him with his flag, 
waving it in a circle over his head, and touching 
him on the chest four times with it, then giving 
it to him. Each one then presented him with his 
burning pipe, the chief himself holding it while 
he smoked, which His Excellency did as he was not 
ignorant of its significance; and finally each 
chief gave him his hand, which is the Indian's 
greatest sign of friendship.
When these ceremonies had been concluded, the 
chief of the Bayougoulas asked permission to speak, 
and His Excellency having granted it, the chief 
made substantially the following speech:
"Red men, chiefs and warriors, in your name I 
speak to the great chief whom the great King of 
Spain has sent to take possession of these lands.
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"Father and great chief, we hope that thou 
wilt deign to have pity on these, thy children, 
and grant us the same favors and benefits as did 
the French, and that thou wilt now deign to have 
our arms and implements repaired and give us some 
little assistance to live on for the rest of the 
year.
"I am afraid of displeasing thee, great chief 
of chiefs, and so I close, assuring thee that all 
these red men, warriors and chiefs of the tribes, 
will be inviolably faithful to thee, both here 
and in the posts where are people of they orders."
O'Reilly took pains to explain to the chiefs the trans­
fer of Louisiana from the King of France to his cousin, the 
King of Spain, and the close ties between the two rulers.
He told the Indians also of the great power of the Spanish 
King and of his clemency, promised them the presents which 
they requested, and ordered them not to attack the English. 
After these words he took a holy medal, and placed one over 
the head of each chief, and then touched the Indian's 
shoulders with his sword. After this ceremony O'Reilly 
promised the Indians a parade of his troops. Accordingly, 
that same afternoon, he held a military review before the 
chiefs. They were all deeply impressed by the skill and 
obvious strength of the Spanish troops, and felt themselves 
to be under powerful protectors. The next day they departed 
for their tribal areas satisfied with their new ruler and 
his representative.44
^Statement attached to letter from O'Reilly to Arriaga,




Stronger ties had to be forged by the Spanish with 
their Indian allies, especially after the insurrection of 
the French settlers in 1768. The dramatic way in which they 
were received by O'Reilly, who sat in their presence almost 
as a monarch, and the demonstration of Spanish military power 
secured their respect and admiration. Not only did the Span­
ish governor treat them as men worthy of respect in their 
own right, but he impressed them with Spain's military 
might so that they were deterred from attacking the Spanish 
forts. Considering the small number of regulars he left in 
Louisiana, and the great distance between forts, O'Reilly's 
move was wise. His use of presents was also calculated to 
win over the Indians.
The use of presents for the Indians was begun by the 
French. While it was costly, the Spanish, nevertheless, 
deemed it more feasible than an attempt to conquer the vari­
ous Indian nations. Actually, such a war probably would at 
that time have been all but impossible for Spain. During 
O'Reilly's administration, gifts valued at 8,257 reals, 78 
sueldos, and 3 dineros were given to twenty-six friendly 
nations in Louisiana. These twenty-six nations were 
divided into three major groups. The first of these groups 
was the Taensa, located east and north of Natchitoches, and 
numbering fifteen nations. These were as follows: the
Ouacha and the Chaouacha, the Osagoula, the Bayogoula,
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the Houma, the Pacana, the Ochana, the Tonika and the 
Avoyelles, the Biloxi, the Pascagoula, the Chactoos, the 
Mobile, the Chitimacha of the River, and the Chitimacha 
of the Great Land. The second group was the Arkansas, 
located near the post of the same name. This group in­
cluded the following: the Quapaw nation, the Ottawa, the
Olamon, and the three Aldeas nations (considered one). The 
third group lived in the Natchitoches area, and included 
the following: the Natchitoch nation, the Grand Caddo, the
Little Caddo, the Yatasi, the Rapides, and the Albamon 
n a t i o n . T h e  vast amount spent by O'Reilly for the 
Indians' gifts, and later by other Spanish governors, 
indicates that Spain heeded Ulloa's warnings that the 
Indians expected extravagant gifts from the Spanish, and 
uttered dire threats when he was not able to provide them.4  ̂
This was another lesson that had been learned from the 
experience of the first Spanish governor.
As the military and Indian affairs of the colony of 
Louisiana were being solved, O'Reilly sent back to Havana 
some of the regular troops in his force. In October, 1769, 
he reassigned to Cuba the three companies of grenadiers of
45"Regulos ... a las Naciones de Indios," March 2, 1770,
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 274-A.
4^Ulloa to Grimaldi, August 4, 1768, A.G.I.S.D., 86-6-6, 
in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, pp. 61-62.
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the Havana militia, and the fifty volunteer cavalrymen who 
had come with him. He noted that all of these soldiers had 
conducted themselves well while on their tour of duty in 
Louisiana. He planned also to return to Havana the 
Catalonian fusiliers, thirty-two dragoons, and all of the 
officers and troops of the artillery units. As only a few 
pieces of artillery were needed in New Orleans, he returned 
at that time all of the pieces which he had transported to 
New Orleans.^ Further withdrawals of men came as time pro­
gressed. In November, O'Reilly sent a communique to Antonio 
Bucareli, the governor and captain general of Cuba, to the 
effect that he was keeping 179 men from the Lisbon Regiment 
for the Louisiana Batallion, but that the remainder of that 
contingent was being returned to Havana and would be added 
to the regiment of that city. Those who were disabled would 
return to the kingdom of Lisbon/4^
Shortly after this reassignment of troops, two additional 
companies were returned to Havana, and plans were made for the 
return of seven more companies to that city as soon as 
transports for them were available. As these men were no 
longer needed to insure order in the colony, they were being
^ 0 'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, October 17, 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, L.C. pp. 309-313.
4^0'Reilly to Bucareli, New Orleans, November 10, 1769, 
Dispatches of the Spanish Governors of Louisiana, 1766-1791 
Book I, No. 83, p. 17. ----------
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49dispatched to points where their presence was required.
In December, six of the seven companies which he had 
planned to send back to Havana returned on the frigate,
La Fetis.~̂  O'Reilly’s well planned actions in establishing 
order in Louisiana, coupled with his rapid organization of 
militia units and his measures for cooperation with the 
Indians, enabled him within a short time to reassign to 
Havana most of his regulars. In this way, as he himself 
noted, the best interests of the crown were served and the 
burdens of the royal treasury were relieved.
O'Reilly's connection with the military affairs of 
Louisiana did not cease after his departure from that colony. 
As the Inspector General of Infantry, and also as the man 
charged with the establishment of the defenses for Louisi­
ana, he was consulted by the crown on various problems that 
arose.
In the spring of 1770, Governor Unzaga requested (of the 
Spanish Minister of State) advice concerning the defense of 
Louisiana. From San Ildefonso the Marques de Grimaldi in­
formed him that until General O'Reilly had been consulted 
concerning these questions, no decision could be made. It 
was the king's wish that all of the military commanders in
^ O ' R e i l l y  to Bucareli, November 18, 1769, ibid., Bk.
1, No. 87, p. 20.
^O'Reilly to Bucareli, December 10, 1769, ibid., Bk.
1, No. 87, p. 22.
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America should direct their communications concerning 
military affairs to O'Reilly.51
Upon the general's return to Spain, Grimaldi sent him 
Governor Unzaga's communique. O'Reilly carefully studied 
the document and gave his recommendations. He pointed out 
the problems facing Unzaga in the defense of Louisiana. The 
Spanish general noted that in time of peace the English 
garrisoned forts near the Choctaw to keep them under control 
and to keep their pelt trade. These forts extended from 
Illinois to Pensacola and made the Mississippi safe for 
English shipping. In time of war, these same forts would 
serve as bases for an attack on Louisiana, thereby severing 
communications between the Spanish at Illinois and those at 
New Orleans.
O'Reilly held that it was impossible to prevent the 
English from controlling the pelt trade in time of peace 
since they could operate more efficiently than the Spanish. 
In time of war, Spain could only defend Louisiana at very 
great expense. The English at that time had fifteen hundred 
veteran troops in the area, and they were supported by seven 
thousand Choctaw braves. The Spanish could not afford to 
match such a force.52
^Grimaldi to Unzaga, San Ildefonso, August 25, 1770, 
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, Doc. 55, L.C. pp. 97-98.
52o'Reilly to Grimaldi, Madrid, September 30, 1770,
A.G.I.S.D., 86-6-7, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, pp. 183-186.
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If Louisiana should come under a massive attack by the 
British, O'Reilly recommended several defensive tactics: 
the governor and his garrison were instructed to abandon 
New Orleans, take up a defensive position at Opelousas, and 
lest he be cut en route to Opelousas, leave a small force 
at Manchac to intercept British troops coming from Natchez. 
O'Reilly hoped that the troops at the fort in Arkansas could 
protect themselves, but if they could not, they should also 
retire to Opelousas and join the governor's forces. The 
garrison and people at the forts of Saint Louis and Saint 
Genevieve were to flee to the Missouri Indians for protection. 
The governor was directed also to closely watch British troop 
movements and to report any unusual activities to the captain 
general of Cuba. O'Reilly further recommended an increase 
of one hundred regulars and seven canons for the Louisiana 
Batallion.53
The strategy in O'Reilly's letter to Grimaldi was the 
same as that which he had proposed to Julian de Arriaga in 
1769. The colony was indefensible. Withdrawal to a post 
near the Texas frontier seemed the best solution if the 
territory were attacked. If Opelousas could be held while 
the British troops dispersed themselves throughout the vast 
region, the Spanish would have protected Mexico and would 
have some hope of retaining at least part of Louisiana.
53Ibid.
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Since Mexico was vital to Spanish interests and Louisiana 
was not, O'Reilly's plans proposed to achieve, with reasonable 
expenditures, the main purpose of Louisiana's incorporation 
within the Spanish-American Empire.
The two premises contained within O'Reilly's plan, 
namely, that Louisiana was indefensible in a traditional way, 
and that whatever holding actions were taken, would be 
executed primarily by the militia, were never fully tested.
Louisiana never underwent a massive attack while under 
Spanish rule. During the American Revolution, the Spanish 
Governor, Bernardo de Galvez, knowing Britain to be occupied 
elsewhere, took the offensive and succeeded. In later years, 
fears of an attack by the British during the second phase 
of the Spanish participation in the Wars of the French 
Revolution never materialized. However, during that time 
Governors Carondelet and Gayoso realized that any British 
attacks which might come from Canada or from the Gulf would 
require more means of resistance than they could offer.^
The second premise^ the reliance on militia, was accepted 
by most of O'Reilly's successors. The need for such units 
was expressed both by Carondelet and Gayoso, who not only 
feared attacks by the British, but also by American frontiers­
men. Carondelet maintained that, "Louisiana cannot exist 
under Spain's dominion for very long unless it can depend for
-^Holmes, Honor and Fidelity, p. 48.
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its security on its own resources, and by giving it a form 
of military administration which arouses the inhabitants' 
military a r d o r . "^5 He had previously, on his own authority, 
re-established six of the Louisiana militia units which 
Governor Miro had allowed to disband, and_hacl promised that 
these units would be outfitted at the expense of the pro­
vincial government. This proposal, however, was not 
approved by the court at Madrid. Carondelet, nevertheless, 
continued to voice his fears of attacks and the need of 
militia units for defense. His successor, Manuel Gayoso 
also tried to reorganize the militia units but found that 
the men were unwilling to train regularly. Yet, when called 
upon to fight, existing units acquitted themselves with 
honor.
The position of Louisiana under Governors Carondelet 
and Gayoso would seem to support O'Reilly's view of the 
military posture of the colony. Both of these men knew 
that Louisiana was practically indefensible, but they also 
agreed with O'Reilly that whatever hope there was for secu­
rity lay with the militia.
5^Carondelet to Luis de Las Casas, captain general of 
Cuba, May 16, 1792, cited in Holmes, ibid., pp. 48-49.
5®Ibid., pp. 19, 68, 71, 76-78. Holmes notes that the 
militia units certainly fought well under Galvez.
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The Indian policy which the general had established 
under instructions from the court had mixed results. In 
some ways the policy was a success. One of its aims had 
been to prevent constant attacks on Spanish outposts and 
towns by the Indians. Basically this was accomplished. 
However, the reliance upon the Indians as allies was of 
dubious merit. One notable example of the failure of this 
proposal, was the alliance with the British by the Creeks 
during the American Revolutionary War. Another instance of 
failure was Governor Miro's inability to control the 
Cherokee.̂
O'Reilly's successors tried to keep the loyalty of the 
Indians to promote still another part of the general's 
Indian policy. Spain had accepted Louisiana in 1762 pri­
marily to curb British expansion toward New Spain. O'Reilly 
had believed that Indian allies in Louisiana would be an 
excellent deterrent to any such aggressive moves. Both 
Carondelet and Gayoso agreed with this policy as there were 
so few French and Spanish settlers in that vast colony. Con 
sequently, when the Treaty of San Lorenzo transferred to the 
United States (England's successor in this region) areas 
inhabited by the Creek, Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chicksaw 
nations, these governors assigned agents to live among the
5^Thomas P. Abernathy, The South in the New Nation, 
1789-1819 (Baton Rouge, 1961), p. 43.
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C OIndians to try and keep their loyalty to Spain. Due to 
Spain's retrocession of Louisiana to France in 1803, and 
the colony's purchase by the United States in that same 
year, this plan proved meaningless. However, as these 
Indian nations had a population of sixty thousand, of whom 
thirteen thousand were warriors, they would have presented 
a formidable problem to the United States had Spain remained 
in possession of Louisiana and retained their loyalty.
O'Reilly also planned to exclude British traders from 
the Indian areas. In Louisiana, this policy was generally 
followed. However, when Spain later reoccupied the Floridas, 
English traders were permitted to continue their trade with 
the Indians. This was a necessity, since Spain could not 
provide these people with necessities, especially with guns
and ammunition.^9
Although O'Reilly's Indian policy was not carried out 
exactly as planned, and was very costly, it was basically 
sound. When everything is considered, there was really no 
alternative. Certainly Spain could not have afforded the 
human and natural resources to conquer the Indians. Alliance 
with them, based on bribery through expensive gifts, was the
5®Arthur P. Whitaker, The Mississippi Question (Glou­
cester, 1962, Reprint), pp. 34, 68.
59Abernathy, South in the New Nation, p. 43.
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only other recourse. A system of alliances without gifts 
would have been a complete failure. If some Indians joined 
the English because they offered more, then probably all of 
them would have allied with the English, had the Spanish 
offered no gifts. This would have been disasterous.
In summary, it may be said that General O ’Reilly 
proposed basically workable military and Indian policies for 
Louisiana. Considering the conditions within the Spanish 
Empire at the time, it is difficult to conceive alternatives.
VIII
FINANCIAL, COMMERCIAL, RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL 
POLICIES OF GOVERNOR O'REILLY
During his brief stay in Louisiana, O'Reilly could give 
attention only to the most fundamental aspects of finance 
and commerce. Primarily, he had to bring the commerce of 
the colony into the framework of the Spanish colonial system. 
Moreover, the unfortunate situation left by the Ulloa ad­
ministration, for which Ulloa was not totally responsible, 
had to be remedied before the economy could function - more 
especially before any reforms could be made.
As the chief auditor, Don Esteban Gayarre had the 
responsibility, under the direction of O'Reilly, for setting 
the finances of the colony in order. An overall accounting 
of the financial status was necessary before the colony could 
be turned over to O'Reilly's successor, Luis de Unzaga. 
Although emergency measures were taken in regard to the 
stabilization of finances, O'Reilly's auditor spent many 
months untangling the financial maze left over from the first 
years of Spanish rule, and the interim period from October, 
1768, to August, 1769.
Among the immediate fiscal problems faced by O'Reilly 
was the lack of adequate funds to run the colony. This had 
been an insoluble problem for Ulloa. O'Reilly was more
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successful in meeting this issue, and by December, 1769, 
the arrival of 100,000 pesos enabled him to begin to pay 
off the promissory notes issued in the name of the Spanish 
government during Ulloa's regime. In 1769 alone, O'Reilly 
spent approximately 260,000 pesos on the colony's needs.
An ample money supply helped quickly to establish confi-
Odence in the new Spanish government. Ulloa's financial 
difficulties had taught the Spanish court the danger in­
herent in a situation such as the one that had been permitted 
to develop in the province in the first attempt at occupation.
Another measure taken to set the finances in order was 
O'Reilly's insistence on a new appraisal of the value of the 
properties being transferred from France to Spain. These 
properties included the hospital buildings, the general 
store house, the guardhouse, the dwelling of the comisario, 
the physician's house, the botanical gardens and the hos­
pital for the soldiers. The prior assessment under Ulloa 
had been a value of 865,799(19-8) pesos fuertes. A new 
evaluation changed this to 603,190(1-0) pesos fuertes. a 
difference of 262,609(18-8) pesos fuertes. The old evalu-
■*"0'Reilly to Bucareli, New Orleans, December 4, 1769, 
Dispatches of the Spanish Governors, Bk. I, No. 86, p. 21.
^Jack D. L. Holmes, "Some Economic Problems of the Span­
ish Governors in Louisiana," Hispanic American Historical 
Review, Vol. XLII, No. 14 (November. 1962), pp. 524-525; 
Documents attached to letter from 0 Reilly to Arriaga, New 
Orleans, October 7, 1769, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mis­
sissippi Valley, pp. 99-101.
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ation was made on the basis of buildings at the time of 
their construction. Depreciation, O'Reilly felt, certainly 
reduced them in value. In this judgment, he was joined by 
Aubry, Unzaga, as well as by Hipolite Amelot, Juan Cotilla, 
Jean Valentin, Comptroller of the Navy, and, of course, 
Esteban Gayarre, his auditor.^ This was another attempt by 
the general to relieve the Royal Treasury of what he con­
sidered undue costs.^
O'Reilly made it clear that generally the colony had no 
problems in supplying itself with food. Consequently, he 
hoped to cut expenses by reducing the importation of those 
items which Louisiana could provide for itself. He found 
that large quantities of food brought by Ulloa had spoiled, 
thus causing considerable loss to the Royal Treasury. He 
ordered an inspection of the salt meat and flour which were 
on hand when he arrived; what was spoiled he ordered dumped 
into the river; whatever was still edible he returned to 
Havana, as New Orleans was able to supply itself with these 
items. If, by chance, flour became short, he noted, the
^Statements attached to letter from O'Reilly to Arriaga,
October 7, 1769, ibid., pp. 99-101.
^According to Elijah W. Lyons in Louisiana in French 
Diplomacy, pp. 53-54, France did not accept this evaluation. 
He cites N. M. Miller Surrey, The Commerce of Louisiana Under 
the French Regime (New York, 1916), Calendar, II, p. 1546,
who stated that France prevailed on Spain to pay 1,622,454
liyres. This was more than twice what O'Reilly had recom­
mended, namely 603 pesos fuertes, 190 reals, 1 sueldo, or 
761,537 livres. /603 pesos fuertes, 190 reals and l sueldo is 
the same as the 5^03,190 (1-0) pesos fuertes referred to m  the 
above cited document. J
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people could make rice bread, which would serve as an
adequate substitute until flour could be obtained. The
colony of Louisiana was given credit for the cost of the
meat and flour which were returned to Havana.-*
O’Reilly took these actions to reduce the expenditures
of the treasury for Louisiana. He hoped that Louisiana
would not be a liability but rather an asset to the Spanish
economy. France had found Louisiana excessively costly,
and O'Reilly hoped to prevent the colony from becoming a
similar burden to Spain. Unfortunately, Louisiana proved
to be almost as costly to Spain as it had been to France.
The historian, Gayarr^, claims that by the end of Spain's
era of possession, Louisiana had cost her fifteen million
dollars.  ̂ These measures were only stop-gap ones, as the
general intended to reform completely the finances of the
colony. Meanwhile, Contador Gayarre's auditing of the books
from the period of Ulloa's rule continued, and by December,
1769, considerable progress had been made. O'Reilly noted
in a communique to Arriaga that:
Since bad weather has delayed my departure for 
Pointe Coupee, I have been able to finish the 
accounts submitted by the French comisario. M.
Bobe, for the year 1766, during which the
^0'Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, December 10, 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-9, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi 
Valley, pp. 126-127.
/ I ^
Gayarre, History of Louisiana, III, 624.
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expenditures of the administration of this pro­
vince were handled by M. Foucault. I had all 
these accounts audited by Auditor Don Esteban 
Gayarre, who disapproved the items shown by the 
attached paper...
From the attached brief abstract Your Excellency 
will see the harm that resulted to the royal 
exchequer from the administration of the expen­
ditures of the province having been left in the 
hands of M. Foucault during the years 1766 and 
1767, and the injustice and despotism with which 
he was wont to proceed in everything. ... I do 
not wish to imply by this that in any way is 
blame to be attributed to Don Antonio de Ulloa, 
to whose zeal and interest I do the justice that 
it deserves. I believe that sole cause of the 
irregularity to have been the desire that h3 had 
on his arrival of manifesting to everyone his con­
fidence and good feeling toward the French. After­
wards he was not able to remedy the damage, and 
to make up his mind at the end of the first year 
to remove M. Foucault entirely from our admin­
istration, or to compel him, as he should have 
done, to submit his accounts. I know that he 
asked him for them several times, but Foucault 
always delayed submitting them for the reasons 
that are quite evident from the attached paper 
... * ̂
In addition to ordering this meticulous accounting for 
all the monies spent by the Spaniards since their arrival in 
Louisiana, O'Reilly reduced the number of treasury officials 
for the colony, and made the contractor, or auditor, directly 
responsible to the governor rather than the Secretario de
^0'Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, December 29, 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-9, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi 
Valley, pp. 153-156. The final cost for Ulloa's regime 
was listed at 80,429 reals, cf. Grimaldi to Arriaga, 
Madrid, September 22, 1770, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2586, L.C. 
pp. 1-4.
227
Despacho (Secretary of State). The treasury officials in 
Louisiana were reduced from five to three in order to econo­
mize. The general recommended that a regular accounting of 
all of the finances of the colony be made every six months, 
in preparation for the annual report sent by the governor.
OThe governor would be assisted in this work by the contador.
Esteban Gayarre disagreed with the procedures estab­
lished by O'Reilly for the contador and the treasury 
officials. Under the new rules, these men were subject 
directly to the governor of the province of Louisiana.
Gayarre maintained that these rules were too rigid, and 
that the contador should be directly responsible to the
QMinister of State in Spain. Upon his return to Spain, 
O'Reilly learned of this and he answered the objections 
raised by Gayarre. He asserted that he had made the contador 
directly responsible to the governor in order to prevent any 
conflict of power in the colony. He felt that the inde­
pendence of these officials under Ulloa had been an 
occasion for trouble. If the contador were directly under 
the governor, a tighter control could be kept and financial 
difficulties averted.^
^0'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, March 1, 1770, 
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, Doc. 32, L.C. pp. 258-266.
^Gayarre to Grimaldi, New Orleans, May 1, 1770, A.G.I. 
S.D., Legajo 2543, Docs. 107-108, L.C. pp. 720-730.
■^O'Reilly to Grimaldi, Madrid, September 4, 1770, ibid.,
Doc. 112, L.C. pp. 748-749.
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Whether or not the return of Gayarre to Spain was in 
any way the outcome of this disagreement with O'Reilly is 
not clear. In September, 1770, he requested and obtained
permission to return to Spain and was replaced as contador
12by Antonio Jose de Aguiar. In any event, in light of the 
general approval given by Charles III to all that O'Reilly 
did in Louisiana, the chances of success by Gayarre in op­
posing any plan established by O'Reilly were indeed remote.
In addition to Gayarre1s general auditing, Don Martin 
Navarro, the treasurer, made an extensive study of the col­
ony's problems. He had notified General O'Reilly of the 
heavy expenditures that would be necessary to run the colony 
under the system begun by Ulloa. Due to these projected 
costs, O'Reilly had decided to reduce the number of all gov­
ernmental employees. He felt that the colony could be run
13just as efficiently with fewer men. The general's pen­
chant for getting the same work done with fewer men was 
characteristic. Later, as will be noted, it contributed 
to his defeat in the battle of Argel in Algeria.
■^Charles Etienne Gayarre, Esteban's grandson, made no 
reference to this clash as a cause for his grandfather's re­
turn to Spain (History of Louisiana, III, 42-43).
^Appointment of Aguiar, September 22, 1770, A.G.I.S.D., 
Legajo 2543, Docs. 113, 115, L.C. pp. 750-751.
Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, ibid., Doc. 81,
L.C. pp. 543-549.
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Just before bis departure from Louisiana for Havana, 
preparatory to his return to Spain, O'Reilly reported that 
the finances of the colony were in order. The treasury re­
port had been completed, and the revised financial system 
was working. These actions had been taken in light of the 
circumstances existing in the colony of Louisiana at that 
time and were thought by him to be those most conducive to 
the service of the crown.^
The wisdom of Governor O'Reilly's emergency action in 
almost immediately paying off the debts owed by the Spanish 
government can only merit praise. The rapid manner in which 
the accounts of the colony were brought up to date by Este­
ban Gayarre, his contador, must also elicit commendation.
His reforms for the treasury and accounting system of the 
colony, however, must be more closely analyzed to see if 
they were suited to the circumstances.
Gayarre disputed O'Reilly's decision to place the of­
fice of contador under the governor of the colony. Was 
O'Reilly's decision a disinterested one? There is no reason 
to believe that it was not. He knew that he would leave the 
colony as soon as he had put its affairs in order. There­
fore , he could not have wanted this power for himself. But 
what of Gayarre? Being subordinate to the governor of the 
colony would certainly be a difficult thing for certain men
•^0'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, March 1, 1770,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, Doc. 32, L.C. pp. 258-266.
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to bear. Perhaps this partially explains his opposition to 
the move as well as his resignation. Be that as it may, in 
view of the clashes that later occurred between the inten- 
dants and the governors over Louisiana's fiscal policy, the 
subordination of everyone in the colony, in 1769, was a wise 
provision.
O'Reilly's decision to reduce the number of treasury 
officials in Louisiana from five to three was definitely 
praiseworthy. One of the greatest defects of the Spanish 
empire was its excessive bureaucracy.^ Moreover, consider­
ing the fact that the colony was a relatively minor part of 
the empire, it was realistic to reduce the number of the con­
tador 's assistants to an absolute minimum.
Closely connected with the finances of the colony was 
the commercial potential of Louisiana. Trade had been car­
ried on by the colonists not only with France, but also with 
the English, prior to O'Reilly's arrival. In the era of 
mercantilism foreign trade could not be tolerated once Span­
ish power had been established in the colony. However, in 
spite of the commercial regulations that would later be en­
forced, the immediate welfare of the colonists was of prime 
concern to O'Reilly. As was noted, one of the general's 
first actions upon arriving in Louisiana was to issue a proc­
lamation fixing food prices, thereby preventing the acquisi-
^Charles Gibson, Spain in America (New York, 1966) , 
p. 109.
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tion of further excessive profits in the confusion attendant 
upon his arrival. The proclamation on food prices stipu­
lated:
Don Alejandro O'Reilly, ...
Nothing requires greater attention from the government 
than the equitable regulation of the prices of food 
products. Having taken note of the abuses which are 
being practiced in this regard, and desiring equally 
that the farmer receive due recompense for his labor, 
and that the soldier, the resident of the city, and 
other consumers may not be tyrannized over, we have, 
after taking all the steps compatible with the sincer­
ity of our intentions, established this tariff of 
prices,... under penalty of a fine... . , ,
September 7, 1769.
This proclamation had attached to it a list of nearly 
all saleable food items, with the price allowed for each. 
O'Reilly obviously did not wish to permit any abusive meas­
ures to persist in the colony whereby the very necessaries 
of life would be priced beyond reason. Such a measure was, 
moreover, politically sound. It might anger the profiteers 
but it would certainly please the majority. Thus, O'Reilly 
could more readily win the loyalty of Spain's new subjects.
The general's permanent trade policies, however, pre­
sented another problem. At the time of O'Reilly's arrival 
in Louisiana, investigations showed that nine-tenths of the 
trade in the colony was carried on by the British, and that 
they employed commercial agents among the Germans along the 
coast, and even in the city of New Orleans. He had put an
^Proclamation of September 7, 1769, concerning prices,
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 187, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, pp. 93-94.
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end to all of this. This tight control of trade, he felt, 
should be continued by his successors.̂
In a letter to the British General, Thomas Gage, O'Reilly 
made it clear that he would see to it that British ships using 
the Mississippi would be protected against attacks by Indians 
under his control and all necessary aid would be given to 
these ships. Nevertheless, no English ship would be allowed 
to put into New Orleans nor to land goods at any place under 
Spanish control. Gage was asked to cooperate in these meas­
ures . IS
A courteous reply was soon forthcoming from the British 
general. After congratulating O'Reilly on his appointment as 
governor of Louisiana, he proceeded to thank him for his in­
tentions to keep the Indians under control, and promised he 
would see that the Indians under British rule did not attack 
the Spanish. He further promised that he would instruct 
British subjects not to attempt to land any goods in terri­
tory under the domination of the Spanish crown, nor to intro­
duce any goods into New Orleans without permission.^
That certain limited trade was allowed by the British at 
New Orleans is quite clear, and this was evidently what General
^ 0 'Reilly to Arriaga, New Orleans, October 17 , 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-7, ibid., pp. 103-105.
1^0'Reilly to Gage, New Orleans, September 2, 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., 80-1-9, ibid., pp. 95-96.
l^Gage to O'Reilly, New York, November 18, 1769, A.G.I.
S.D., 80-1-9, No. 4, ibid., pp. 107-108.
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Gage referred to when he instructed Englishmen not to intro­
duce goods into New Orleans without permission. Elias Durn­
ford, the British commander in Pensacola, offered further 
evidence of the limited trade permitted by O'Reilly when he 
wrote to the Spanish general thanking him for the good treat­
ment accorded English traders in Louisiana. He was particu­
larly appreciative of the favors shown to a certain Evan 
Jones, a merchant, whom O'Reilly had assisted while he was 
trading in New Orleans. Durnford also thanked O'Reilly for 
the special port set aside for English ships. He added that, 
in reciprocity, a special port had been set aside on English 
territory for Spanish ships. These temporary arrangements 
were doubtless made by O'Reilly to provide for emergency 
goods which the English possessed. The trade regulations
which he later proposed to Grimaldi and Arriaga made no pro-
20visions for any such trade reciprocity.
These temporary measures were used by O'Reilly until 
comprehensive trade regulations could be established for the 
colony. In the meantime, the regulations of 1766 and 1768 
initiated under Ulloa were in effect. However, by October, 
1769, O'Reilly saw the need for a more realistic policy and 
at that time he began to press the crown for action, as had 
Ulloa. O'Reilly pointed out to Julian de Arriaga, Minister 
of the Council of the Indies, that the province of Louisiana
20Durnford to O'Reilly, undated (copy), A.G.I.S.D.,
80-1-9, ibid., pp. 79-80.
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could not survive without commerce. Timber, the most impor­
tant product of Louisiana at that time, was not then needed 
by Spain. Therefore, he recommended that Louisiana be per­
mitted to sell its timber and other products to Cuba. This 
arrangement was considered most feasible, since it would not 
only give Louisiana a market for its products but would also 
provide the Cubans with wood for sugar crates. The material 
from Louisiana for these crates would be cheaper than any 
other wood then available--an arrangement profitable to both 
Louisiana and Cuba. He also recommended that the crown col­
lect the duty on this commodity at Havana. However, no other 
duties were to be charged, and trade between Louisiana and 
Cuba should otherwise be free. Louisiana could provide not 
only wood for Cuba, but also corn, rice, cotton, indigo and 
pelts. Cuba, for its part, would find a ready market for 
its rum in Louisiana. A final recommendation was that only
Spanish ships should be permitted to engage in this trade
21between Cuba and Louisiana.
A communique, containing basically the same plans sug­
gested to Arriaga, was sent to the Marques de Grimaldi that 
same day. O'Reilly reiterated the needs of the colony for 
commerce and again stated that free trade with Cuba would be
210'Reilly to Arriaga, October 17, 1769, A.G.I.S.D., 
80-1-7, ibid., pp. “103-105. Ulloa had also recommended such 
trade with Cuba, but his request was refused. Cf. Ulloa to 
Grimaldi, Havana, November 27, 1765, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2585, 
L.C. pp. 80-90; and Grimaldi to Ulloa, El Pardo, February 22, 
1766, ibid., pp. 93-94.
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22profitable to both colonies, as well as to the crown. To
facilitate the trade and transportation between New Orleans
and Havana, he compiled a list of the better ships' captains
and suggested a schedule and route for ships sailing between
the mouth of the Mississippi River and the port of Havana.
He recommended that the list and schedule be printed and dis-
23tributed among those who would trade with Louisiana.
Grimaldi received the communiques at El Pardo in Janu­
ary of 1770 and soon acted upon them. The Minister of State 
granted O'Reilly permission to observe the proposed trade 
arrangements between Havana and Louisiana. He also approved 
the opening of commerce with a limited number of Spanish 
ports, among them Seville, Cartagena, Malaga, Barcelona, La 
Coruna and Alicante. However, in all of this trade, Spanish 
ships must transport the goods. This concept was in keeping 
with the plans for trade as proposed by O'Reilly. In addi­
tion to this, Grimaldi forbade any direct trade by Louisiana 
with foreign ports or with New Spain. Thus, with the excep­
tion of the Cuban trade and the new ports open to Louisiana 
trade, the decree of March 23, 1768 was, in essence, re-es­
tablished for the Louisiana colonists by the Spanish Minister
99O'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, October 17, 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. pp. 248-256.
■^0'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, October 17, 1769,
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2543, L.C. pp. 343-344.
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24of State.
Further clarification of these orders was spelled out 
to Don Antonio Maria Bucareli, captain general of Cuba, in 
a letter of instructions from O'Reilly in April, 1770. Buca­
reli was ordered to follow the procedures approved by Grimal­
di. He was warned not to admit to Cuba any tobacco produced 
in Louisiana, as it was inferior in quality to that grown in 
Cuba. It is also probable that Louisiana tobacco was not 
sent to Cuba to prevent competition. The colonists of Loui­
siana were to be prohibited from introducing into Cuba any 
goods not produced in Louisiana itself. If anyone were
25found doing this, he would be punished as the law required. 
Here was an example of the theory of mercantilism in its 
most rigid form.
Bucareli received additional instructions from O'Reilly 
shortly afterwards. The duties charged on ships from Louisi­
ana were to be the same as those established and observed in 
Havana in the trade with the mother country. To promote this 
commerce between Louisiana and Havana, Bucareli was directed 
to convince the people of Louisiana of the advantages to be 
derived from this trade. It was O'Reilly's opinion that the
0 /Grimaldi to O'Reilly, El Pardo, January 26, 1770, 
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. pp. 349-352.
^O'Reilly to Bucareli, Havana, April 3, 1770, A.G.I.
P.C., Legajo 174, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, pp. 165-166.
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value of goods sold to Havana by the people of Louisiana 
would be about the same as the value of goods which they
bought in Havana.^6
The extent to which O'Reilly's advice was followed in 
matters of trade is additional evidence of the confidence 
placed in him by the Spanish court. Practically all of his 
suggestions were accepted, and no decree was drawn up dur­
ing this initial period of Spanish rule in Louisiana with­
out O'Reilly's advice. This was as true of commercial mat­
ters as it had been of legal and military affairs. The ex­
tent of the court's reliance upon O'Reilly is further illus­
trated by Julian de Arriaga's refusal to act upon a sugges­
tion of the intendant of Cataluna regarding ships returning 
from Louisiana to Spain. Don Miguel de Muzquiz, the intend­
ant, suggested that Spanish ships departing from Louisiana 
for Spain should first stop at the Windward Islands. The 
money they had gotten from selling goods in Louisiana could 
be used to purchase products at the Windward Islands. Arriaga 
postponed his decision until O'Reilly could return to Spain 
and be consulted as to the necessity for such a procedure. 7̂ 
Arriaga's action in this matter is but added proof that 
O'Reilly obviously had the full confidence of the court and 
the king.
2^0'Reilly to Bucareli, Havana, April 5, 1770, A.G.I. 
S.D., 80-1-9, ibid., p. 167.
^ A r r i a g a  to Muzquiz, El Pardo, March 21, 1770, A.G.I. 
S.D., 80-1-9, ibid., pp. 161-162.
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Most historians who have written on this period of Lou­
isiana's development, even those sympathetic to the Spanish 
regime, like Gayarre, have maintained that the restrictive 
commercial policies set up by O'Reilly were unrealistic, and 
would have been severely damaging to the prosperity of the 
colony had they been strictly e n f o r c e d . ^  Actually, the as­
sertions of these historians are not so much attacks on 
O'Reilly's mercantile policies as they are criticism of the 
entire Spanish mercantile system. To attempt to defend his 
commercial policies would be to try to defend the entire mer­
cantile system of Spain, as opposed to free trade. Neverthe­
less, under the systems existing among all European powers 
at that time, the policies established by O'Reilly for Loui­
siana were technically no more restrictive than those of the 
British or French. They were devised by O'Reilly to promote 
the welfare of both the mother country and the colony. He 
permitted the removal of such restrictive features of mercan­
tilism as he felt were needed to maintain the prosperity of 
the people of Louisiana.
In his study of Louisiana, Gayarre maintains that, in 
general, the mercantile system suggested by O'Reilly and ac­
cepted by the Spanish court "was exceedingly foolish as it 
could benefit neither the colony nor the mother country."^9
^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, IIIt 44-46.
29Ibid.. p. 44.
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It is indeed true that Spain had little use for Louisiana's 
materials. The colony had been developed by the French, and 
naturally its products had been developed to meet the needs 
of France or of her other colonies. Furs, a large item, 
were certainly useless in Spain; Louisiana's tobacco could 
not compare with that of Cuba; nor could its indigo compete 
with that of Guatemala or Caracas. However, there was merit 
in sending Louisiana's timber to Cuba for sugar crates and 
for buildings. Obviously, this would not have solved the en­
tire problem of Louisiana's commerce. But, in justice to the 
Spanish general, it should be judged as a realistic outlet 
for a considerable quantity of Louisiana's .timber. GayarrlT 
considers this as part of O'Reilly's enlightened commercial 
policy.30
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the mercantile sys­
tem simply could not be enforced in Louisiana without wrecking 
the trade of the colonists. Unzaga, for all practical pur­
poses, ignored the regulations, and the British openly traded 
with the colonists. This certainly helped the settlers, but 
it is questionable how advantageous it was to Spain. Regu­
lated trade with foreign nations might have provided the an­
swer. In this way, the mother country could have solved the 
problem of disposing of Louisiana's products and providing 
the colonists with needed manufactures, while collecting a 
tax on foreign trade. The failure of O'Reilly's commercial
3Qlbid., pp. 44-45.
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plans for Louisiana is, therefore, not so much a personal 
failure as it is the failure of an outdated system of trade. 
Lack of ample population was part of the basic problem for 
the Spanish in Louisiana. Actually, the territory became 
profitable only after American possession, with its influx 
of vast numbers of people to the west throughout the nine­
teenth century. 3-*-
Religion was another concern of O'Reilly. In a society 
in which church and state were as intimately united as they 
were in Spanish society, O'Reilly exercised almost complete 
authority over the church. As the direct representative of 
Charles III, he had the authority of the real patronato.
Here, as in other matters, the crown relied upon his advice.
One of ‘the first things O'Reilly did in the religious 
field was to see that the people of the colony and the mili­
tia unit had a sufficient number of priests to minister to 
their needs. In a letter to Antonio Bucareli in November, 
1769, he noted that the Battalion of Louisiana needed a chap­
lain, and he requested that the Bishop of Santiago de Cuba 
send one who could quickly learn French. He further stipu­
lated that the Bishop grant this priest as many spiritual
32faculties as possible.
31Ibid., pp. 624-625.
3^0'Reilly to Bucareli, New Orleans, November 10, 1769,
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 1055, in Kinnaird, Spain in the Mississippi
Valley, p. 106.
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Concerning the religious needs of the civilian population, 
O ’Reilly conferred with Father Dagobert, the pastor of Saint 
Louis Church and Vicar General of Louisiana. Upon Father Da­
gobert 's recommendation, the Spanish governor requested that 
the total number of priests for Louisiana be set at eighteen. 
Six were needed for New Orleans and its environs, and the 
others for the rest of the colony. O'Reilly thought well of 
Father Dagobert, and noted that he was held in high esteem by 
the people of Louisiana.^3
Father Dagobert had been faced with a shortage of priests 
since his appointment as Vicar General of Louisiana in 1765. 
When the Jesuits were expelled from the colony, he, eight 
other French Capuchins, and one secular priest were left to 
care for the colony's religious needs.^ O'Reilly's recogni­
tion that the eighteen priests requested by Father Dagobert 
in 1769 were necessary indicates the governor's realism. His 
ability to get them indicates the complete discretion given 
him by the king in handling all matters in Louisiana. It may 
be further noted that, except for the two priests assigned 
to the posts of St. Louis and St. Genevieve, the remaining 
sixteen were all within the area comprising the present state
33o'Reilly to Grimaldi, New Orleans, February 14, 1770, 
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 1055, ibid., pp. 159-160; O'Reilly to 
Grimaldi, New Orleans, March 1, 1770, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, 
L.C. pp. 261-262.
3 4 - R o g e r  Baudier, A History of the Catholic Church in 
Louisiana (New Orleans, 1939) , pp. 168-169.
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O Cof Louisiana where the population was heaviest.
Education was not neglected under O'Reilly. A royal 
cedula noted the departure for Louisiana of six Capuchin 
priests, who were instructed not only to promote the 
Christian faith, but also to train the people in the 
fundamentals of reading and writing.36 Nor were these 
Capuchins alone in the program. The Ursuline nuns, an 
order which had arrived in Louisiana under Louis XV, had 
for many years conducted an orphanage. In addition, these 
dedicated women cared for the education of both White and 
Negro girls, gave them religious instructions and arranged 
for their baptism at the church of St. Louis in New Orleans. 
The hospital work previously done by the Ursulines had to 
be discontinued, however, since they did not have a suf­
ficient number of young women entering the convent to re­
plenish their ranks.^
The building and care of churches were also directed 
and often provided by the state. Among other things that 
he did in the king's name, O'Reilly granted to the church
35Ibid., p. 180.
3^Cedula of Appointment, San Ildefonso., August 17 , 1772, 
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. pp. 484-485.
3?Baudier, Catholic Church in Louisiana, p. 183; Saint 
Louis Basilica Archives, New Orleans, Baptismal Register.
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of Saint Louis a new bell, valued at 220 livres, and 
additional money needed for sundry i t e m s . 38
Another example of Church-State relations is found in 
the instruction to Athanasius de Mezieres at Natchitoches.
The general ordered that the parish church be repaired. 
Furthermore, he impressed upon the lieutenant governor of 
that town the people's responsibility for caring for the 
church. Each parishioner was expected to contribute his 
share to the upkeep of the building. De Mezieres was given 
the power to compel the people to support the Church, if 
compulsion proved necessary.39 Accordingly, De Mezieres 
and the priest at Natchitoches, Father Stanislaus, a Cap­
uchin, collected a very substantial amount of money from 
the parishioners. With this they erected the first im­
pressive church at the post (the old one was beyond repair), 
and de Mezieres indicated that no compulsion had been 
necessary to get the people's support.^
Shortly before he was ready to depart from Louisiana, 
the inhabitants of the German Coast of Saint John the 
Baptist asked O'Reilly for a grant of land upon which to
3^Saint Louis Basilica Archives, Financial Record, Book 
I, p. 100, item 30, 1769.
3QBolton, Athanase de Mezieres, I, 27-29.
^De Mezieres to Unzaga, Natchitoches, February 1, 1770,
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 110, No. 189, ibid., I, 237-238.
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build a church. After examining their request and consider­
ing it reasonable, the general ordered the construction of 
the church and the appropriation of the land for its site.
The document issued by O'Reilly on this occasion clearly 
indicates the control of the Church by the State, and the 
absolute power of the State over the colonists and their 
lands:
We, Captain General and Governor of the 
Province of Louisiana. In view of represen­
tations made to us by inhabitants of the 
German coast of Saint John the Baptist, and 
upon petition of Senor Michael Pauche in the 
name of said inhabitants, which documents are 
deposited with the government:
We shall take four acres of ground belong­
ing to a party named Dubroc, for the purpose of 
erecting thereon a church; said Dubroc being 
single, without a family, and possessing twelve 
acres of ground; provided, however, that the 
community shall clear the remaining eight acres 
in the same manner as the said four acres taken 
for the church, and further providing that they 
shall give him as many new posts as there are 
old ones on said four acres.
Given at our Cabildo in New Orleans on February 
21, 1770.41
As Dubroc was a bachelor, O'Reilly obviously felt he 
did not need the entire twelve acres. Since a church was 
deemed necessary for the community and Dubroc's land was 
apparently the proper site, it was expropriated. It should 
be further observed, however, that the community had to clear
^Document No. 17, File No. 12816, New Orleans, La. 
(copy certified by Z. Milhet, clerk of court, Saint John 
the Baptist Parish, Louisiana. 1896.), in Louisiana State 
Museum.
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Dubroc's remaining eight acres, and had to give him new 
posts to replace those on the four acres taken for the 
church. Thus, a form of compensation was made by the 
colonial government for the lands taken for the church 
site. But it is clear that O'Reilly had complete dis­
cretion in the disposal of any land for the needs of the 
colony. Whatever form of compensation was given to Dubroc 
was given freely by O'Reilly, not as a right due to Dubroc.
The promotion of the health and general welfare of the 
colony was another obligation resting upon the Spanish 
general. In addition to the proclamation fixing food 
prices in August of 1769, numerous proclamations affecting 
the health, welfare, and morals of the colony were issued 
during his stay in Louisiana. Some of these have already 
been cited by scholars writing the history of Louisiana, 
others have not. The best known proclamation concerned 
the regulations for taverns, coffee houses, boarding houses, 
and billiard tables. Gayarre" noted it and Professor Holmes 
recently edited the entire document. It levied a tax of 
forty dollars per year on the coffee houses, taverns and 
billiard tables, and a charge of twenty dollars per year 
on the boarding houses. This was to be used as revenue for 
the upkeep of the city of New O r l e a n s . ^  it was a reasonable
^ G a y a r r e ,  History of Louisiana, III, 34-35; Jack D. L. 
Holmes (ed.), "O'Reilly's Regulations on Booze, Boarding 
Houses, and Billiards, Louisiana History, Vol. VI (June, 
1965), pp. 293-300.
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and realistic source of revenue for the city government.
Among O'Reilly's earliest proclamations, one dealt 
with unfit meat in the New Orleans market places. The 
royal physician accompanying O'Reilly had noted that 
diseased animals had been put up for sale in New Orleans. 
Because of this, O'Reilly issued an order on August 29, 
appointing Charles Tarascan as inspector of all animals 
that were offered for sale as food in the various market 
places and stores of New Orleans. The decree noted that 
this official, with the assistance of the lieutenant of 
police, was empowered to order all diseased animals re­
moved from the market places and stores. Anyone offering 
these animals for sale was fined, and if the person com­
mitted a second offense, the fine was increased.^
A health proclamation of a broader nature was issued 
by O'Reilly on February 2, 1770, setting the standards to 
be met by doctors, surgeons and pharmacists. The procla­
mation made it clear that surgeons were always subordinate 
to the doctors. Before any surgeon was allowed to practice, 
he had to pass an examination. If the doctors did not 
approve him, he would then have to work under their super­
vision at the Maison de Charite or at the royal hospital
^Proclamation on Health, August 29, 1769, A.G.I.S.D.,
Legajo 2594, Doc. 71, L.C. p. 217.
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for six months. At the end of this period, the surgeon had
to pass the examination or he would not be allowed to 
44practice.
O'Reilly permitted only six surgeons in New Orleans.
In no case was the surgeon permitted to treat internal ill­
nesses in the city, except under a doctor's supervision.
If the former practiced internal medicine in a rural area 
he was required to follow remedies prescribed by doctors. 
Furthermore, a surgeon could treat children and slaves only 
with the permission of the parents or master. A general 
discussion of the medical problems of the area took place 
at a meeting of the doctors and surgeons every Monday.
Surgeons were also warned that if they failed to call 
in a doctor within three days after consultation and the 
patient died, they were culpable. However, the penalty was 
only a fine in this instance, as was the case for any other 
failure to follow instructions. In cases where violence or 
poisoning was suspected, a surgeon was required under penalty 
of fine to call in the police officials.
Remedies were also subject to inspection by the public 
authorities, and would be disposed of if they were not in 
proper condition. According to David L. Cowen, Louisiana
^Proclamation concerning the Practice of Medicine and 
Pharmacy and Surgery, November 12, 1770, A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 
181 •
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was first in pharmacy regulations in the present United 
States.̂ 5
Considering the deplorable state of medical knowledge 
prevailing in eighteenth century Europe and America, O'Reilly's 
regulations in this regard were a necessity. Moreover, this 
proclamation, as most of the others, indicates the high degree 
of supervision prevalent within the Spanish empire. O'Reilly 
brought to the Creoles a degree of regulation which they had
t-not previously^oxperienced.
Many of the problems faced by the Spanish governor had 
to be resolved as quickly as possible. Speed was necessary 
to insure stability for the new government and loyalty to 
the crown. O'Reilly himself had often mentioned this in his 
letters to Arriaga and Grimaldi. In making an assessment 
of his work in the fields of welfare, health, commerce and 
finance, one must consider the general's accomplishments 
from two points of view: first, emergency regulations;
second, policy regulations. From the standpoint of emergency 
actions, it seems just to admire the man for the rapidity 
and sureness of the steps which he took. Matters such as 
money supply, food supply, medical practices and immediate 
religious or social needs were, as noted, promptly and effect-
^ Ibid.; David L. Cowen, "Louisiana, Pioneer in the 
Regulation of Pharmacy," Louisiana Historical Quarterly,
Vol. XXVI, No. 2 (April, 1443), pp. 330-340.
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ively handled. O'Reilly certainly proved that the Spanish 
king had acted wisely when he chose the general for the task 
of setting up an orderly and stable society under Spanish 
rule in Louisiana.
The long range policies of O'Reilly, as has already 
been suggested, were not always of such obvious merit.
Without doubt, the weakest of these long term policies was 
the outdated mercantile trade policy, whose defects have 
already been noted. The fact that it was later ignored by 
Unzaga, and then altered by Galvez, revealed its faults. 
Moreover, O'Reilly's attempt to establish an efficient and 
not too costly bureaucracy for the colony met the fate of 
many such reform measures. For this he is hardly to blame.
On the whole, his administration, nevertheless, was 
excellent. In spite of some of its long term weaknesses, 
the general accomplished his basic mission. He did establish 
effective Spanish rule in Louisiana; and the colonists, 
although remaining essentially French in culture, on the 
whole were loyal to Spain. There can be little doubt that 
he had the ability and personality required for this par­
ticular assignment. When O'Reilly turned the government over 
to Unzaga and departed for Havana, the new governor could 
feel secure and begin his own task of governing an orderly 
colony, already incorporated into the Spanish-American 
empire.
EPILOGUE
Prior to his departure for Havana in March, 1770,
General O'Reilly completed his job of bringing order to 
Louisiana. Among the last things he did before leaving, 
was to order inventories of the medical and military supplies 
on hand in the colony.
A group of local civilians, assisted by Spanish officials 
compiled the report on the medical supplies. Among those who 
took part were M. LeBeau, a doctor, M. Duforest, a merchant, 
and Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Bouligny, O'Reilly's aide 
de camp. and, at that time, also adjutant major of the 
Louisiana Batallion. The supplies at the royal hospital in 
New Orleans were valued at 7,500 livres. In addition, a list 
of all other medical supplies available at the various posts 
of the colony was drawn up and their value estimated.
Finally, the cost to the French king for medicines during 
the period from the cession of the colony to O'Reilly's 
arrival, was also estimated. The total of these two latter 
items was estimated at 8,606 livres, making the overall cost 
16,106 livres. This report was delivered to Governor-elect 
Unzaga in the middle of February, 1770.^
■*■0'Reilly to Unzaga, New Orleans, February 15, 1770,
Doc. 9, Report on Medical Supplies, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 181.
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The report on the military supplies throughout the 
colony was completed soon afterwards by two Spanish officers, 
Juan Kelly and Julian Alvarez. The most important places 
listed in this report included New Orleans, the posts along 
the Missouri, the German Coast, the Acadian Coast, the 
Iberville Coast, and Pointe Coupee. The supplies included 
items ranging from canons to pistols, with ample powder and 
shot for each type of weapon. Most of the military equip­
ment was stored at the capital city.2
By March 1, 1770, all of the governmental papers had 
been transferred to Unzaga by O'Reilly. On that day, the 
general deposited with the cabildo a letter certifying the 
formal transfer of government to Unzaga, and boarded ship 
for Havana. As early as December 1, 1769, Unzaga had been 
appointed military and civil governor of New Orleans and its 
environs, but it was not until March 1, 1770, that he assumed 
full control of the colony.-*
On November 29, 1769, O'Reilly had informed Unzaga 
that pursuant to his instructions from the Minister of the 
Indies, Julian de Arriaga, he would first appoint him governor 
of New Orleans and would then turn over to him the direction 
of affairs for the entire colony once Louisiana had been
20'Reilly to Unzaga, New Orleans, February 24, 1770,
Doc. 12, Report on Military Supplies, ibid.
^Records and Deliberations of the Cabildo. Book I, Part 
II, pp~ 16-17 (9a-9b) , New Orleans, March 1, 1770.
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stabilized. Shortly after this, the general had written to 
Antonio Bucareli, the captain general and governor of Cuba, 
notifying him of Unzaga's appointment and of the subordi-
A-nation of Louisiana to Cuba in civil and military affairs.
When he arrived in Havana, O'Reilly clarified for 
Bucareli the status of Louisiana in its relationship to Cuba. 
The Spanish general informed him that Louisiana was subject 
to the same laws as all the king's colonies in the West 
Indies. Spanish was to be the official language; appeals 
from Louisiana would be sent to a special tribunal to be 
established at Havana for that purpose; appeals from Havana 
were to be sent to the Council of the Indies; and finally, 
all appointments to offices in Louisiana would require the 
approval of the captain general of Cuba. Louisiana was, in 
effect, a dependency of Cuba in both civil and military 
affairs
After terminating his duties on the island of Cuba, 
O'Reilly returned to Spain in June, 1770. He was welcomed 
by the king, receiving from him a gift of 2,000 pesos in 
recognition of a task well performed. He was publically
^O'Reilly to Unzaga, New Orleans, November 29, 1769, 
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2594, L.C. pp. 231-233; O'Reilly to 
Bucareli, New Orleans, December 10, 1769, Dispatches of 
the Spanish Governors. No. 88, p. 23.
^O'Reilly to Bucareli, Havana, April 3, 1770, Dis-
patches of the Spanish Governors, Bk. I, I, No. 95, 32-34.
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honored in the Gaceta de Madrid, which noted that the king had 
commended the general for fulfilling all of the duties assigned 
to him. His work in Louisiana was cited as a special example 
of his accomplishments.^
O'Reilly's record in Louisiana was extraordinary, con­
sidering that he spent but little more than six months there. 
During his brief stay, he had taken possession of the colony, 
tried the rebel leaders, established Spanish law in Louisiana, 
and had incorporated the colony into the Spanish imperial 
system. It had not been without cause that the king compli­
mented him on a "task well-done."
Shortly after his return to Spain, O'Reilly took up his 
former position as military governor of Madrid, while still 
keeping his post as Inspector General of Infantry. In his 
capacity as Inspector General, he established a military 
academy at Avila for the training of officers. He planned 
to model the Spanish army after that of Prussia. Unfortu­
nately, owing to the adverse attitude of the military caste, 
opposed to any change in the system, and to O'Reilly's later 
fall from favor at the court, this institution eventually
°Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros Anos de domxnacion espanola, 
p. 301 (Citing the Gaceta de Madrid of June 18, 1770T"! ~
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fell into disuse.?
Although busy with his new military academy and the many 
tasks incumbent upon him as Inspector General and military 
governor of Madrid,the general was still much involved in 
the affairs of Louisiana. In his role as Inspector General, 
and as the special supervisor of the militia in the Americas, 
he closely scrutinized the functioning of the army in Louisi­
ana. Anyone familiar with the task of an inspector general 
in a modem army will realize the minutiae with which, of 
necessity, O'Reilly concerned himself. Matters of discipline, 
promotion, retirement, deployment of forces, tactics, and 
every possible problem connected with the military were 
constantly brought to his attention.
One problem, typical of those sent to O'Reilly from 
Louisiana for his consideration, concerned the procedure for 
troop retirement. Governor Unzaga was informed by the general, 
in reply to his request for a decision, that the Royal Decree 
of October 4, 1766, concerning retirement, which applied to 
all of the king's troops outside of Louisiana, was also to 
govern retirement in that colony. The Minister of the Indies,
7Ibid., pp. 303-305; Arthur S. Aiton, "Spanish Colonial 
Reorganization and the Family Compact," Hispanic-American 
Historical Review, Vol. XII (August, 1932), p. 278. It is 
also evident that O'Reilly's foreign origin played a part 
in the resistance offered by the Spanish officer corps to 
his reforms. The clashes between the Aragonese party and 
the foreigners who were in favor at court at this time, 
bear this out.
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Don Julian de Arriaga, acting for the king,had given O'Reilly 
to understand that this was the regulation for Louisiana as 
well as for the rest of the empire.^
A similar problem was solved for Unzaga regarding pro­
cedures to be observed in the event of the absence or death 
of military officers in Louisiana. The general notified 
Unzaga that in the event of the absence or death of the 
colonel of the Louisiana Batallion, he was to be replaced by 
the lieutenant colonel; the lieutenant colonel's post would 
then be assumed by the sergeant major of the batallion, and
Qso on down the chain of command.
In the spring of 1773, an interesting incident involving 
military discipline came to O'Reilly's attention. Lieutenant 
Colonel Francisco Bouligny, who also held the position of 
sergeant major in the Louisiana Batallion, had imprisoned 
several deserters for a period greatly in excess of the normal 
legal penalty. Although all of the men were first offenders, 
five had been given six year prison terms, and two had 
received terms of five years. The prescribed penalty of the 
Royal Ordinances, Title Eight, was only four months imprison­
ment, and confiscation of pay for that p e r i o d . A t  the same
^O'Reilly to Unzaga, Madrid, September 24, 1773, A.G.
I.P.C., Legajo 181.
^0*Reilly to Unzaga, Madrid, November 5, 1773, ibid.
■^Colonel Francisco Estacheria to O'Reilly, New Orleans, 
May 18, 1773, A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2661, L.C. pp. 17-21.
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time, O'Reilly received a communique from Governor Unzaga
stating that Bouligny, because of this breach of military
law, had been removed from his command and placed under 
11house arrest. Immediately, the general informed Don Julian 
de Arriaga of the situation. O'Reilly recommended leniency, 
as he felt that Bouligny had acted out of ignorance and not 
out of malice. Moreover, he regarded house arrest as 
adequate punishment, and recommended that Bouligny be 
restored to his command. He noted, however, that the 
lieutenant colonel should be warned to carefully observe 
the king's decrees in the future.^ Arriaga accepted these 
recommendations without alteration. In consequence, he wrote 
to Unzaga to release Bouligny and to restore him to his com­
mand. At the same time, however, the governor was ordered 
to reprimand the lieutenant colonel, and to warn him to ob­
serve all royal decrees with exactness in the future. Unzaga 
notified the Minister of the Indies that he had promptly 
carried out these orders.13
■^Unzaga to O'Reilly, New Orleans, May 20, 1773, ibid., 
pp. 8-9.
1^01 Reilly to Arriaga, Madrid, December 13, 1773, 
ibid., pp. 24-25.
•^Arriaga to Unzaga, Madrid, December 19, 1773, ibid., 
p. 27; Unzaga to Arriaga, New Orleans, May 30, 1774, ibid., 
pp. 28-29.
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One curious aspect of this incident is that it involved 
O'Reilly's former aide de camp. Was his recommendation of 
leniency for Bouligny influenced by personal motives, or by 
a sense of justice? In the absence of any available docu­
ments concerning this, it is impossible to be sure. However, 
when O'Reilly was in Louisiana, he had acted more severely 
when confronted with a similar failure to carry out orders 
of an even less critical nature. His sharp censure of the 
commander of the Post of St. Louis, M. Desmaseilleres, for 
failing to carry adequate supplies, and for distributing gifts 
to the Indians in excess of the allowed amounts, stands out 
in sharp contrast to his leniency toward Bouligny.^ Yet, 
in fairness to the general, it must be noted that complete 
obedience to orders was far more necessary in 1770, when 
Spanish rule in Louisiana was still so new, than in 1773, 
when it had become secure. It is quite possible that a com­
bination of policy and personal motives could be attributed 
to O'Reilly in Bouligny's case. Moreover, Bouligny's house 
arrest certainly served as a harsh humiliation for a Spanish 
officer whose only offense noted by Colonel Estacheria and 
Governor Unzaga was the one under discussion. It may well 
have been an adequate punishment.
An example of a disciplinary decree of a general nature 
involving Louisiana was the one forwarded by O'Reilly to
l^Cf. above, Chapter VII, pp. 201-204.
258
Governor Bernardo de Galvez in 1781. The shortage of soldiers 
in the colony and the distance from Spain seemed to indicate 
to Galvez that some mitigation of the military code was in 
order. However, the Spanish court was not of the same 
opinion. In a letter to the Louisiana governor, General 
O'Reilly noted that despite the distance of the colony from 
the mother country, there could be no departure from the mili­
tary code. Any soldier found guilty of a crime must be 
punished as were Spanish soldiers throughout the empire. 
O'Reilly based his ruling on a decree issued by Don Jose de 
Galvez, Minister of the Indies at that time.^
Problems of a personal nature concerning military per­
sonnel in Louisiana also came to O'Reilly's attention. Not 
long after his return to Spain, he received a request from 
Unzaga for a leave for Carlos de Grandpre, adjutant of the 
Louisiana Batallion. Grandpref wished to absent himself from 
the colony for eighteen months, in order to settle family 
business in France. O'Reilly recommended the granting of 
the leave, but noted that twelve months seamed adequate for
■^0'Reilly to Bernardo de Galvez, Cadiz, December 6, 1781, 
A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 181. Had this decree been issued when Bou­
ligny violated the military code, it is quite possible that 
his punishment would have been more severe.
259
Grandpre^s purposes. When the leave was granted by the 
Minister of the Indies, Julian de Arriaga, it was with 
O'Reilly's recommendation regarding the twelve month limi­
tation.-^ The rather intricate proceedings surrounding the 
authorization of temporary absence from duty is noteworthy. 
Not only did the Inspector General have to concern himself 
with all such matters, but in the cases cited, the Minister 
of the Indies made the final decision. However, as indi­
cated in these instances, O'Reilly's suggestions were in­
variably followed, and it is likely that the approval of 
the Minister of the Indies was generally a mere formality.
Appointment of young men as cadets in the Spanish army 
also required the approval of the Inspector General. Dona 
Petit Coulange, widow of Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Villement 
of the Louisiana Batallion, asked Governor Unzaga to obtain 
permission for her son to attend a military academy in Spain. 
The appointment had to come from the king, but before 
granting the appointment, Charles III had referred the 
petition to the Inspector General for his approval. In the 
certificate of appointment, the king noted: "The Inspector 
General, Count of O'Reilly, has agreed that it is proper to
^Unzaga to O'Reilly, New Orleans. March 1, 1771, 
A.G.I.S.D., Legajo 2661, L.C. p. 59; 0 Reilly to Arriaga, 
Madrid, June 5, 1771, ibid., pp. 61-62; Arriaga to Unzaga, 
Aranjuez, June 20, 1771, ibid.. pp. 63-64.
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grant this favor to some natives (of Louisiana) so that they 
may live with satisfaction and grow to love the (Spanish) 
nation.
These instances involving the Inspector General indicate 
the extensive scope of O'Reilly's jurisdiction. Even after 
he had given up direct command of the militia in Louisiana 
(Which had been vested in him by a special commission), he 
still exercised considerable supervision in that colony in 
his capacity as Inspector General. After 1777, he was 
relieved of his special control over the Louisiana militia, 
but as late as 1783 he continued to exercise a kind of super­
visory power in the military affairs of the colony in virtue
1 ftof his office of Inspector General. °
After 1770, O'Reilly's main interests lay in Spain.
Both in his special capacity in the army\ and as governor of 
Madrid, Andalusia, and Cadiz, successively, he was involved 
both in military and political affairs.
■ ^ D e c r e e  of Charles III, Madrid, September 3, 1774, 
ibid. , p . 191.
180'Reilly to Bernardo de Galvez, Puerto de Santa Maria, 
August 7, 1777 (Document informing Galvez that O'Reilly no 
longer had supervision of the Louisiana militia), A.G.I.S.D., 
Legajo 2534, L.C. p. 126; Document referring to O'Reilly as 
Inspector General, April 10, 1783, A.G.I.P.C., Legajo 181.
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During the general's tenure as military governor of 
Madrid, his name was linked, although vaguely, with a certain 
rationalistic philosopher, Olavide-Samaniego, who was brought 
before the Inquisition. When the philosopher was later 
questioned about his views by officials of that body, it 
became known that O'Reilly had attended some of his lectures 
in Madrid. According to a well known Spanish historian, 
from that day forward the general never again enjoyed the 
complete confidence of Charles III.19
This incident may possibly have hurt O'Reilly's career, 
but there is no doubt that intrigues in which he later 
became involved severely damaged his ascendancy. The general 
was an ally of the Marques de Grimaldi, leader of a clique 
of foreigners in power at court. This group constantly 
struggled to maintain itself against its chief opponents, 
the Aragonese Party, composed of native-born Spaniards, and 
led by the Conde de Floridablanca, who was allied to the Conde 
de Aranda. While O'Reilly was still governor of Madrid, he 
was on relatively good terms with Aranda. In a letter to 
O'Reilly, the Conde de Aranda made the mistake of critizing 
Charles III. For motives that are still unclear, O'Reilly
•*-9Rodriguez-Casado, Primer os a nos de dominacion espanola, 
In light of O'Reilly's continued prominence in both military 
and court affairs, this assertion of Rodriguez-Casado seems 
open to question.
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passed on this information to Charles III. If O'Reilly's 
intent was to lessen the influence of the count, he succeeded, 
at least temporarily. Immediately upon receiving this news 
from the general, the king dismissed Aranda from the court 
and sent him to Versailles as ambassador. After this inci­
dent, according to the Spanish historian, Rodriguez-Casado, 
O'Reilly was viewed as a dangerous political enemy of the 
Aragonese party, and the chief obstacle to their rise to 
power. It is quite possible that if the general had remained 
aloof from political affairs, he might well have survived the 
fall of Grimaldi in 1775. That same year, however, O'Reilly 
was removed from court; but it must be noted that his 
departure was more specifically related to matters other
20than the fall of Grimaldi or those events already mentioned. 
Two other incidents soon followed, the first of which had 
little influence on O'Reilly's career, but the second one 
most certainly enabled the general's opponents to persuade 
Charles III to dismiss him from the court.
The first incident involved a jurisdictional clash with 
the influential Duke D'Ossun. The Guardias Espanolas, an 
elite corps stationed in Madrid, was commanded by the Duke. 
Some of its officers had committed certain crimes, and the 
general wished to have them tried and punished in his courts.
20Ibid., pp 303-304.
He maintained that in spite of Military Article Number 14, 
Title 11, of the Royal Military Ordinances, he, as governor 
of Madrid, had jurisdiction over these men. For his part, 
the Duke claimed that O'Reilly was obliged to release any 
officer of the Guards, whom he arrested, within forty-eight 
hours. The duke contended that the men were subject to him­
self as the colonel of the Guards. To defend his position, 
O'Reilly wrote the Secretary of War, the Conde de Ricla, 
citing the General Orders of the Army, Article 1, Title and 
Tract 6, which gave a governor jurisdiction over all mili­
tary personnel within his province. He ended his plea by
noting that he did not desire to increase his power, but
21wished only to preserve the good order of the service.
The duke also wrote Ricla, referring to the Royal 
Military Orders, Articles 1 and 2, which, he held, gave to 
the colonel of units as the Guards, complete jurisdiction 
over his officers. He conceded that the men were subject 
to the Bandos de Gobierno issued by a governor, but this 
was the limit of the governor's powers.^2
Within a short time, the dispute had been referred by 
Ricla to the king, who gave his decision. Charles III decided
21o'Reilly to the Conde de Ricla, Madrid, January 18, 
1775, A.H.N.P.E., Legajo, 2858, folios 1,2.
22o'Ossun to the Conde de Ricla, Madrid, February 17, 
1775, ibid., folios 2,4.
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that the captain general and governor of Madrid, O'Reilly, 
had jurisdiction over all military personnel within his 
administrative area. But, he also decreed that it was his 
royal intention that in cases involving the officers of the 
Guardias Espanolas and other such units, the colonel of the 
unit be given jurisdiction. The governor could only hold 
these men for forty-eight hours, and then turn them over to 
the colonel. He noted, as D'Ossun had admitted, that the 
only exception was in cases involving the violation of the 
Bandos de Gobiemo which the governor might issue.^
Whether or not this reflected the gradual loss of 
influence by O'Reilly, is open to question. It may merely 
have been the logical settlement of this matter of juris­
diction. However, be that as it may, it is interesting 
from another point of view. The entire episode casts some 
light on O'Reilly's character. As he himself protested, he 
had no personal ambition to increase his powers. Assuming 
this, it leads to another explanation of his actions. He was 
convinced that the regulations gave him jurisdiction, and 
he feared abuses by the colonel of the Guards who might fail 
to punish guilty men, especially when serious crimes were
r\ t
involved. Possibly, O'Reilly believed that strict enforce-
2 2JThe King to Ricla and D'Ossun, Aranjuez, March 31, 
1775, ibid., Legajo 2858, folios 4,5.
2^0'Reilly to Ricla, Madrid, January 18, 1775, ibid.,
Legajo 2858, folios 1,2.
265
ment of regulations was necessary, whatever else might be 
involved. If so, it may have reflected his natural tempera­
ment, or it may have been the result of the type of duties 
imposed on him as Inspector General. His actions indicate 
a certain inflexibility of character and make him more readily 
understood. This inflexibility may explain, at least in part, 
his decision not to grant either pardon or commutation of 
sentences to the rebel leaders who were condemned to death 
in New Orleans.
The second incident, certainly a factor in precipitating 
O'Reilly's political downfall, was his disastrous campaign in 
North Africa in July, 1775. Spain and Morocco had been major 
rivals since the days of the conquest of the Kingdom of 
Granada in 1492. However, a prolonged period of peace be­
tween the two nations seemed likely when, on May 28, 176 7, 
the Sultan of Morocco and Charles III signed a treaty demili­
tarizing their adjacent coastal areas. Unfortunately, it 
was not long before England, Spain's perennial enemy, per­
suaded the Moroccans to renew their attacks on the Spanish.
By 1774, the depredations against Spanish shipping forced 
Charles III to prepare for hostilies against the Sultan. It 
seemed that war might be postponed when the Sultan sent word 
to Charles III that he had ordered his subjects to cease 
their attacks. But, the Dey of Algiers, practically inde­
pendent of the Sultan, refused to cooperate and continued 
to harass Spanish shipping in the Mediterranean. Due to
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these continued forays, the Spanish king had no choice but 
to continue preparations for war.25
When Charles III first considered the appointment of a 
general to lead the forces against the Dey of Algiers, he 
turned to the famous Spanish general, Pedro Ceballos.^
The latter estimated that in order to carry out his mission 
effectively, he would need forty thousand troops. This 
number seemed excessive to the Spanish monarch, who turned 
to O'Reilly for advice. The Irishman convinced the king 
that with a force of only twenty thousand men he could make 
a successful landing at Argel and subdue the Algerians. 
Consequently, O'Reilly was chosen to lead the expeditionary 
force. This was, incidently, the first time that O'Reilly 
had commanded an entire army.^
Preparations for the invasion of Algiers began as soon 
as the king made his choice of a general. The force prepared 
by O'Reilly consisted of twenty thousand troops, three
O C  /•̂JGayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 287; Rodriguez- 
Casado, Primeros anos ae dominacidh~espa~nola, pp. 305-309.
^ G e n e r a l  Pedro Ceballos had led the Spanish forces 
against the Anglo-Portuguese colony which had been erected 
along the border of the Province of La Plata, and had forced 
them to withdraw from their positions. Cf. Isabel Rennie,
A History of Argentina (Chapel Hill, 1937), p. 77.
^Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 287; Rodriguez- 
Casado, Primeros anos de dominacitm espaiiola, pp. 309-316.
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hundred and fifty transport ships, and forty ships-of-the- 
line. He also had ordered a fleet of flat boats to serve as 
landing craft. The armada left Spain on June 23, 1775, and 
landed at the mouth of the Jarache River in Argel on July S. 
Unfortunately, the fleet of flat boats did not arrive on 
schedule. O'Reilly, nevertheless, decided that he had to 
proceed with the campaign. Consequently, he sent ten 
thousand of his men ashore in whatever small vessels were 
available. These troops, under the command of the Marques 
de Romana, were expected to establish a beachhead and await 
the arrival of the remainder of the troops led by O'Reilly. 
However, the Marques was drawn into battle by the Dey's 
forces, and he elected to disregard his instructions and 
pursue the enemy. The Dey's men led Romana's troops into a 
trap and killed four thousand, and among the dead was Romana 
himself. Meanwhile, O'Reilly's forces landed and joined 
battle. Although the general and his troops fought bravely 
(O'Reilly's horse was twice wounded in the battle), he felt 
compelled to withdraw to the safety of the ships. His men 
had become demoralized by their heavy losses, and it seems
that O'Reilly feared a mutiny. Rather than risk a collapse,
28he chose to retreat to Spain.
28 —Antonio Ferrer del Rio, Historia del Reinado de Carlos 
III en Espana (Madjrid, 1856) , Vol> III, pp. 119-121; Rodriguez- 
Casado, Primeros Alnos de dominacion espanola, pp. 309-316; 
Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 287-288.
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Upon his return to Madrid, O'Reilly was the target of 
attacks from his foes within the military and at the court. 
Through the Gaceta de Madrid, the military hierarchy de­
manded his removal from power, since he, the Inspector 
General, had disgraced the army by his failure in Algiers. 
O'Reilly's old political foes joined in the attack, and the 
king was placed under heavy pressure. In partial deference 
to these groups, Charles III sent O'Reilly to the Chafarinas
Islands off the coast of Morocco, ostensibly to secure their
29defenses. The real motive seems to have been to remove 
the general from the court, at least temporarily.^
O'Reilly returned from these islands late in 1775, and 
was transferred from the governorship of Madrid to that of 
Andalusia. He retained his position as Inspector General of 
Infantry, in spite of the opposition from most of the mili­
tary caste. This clearly indicates that he still enjoyed 
considerable influence wi*"h the king.31
29xhese islands, three in number, are in the Mediter­
ranean Sea, off the northeast coast of Morocco. Their names 
are Congreso, Isabel II and Rey. At one time they were a 
haven for pirates.
30Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacion espanola, 
History of Louisiana, II, 288; Ferrer deT Rio, Carlos III,
III, 121-135.
31-Aiton, "Spanish Colonial Reorganization and the Family 
Compact," Hispanic-American Historical Review, pp. 278-279 
(Citing D'Ossun to Vergennes, October 2, 1775, Archivo 
General de Simancas, Papeles de Estado, Legajo 1715, pocket 
578, folios 4-7); Del Rio, Carlos III, III, 135.
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Although he had suffered a serious loss of prestige, 
O'Reilly still remained a factor in court intrigues. In 
1777, he allied himself with the Conde de Rubi and Luis de 
las Casas in an attempt to unseat the Minister of State, the 
Conde de Floridablanca, who as leader of the Aragonese party, 
had unseated his opponent, the Marques de Grimaldi, the 
leader of the foreign party. O'Reilly and his associates 
were unsuccessful and were removed from positions of 
influence at court. De Rubi was sent to Prussia as ambassa­
dor; de las Casas became governor of Oran; and O'Reilly was 
appointed governor of Cadiz. O'Reilly was also deprived of 
his control over the militia in America. His appointment 
to Cadiz marked the virtual end of his influence in state 
affairs.^
The general served as governor of that maritime province 
from 1779 until his retirement from active life in 1786. When 
he left that post, the cabildo of Cadiz presented him with a 
memorial attesting to his seven years of noteworthy service 
to the community. He was praised for improving the finances 
of the city, for promoting public works, and for his concern 
for and promotion of the welfare of the people. O'Reilly 
answered in kind, thanking the cabildo and the citizens for
32Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros anos de dominacion espanola, 
p. 317; Gayarre, History of Louisiana, II, 288.
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their cooperation during his administration and expressing 
his gratitude for their t e s t i m o n i a l .33
In 1788 Charles III died. With his protector no longer 
on the throne, O'Reilly was banished to Galicia where he 
lived in complete retirement on a small pension. It was not 
until the Wars of the French Revolution that he again entered 
public life in Spain. Upon the death of General Carlos 
Richardos-^ in 1794, O'Reilly was recalled to duty. Although 
still out of favor at court, he was recognized as one of 
Spain's most outstanding generals. He set out to take com­
mand of the Army of the East Pyrenees early in 1794. How­
ever, his advanced age was against him, and he contracted a 
fever. On March 23, 1794, at the age of 72, he died at 
Bonette, near Chinchilla (Murcia), before leading his army 
into combat.35
Thus ended the career of one of the most remarkable 
soldiers of fortune of the eighteenth century. He had risen 
from a lowly cadet in the Spanish army to one of the highest 
military positions, and had been elevated to the ranks of the
33Ac tas de Cabildo de Archivo Municipal de Cadiz, Vol. 
CXLII, folios 98-101, 110, cited in Jack D. L. Holmes,
Gayoso: The Life of a Spanish Governor in the Mississippi 
Valley, 1789-99 (Baton Rouge. 1965), p. (T
3^Carlos Richardos was a member of the military caste, 
one-time Inspector General of Cavalry, and, at the time of 
his death, commander of the Army of the East Pyrenees.
35Ant_onio Ballesteros y Berretta, Historia de Espana, V 
(Barcelona, 1948), 389; Gayarre, History of Louisiana. II. 
288-289. --------------------
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nobility with the title of count. In spite of the constant 
friction with the native-born faction in the court, his deeds 
of service to the king won him the permanent good will of 
Charles III. Even his exile to Galicia, upon the death of 
that monarch in 1788, did not remove his name from influence 
among the military, as was evidenced by his recall to active 
duty in 1794.
To judge O'Reilly's place in the history of the Spanish 
Empire is difficult. Few men stand out to such a degree 
that they merit the title of "great". It would seem that 
Alejandro O'Reilly belonged to that category of men, who, 
although they stand far above most in their achievements, 
nevertheless fail to reach the summit. Re was an able mili­
tary man and administrator, who, on occasion, committed 
serious errors. Nevertheless, he was one of the most faith­
ful officials of Charles III. He rose from the ranks, 
through merit, and became Inspector General of the Royal 
Infantry. In that position he excelled. He served as a 
"trouble-shooter" for the king, both in Havana in 1764, and 
in Louisiana from 1769 to 1770. His administration in 
Louisiana demonstrated a high degree of competence. Not 
only did he pacify the province, but he also laid the 
foundation for the able Spanish rule that continued without 
serious interruption until the retrocession of Louisiana to
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France in 1803. The Code 0 1 Reilly was in itself a remarkable 
achievement. Although his name evoked little love among the 
French in Louisiana, he won their respect for the enforce­
ment of law and order.
In the last analysis, Alejandro O'Reilly deserves a 
place alongside such colonial governors as Bernardo de 
Galvez in Louisiana and Antonio Maria Bucareli in Cuba. 
Without him, and other such loyal and energetic officials, 
the implementation of the colonial reforms of Charles III 
would have been impossible.
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